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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with what pervasive risk management is, and how it 
can be achieved in practice.  Specifically, it examines the effect of social processes 
and cultural factors on how risk management can be coordinated across and 
embedded within business processes and organisational culture. 
A growing literature addresses what is termed risk management maturity: the 
capability of an organisation to assess, manage, communicate and govern risk (and 
opportunity).  Notwithstanding its benefits, the emphasis of this literature on risk 
management benchmarking and standardisation has led, arguably, to a 
bureaucratisation of risk management process.   
Research followed a case study strategy and data were gathered through semi-
structured interviews. A total of 43 interviews were conducted in one private and one 
public sector organisation. 
The findings describe a number of social processes and related cultural factors 
that significantly affected risk management pervasiveness in the two organisations. (1) 
Shared experience and respect for experience facilitated flexible coordination between 
operational and strategic risk management. (2) Informal, lateral communication 
integrated the knowledge of diverse stakeholders required to manage complex 
environmental risks. (3) Lack of common understanding of the purpose and function 
of risk management undermined coordination of risk management practice.  
These findings progress the debate on the balance between standardisation and 
informal social process to achieve pervasive risk management, and contribute to a 
richer description of organisational risk management maturity.  The findings are of 
value to risk managers wishing to embed the adaptive and coordinated risk 
management required in dynamic and complex environments. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Context and background 
 
Risk analysis is a field that contains specialised terminology and a large number of 
constructs. Definitions are contested and terms are often used interchangeably, it is 
therefore essential to explain how these terms are to be used in this thesis and to 
position this research within the field. Risk analysis can be categorised as; risk 
assessment and risk management (Short 1984). Risk assessment focuses on providing 
scientific data to inform risk-based decisions (Younger et al. 2005; Robinson & Levy 
2011). Risk management concerns risk-based decisions and the actions taken to 
control risk. In turn risk management can be further defined as risk communication, 
risk-based decisions making and risk governance. Risk communication concerns how 
risk is constructed and perceived (Fischhoff 1995; Slovic et al. 2005); Risk-based 
decision making involves decision analysis and modelling (Amendola 2002; Tversky 
& Kahneman 1992) and risk governance describes the organisational processes 
involved in managing risk (Renn & Walker 2008; Renn 2005). This thesis is set 
within the field of risk governance.  
 
The term governance refers the multitude of actors and processes that lead to 
collective binding decisions and actions in organisations. Governance is underpinned 
by the allocation of decision rights bureaucracy (Grandori 1997), market mechanisms 
(Grandori 1997) communities of practice (Brown and Duguid 1991), knowledge 
transfer (Carlile 2004), trust (Bradach & Eccles 1989), identities (Ouchi 1980) and 
networks (Thompson, Francis & Mitchel 1991). Risk Governance refers to these 
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processes of organized decision making and actions in relation to risk (Boholm, 
Corvellec & Karlsson 2013). 
 
While risk and attempts to reduce risk are not new (Cummins et al. 1998), there has 
been a dramatic rise in explicit and systematic risk management since the 1990s 
(Gephart et al. 2009; Power 2004). This has in part been a response to conspicuous 
organisational failures to manage risk, such as Chernobyl and the Columbia incident 
(Pidgeon 1991; Gheman, Jr 2003). Risk based systems of governance have been 
implemented in a wide range of business organisations and government departments 
(Gephart et al. 2009; Power 2004a). In parallel with the increase in formal risk 
management, the remit of risk management has moved from a focus so called 
‘primary risks’, such as the impact of flooding or public exposure to toxins, to include 
‘secondary risks’ that are created by the risk management entity itself, such as 
reputational risk (Power et al. 2009).  
 
Risk analysis, the science of risk management, which has both informed and driven 
this trend, concerns how organisations identify, assess and mitigate factors which pose 
a risk to achieving their objectives. In recent decades the science of risk analysis has 
expanded beyond a predominantly technical discipline focused on the identification 
and assessment of risk to a broader, and arguably less defined, concept of risk-based 
organisational governance (Arena et al. 2010). In particular, the concepts of enterprise 
risk management (Kimbrough & Componation 2009) and risk management maturity 
(Strutt et al. 2006) constitute a shift towards increased focus on internal control and 
other organisational attributes that affect risk management capability. Risk 
governance is critical because the actions and decisions of people in organisations 
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determine how risk is managed (Pidgeon & Leary 2000). Thus, understanding of the 
people and organisational context is essential to a sustained ability to manage risk. 
 
Risk maturity and enterprise risk management are two prominent organisational risk 
governance paradigms. Risk maturity concerns describing the business processes 
involved in managing risk and delineated them by their relative maturity in ‘risk 
maturity models’ (RMMs) (MacGillivray et al. 2007). RMMs typically focus on the 
organisational processes related to managing a single risk area, such as operational 
safety, and are often used for benchmarking organisational risk management 
capability (Strutt et al. 2006). Enterprise risk management (ERM) is a management 
system developed in response to prominent failures of organisational internal control, 
for example Barings Bank, Polly Peck and Enron (Beck 2009; Burnaby & Hass 2009). 
These events lead to increased regulatory requirement for internal control, such as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002 in the USA and the Turnbull Report in the UK (ICAEW 
1999; SOX 2002). To meet those requirements the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organisations (COSO) developed the Enterprise Risk Management Framework  
(COSO 2004). Since then a number of other ERM frameworks have been developed 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 2004; Deloitte 2006). ERM management systems have 
subsequently incorporated into the credit rating process (Standard & Poor 2007) and 
implemented in a wide range of private organisations (Kimbrough & Componation 
2009). More recently ERM has influenced public sector risk management (Power 
2004), including in Canada, Australia, the USA (Province of British Columbia 2012; 
AON 2011; Power 2008; Victorian Auditor-General’s Office 2007) and the UK (OGC 
2007; OGC & HM Treasury 2003; HM Treasury 2009; HM Treasury 2004). ERM 
differs from previous risk governance models in its emphasis on internal control 
 17 
(Power 2008); secondary risks (such as reputational risk) (Power et al. 2009); and its 
aim to embed risk in all decisions with an organisation, from strategic to operational 
(COSO 2004).  
 
Both RMMs and ERM are underpinned by the concept of risk management 
pervasiveness. Pervasive risk management is defined as risk management practices 
that are coordinated and consistent across an organisation. Pervasive risk management 
is required by RMMs and ERM on the basis that it is necessary to manage risks that 
span functional and hierarchal divisions and to achieve controlled and repeatable risk 
management practice throughout an organisation (MacGillivray et al. 2007; Paulk et 
al. 1993; COSO 2004; IRGC 2009). In this thesis I explore why, despite having 
formal processes in place, many organisations are finding it difficult to achieve 
pervasive risk management. 
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1.2. Problem statement  
 
Many organisations, in both the public and private sectors, have implemented risk 
management systems. However, many organisations still find it difficult to achieve 
pervasive risk management. This inability to achieve pervasive risk management is 
widely reported by risk managers as a key factor contributing to shortfalls between 
executive ambition and actual risk management performance (Economist Intelligence 
Unit 2009; AON 2007).  
 
1.3. Aims and Objectives 
 
The research question which this thesis addresses is: 
 
“What factors affect risk management pervasiveness in organisations?” 
 
This thesis focuses on the factors influencing the embedding and coordination of risk 
management within organisations: with a focus on the cultural and organisational 
factors. The core aim is to contribute to an explanation for risk management 
pervasiveness. 
 
The key research objectives are to: 
 
1. Synthesise available literature and conduct a critical literature review to define 
pervasiveness and identifying the best explanation for risk management 
pervasiveness given current evidence. 
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2. Conduct two case studies investigating the cultural and organisational factors 
which influence risk management pervasiveness. 
3. Carry out a cross case analysis of the results developed from the case studies 
in order to identify any cross cutting factors.  
4. Evaluate existing evidence and theory in light of the results of the cross case 
analysis.   
5. Help to explain risk management pervasiveness, based on the evidence 
gathered, generating novel insight to inform risk management practice and 
external theory. 
1.3.1. Use of the term ‘pervasive’ 
 
I recognise that use of the term pervasive in this Thesis is somewhat idiosyncratic. 
Common usage of pervasive refers to the extending throughout, or being in every part 
of (see dictionary definitions below). We use the term pervasive to mean coordinated 
and consistent across an organisation. However, it is the sense of risk management 
practices and processes extending throughout the entire organisation we want to 
emphasise, hence use of the term pervasive.  
Oxford dictionary - to pervade  (pervadere per+vadere go, walk): 
1. verb. pass or flow through; traverse (now rare) 
2. verb. extend throughout; spread through or into every part of; permeate, 
saturate. 
3. verb become diffused (now rare) 
pervasive : (capable of ) pervading 
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1.4. Thesis structure 
 
Here the contents of each chapter are summarised and placed in the overall research 
process (Figure 1.1). 
 
Chapter 2: Presents a review of the relevant literature. Current work on risk 
governance, risk culture and risk management maturity are described and critiqued 
(Figure 1.1). The concept of risk management pervasiveness, its definition and 
importance, in the current literature are explored. The literature review identifies a 
gap in current work regarding how organisations achieve pervasive risk management. 
This is used to formulate the research question (Figure 1.1). 
 
Chapter 3: Describes the methodology and method used. This research followed a 
qualitative, abductive methodology. Data gathering was inductive and exploratory, 
allowing qualitative themes to emerge from the data. The research comprised two case 
studies, each carried out in a different organisation. In each case study risk 
management practice and factors affecting that practice were explored using semi-
structured interviews. Subsequent data analysis retroductively applied current theories 
to develop a possible explanation for the emergent results (Figure 1.1).  
 
Chapter 4: Presents the data gathered by the research (Figure 1.1). The emergent 
themes are described and presented in tables giving examples the underlying data and 
number of interview transcripts containing each theme. A number of social processes 
and cultural factors that affected the risk management practice of the participants 
interviewed are identified from the data. 
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Chapter 5: Discusses the research findings with reference to relevant academic 
literature (Figure 1.1). Each case study is analysed independently to identify the key 
social processes and cultural factors affecting risk management practice. Then, 
through a cross case analysis the common themes; of coordination, dialogue, 
deference to expertise and shared mental models are identified. A conceptual model 
describing and explaining the findings is developed.  
 
6. Conclusion and summary: Describes and summarises the core findings of this 
thesis (Figure 1.1). The novel insights are highlighted and practical implications for 
risk management practitioners offered.  
 
7. Critical review of research: The strengths and weakness of this research are 
evaluated and suggestions for further research to develop the subject are outlined. 
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Figure 1.1.: Overview of research process and thesis structure.Figure 1.1.: Overview of research 
process and thesis structure. The research process followed abductive logic, whereby data gathering 
was inductive to allow data to be developed with minimal theoretical bias but interpretation of that 
data drew on existing theory to develop the research findings and identify their contribution to the 
wider theoretical understanding of risk management pervasiveness.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theory 
(Chapter 2) 
Data  
(Chapter 4) 
Research question 
(chapter 1) and method 
(chapter 3) 
Findings (chapter 6) 
Relevant theory explored in 
literature review (chapter 2). 
Literature review informs research 
question (chapter 1) and research 
method (chapter 3). 
Grounded data collection and 
analysis allows qualitative 
themes to emerge (chapter 3). 
Data were interpreted with 
reference to existing theory to 
develop explanations for the 
empirical observations (chapter 
5). 
Findings contribute to existing 
theory and inform risk 
management practice (chapter 
6). 
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1.5. Contribution 
 
The novelty and contribution to science of this thesis are discussed in chapter 6. Here 
the contribution is summarised: 
 
 The research provides a close description of the heterogeneity and 
disjointed nature of risk management practice within the two case studies. 
This provides empirical of the importance of coordination to achieve pervasive 
risk management. 
 The research identified a number of social processes and associated cultural 
factors that affected the ability of the two organisations studied to achieve 
consistent and coordinated risk management practices. The method of 
coordination is identified as coordination through mutual adjustment. The 
findings expand understanding of the role of one of the social processes, 
deference to expertise, from allocation of decision rights to also include 
coordination. These findings contribute to the debate on the balance between 
standardisation and social process to achieve pervasive risk management. 
 The research identifies and develops a possible mechanism by which the 
social processes identified facilitated coordination: the integration of 
distributed knowledge, including experiential and tacit knowledge.  
 The research identifies a relationship between coordination through 
mutual adjustment and organisational ability to adapt to a dynamic and 
unpredictable risk environment. This expands understanding of the 
organisational attributes required for maturity levels four and five (Strutt et al. 
2006) and, together with the social processes and cultural factors identified, 
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contributes to a richer description of organisational risk management 
maturity.   
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1.6. Motivation 
 
Here the research presented in this thesis is outlined in order to establish how it is 
intended to be judged. This research followed a qualitative case study approach (Yin 
2008) as will be described in more detail in Chapter 3. As such the work falls into the 
interpretive social sciences that aim to describe social behaviour and the processes 
which shape it, based on the richness and depth of data obtained through interviewing 
people (Locke 2001). This research aimed to explore the subject of interest, risk 
management pervasiveness, and thus contribute to an explanation of how 
organisations can achieve pervasive risk management. This type of research does not 
develop a hypothesis in advance of data gathering as the emphasis is on developing 
findings from the data with minimal theoretical or researcher bias. Further, the 
outcome of this research is not intended to be statistically generalisable findings; 
rather the aim is to develop in-depth insight into risk management pervasiveness that 
contributes to understanding of that subject. Thus, the aim is for analytical 
generalisation, where the findings of this research are used in further studies to 
develop understanding of the subject– a theory building approach (chapter 3).  
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2. Literature review 
 
a
 A modified version of this literature review was published in Int. J. Business 
Continuity and Risk Management, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2011 305. Copyright © 2011 
Inderscience Enterprises Ltd. 
 
In this literature review I address the question: ‘does existing theory of risk 
governance explain why, despite tools and processes being in place, there is still a 
perceived shortfall in risk management outcomes?’ To address this issue, I review the 
underlying assumptions of risk governance, focusing on the concept of risk 
management maturity which attempts to explain organisational risk management 
capability. I reveal significant inconsistencies in the way the organisational culture 
has been conceptualised and illuminate assumptions that are rarely acknowledged and 
cause confusion in the way risk management maturity models are understood and 
utilised. I identify two basic types of risk maturity model: type one, focused on 
coordinating risk behaviour across the whole organisation through standardised 
processes and outputs; and type two, focused on deeply embedding risk management 
into the culture of the organisation. I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of both 
models before reconceptualising risk management maturity by amalgamating both 
perspectives. Type one maturity models address the issue of coordination but rarely 
incorporate organisational culture, despite evidence of its importance. In contrast, type 
two maturity models incorporate organisational culture but do so in an unsystematic 
manner and do not adequately define organisational culture or explain its relationship 
with risk maturity. I propose a new conception of organisational risk management 
maturity that takes into consideration both the extent to which risk behaviour is 
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coordinated across the whole organisation and the depth to which risk management is 
embedded in its’ culture. I define risk management that is coordinated and embedded 
in an organisation to be ‘pervasive’.   
 
 
2.1. Organisational risk governance 
 
Organisational governance, decision-making and behaviour are increasingly being 
driven by risk and risk management practices (Pollard et al. 2002; Power 2004). Risk 
is commonly defined as the function of the probability of consequence multiplied by 
its relative magnitude (Hulett & Hillson 2002; Klinke & Renn 2002). In the last few 
decades, the scope of risk management in organisations has widened considerably 
through advances in the technical ability to estimate probabilities and impacts 
(Jonkman 2003; Aven & Steen 2010), the codification of risk-based decision making 
and management processes (IRGC 2005; Herath & Wijiyanayake 2010) and the 
identification of the organisational processes involved in risk management 
(MacGillivray et al. 2007; Strutt et al. 2006). Risk-based decision making has been 
championed as an effective and equitable way to utilise limited resources to manage 
risk for public and private organisations (Pollard et al. 2002; Kimbrough & 
Componation 2009; Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit 2002). The related field of safety 
science has had a significant influence on risk management by revealing the 
conditions that give rise to organisational failure and its avoidance (Hopkins 2002; 
Cooper 2000; Pidgeon 1991; Pidgeon & O’leary 2000), including organisational and 
systemic factors (Reason 2000; van Vuuren 2000; Sorensen 2002). The concept of 
‘safety climate’, the individual and shared attitudes towards safety (Flin et al. 2000; 
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Mearns & Flin 1999), and ‘safety culture’, the shared systems of meaning (Cox & 
Flin 1998; Guldenmund 2000; Choudry et al. 2007), have highlighted the importance 
organisational culture to preventative risk management. A number of studies have 
demonstrated relationships between measures of safety climate, organisational culture 
and safety performance (Shannon 1997; Hoff et al. 2004). Organisational culture also 
features strongly in theories explaining organisational failure and failure avoidance 
including normal accident theory (NAT) and high reliability theory (HRT) (Perrow 
1999; Roberts & Rousseau 1989), which have had a significant influence on safety 
and risk management science (Reason 2000; Tamuz & Harrison 2006; Van Den Eede 
et al. 2006). As such, I draw on these related literatures throughout this paper. 
However, whilst there are many commonalities with risk management, the literature 
on safety science and high reliability organisations tends to focus on optimising 
organisational safety performance (Sorensen 2002; Hopkins 2007). In contrast, the 
science of risk management science is concerned with identifying and assessing all 
potential risks including reputational, financial and regulatory risks. Therefore, it is 
important to acknowledge that risk-based decisions often have to achieve a balance of 
risk against gains and losses in the context of multiple, potentially conflicting, 
objectives and values (Leveson et al. 2009). Despite the development and 
implementation of risk management tools and processes, risk management failures are 
common and many organisations are still perceived to be underperforming in terms of 
risk management (FERMA 2008; IRGC 2009). For example, in the banking crisis, 
originating in 2007, although similar risk management tools and technologies were 
adopted across the industry, some banks proved more vulnerable to risk than others 
(Strebel & Lu 2010; Valencia 2010). The International Risk Governance Council 
(IRGC) report on risk management categorised risk management shortcomings into 
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two categories (IRGC 2009). The first, concerned understanding and assessing risk, 
the second, concerned the ability of organisations to implement risk management 
tools and processes to achieve desired outcomes (IRGC, 2009). It is on this second 
category that this review will focus.  
 
The IRGC (2009) attributed shortcomings in the implementation of risk management 
tools and processes to a lack of leadership commitment, and failure of coordination 
due to a lack of resources, skills, capabilities and a ‘suitable’ organisational culture 
(IRGC, 2009). Deficient organisational culture (Economist Intelligence Unit 2009b; 
IRGC 2009) and flawed corporate leadership (Strebel & Lu 2010; Valencia 2010) are 
common explanations of poor risk management in this literature. The field of risk 
maturity directly addresses the issues of organisational capability to effect risk 
management tools and processes and has developed a number of risk maturity models 
(RMMs) that describe the factors, conditions and mechanisms that determine an 
organisation’s ability to achieve risk management goals (Hillson 1997; Strutt et al. 
2006; MacGillivray et al. 2007). The underlying concept and structure of RMMs have 
their root in the capability maturity model (CMM), developed by the Software 
Engineering Institute in the 1990s (Paulk et al. 1993). As originally conceived, the 
tool attempts to measure an organisation’s capability to effect a business process by 
evaluating attributes for each of five successive levels of capability, the so-called 
‘maturity levels’ (Figure 2.1.). Since the original CMM, later renamed the ‘Software 
CMM’, a number of incarnations have been developed to assess organisational 
maturity in different organisational functions, including risk management (Hillson 
1997; Mutafelija & Stromberg 2003; MacGillivray et al. 2007). RMMs vary in 
content, but generally contain descriptions of the organisational attributes required to 
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achieve maturity. These often include organisational structure, strategy, business 
processes, and culture. RMMs are proposed as a way for managers to improve risk 
management processes, benchmark performance and demonstrate their capability to 
third parties, including regulators (Strutt et al. 2006). RMMs also share many features 
with enterprise risk management (ERM), a framework that encompasses the entire 
management structure, rejecting the notion of risk management as an isolated 
specialism (Aabo et al. 2005; Kimbrough & Componation 2009). ERM principles are 
embodied in a number of management standards (Deloitte 2006; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 2004) and have been implemented by many 
organisations (AON 2007) and government departments (Prime Minister’s Strategy 
Unit 2002). 
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Figure 2.1: Current model of risk maturityFigure 2.1.: Current model of risk maturity 
Figure one represents an existing risk maturity model, showing its focus on defined 
processes and coordinating risk behaviour.  
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2.2. Risk management pervasiveness and organisational maturity 
 
The literatures on RMMs and ERMs tend express the assumption that ‘good’ risk 
management and high maturity requires risk management to be pervasive in an 
organisation. I argue that risk management is pervasive when it is coordinated and 
consistent across an organisation. Descriptions of ‘good’ risk management in the 
ERM and RMM literature typically include a centrally-defined and uniformly applied 
risk management policy, process and ‘appetite’; the integration of risk management 
functions with wider organisational functions; and a common approach to risk 
management throughout an organisation (Hillson 1997; Duodu et al. 2003; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 2004; Deloitte 2006; Strutt et al. 2006; MacGillivray et 
al. 2007; Economist Intelligence Unit 2007; HM Treasury 2009).  
 
However, achieving pervasive risk management is clearly a challenge for many 
organisations, (Economist Intelligence Unit 2009; FERMA 2008; AON 2007), 
 
“With a strong culture and awareness of risk cited as being the most important factor 
in determining the success of risk management, close integration between risk and 
other functions in the organisation is clearly important. At present, however, progress 
on embedding risk in other parts of the business appears to be patchy. This finding 
supports the earlier conclusion that, although risk management has become 
established in mainstream business practice, instilling a culture of risk at every level 
of the organisation remains a central challenge.” (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007) 
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The Economist Intelligence Unit (2009) survey of 364 risk managers found that their 
confidence in others organisational subgroups’ understanding of risk and efficacy of 
communication with risk managers varied considerably. Confidence was much higher 
among non-executive directors, executive management and finance than other 
organisational groups, particularly business units. The Economist Intelligence Unit 
(2009) survey also found only 28% of risk managers agreed that their organisation 
was effective at ‘instilling an awareness of risk throughout the organisation’. A survey 
of 555 European risk managers reported that the influence of risk management on 
decision making differed according to the type of decision being made: strategic 
decision making being most influenced by risk management (FERMA, 2008). A 
survey of 103 senior managers responsible for risk found that only 10% of 
organisations described their ERM programme as embedded across their organisation 
(AON, 2007). The same survey found that understanding and support for ERM 
objectives was high with senior managers, lower with middle management and lowest 
with employees (AON, 2007). These surveys offer little explanation as to why desired 
risk behaviour was not pervasive in these organisations except for general references 
to the lack of a ‘strong risk culture’ (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009). This review 
reveals two aspects of pervasive risk management. The first characteristic of 
pervasiveness is the extent to which an organisation is able to influence risk behaviour 
of individuals and thus, coordinate risk behaviour across the organisation. The second 
facet of pervasiveness is an organisation’s ability to deeply embed a common set of 
values, norms and assumptions regarding risk management into to culture of the 
organisation. I explore these two concepts of risk management pervasiveness in more 
detail. 
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2.3. Risk maturity models: risk coordination focus b 
 
b
 For a more general review of coordination theory see Appendix A. 
 
Type one RMMs are most similar to the original CMM, do not explicitly include 
organisational culture and focus on the coordination and control of risk behaviour 
(MacGillivray et al. 2007; MacGillivray & Pollard 2008; Strutt et al. 2006) (Figure 
2.1.). The concept of pervasive risk management and its relation to risk maturity 
found in type one RMMs stems from the CMM. In the CMM, mature organisations 
have business processes which are explicitly defined, documented and enacted 
uniformly across the whole organisation. Furthermore, lessons learned by individuals 
and subgroups are disseminated across the whole organisation, keeping changes in 
behaviour coordinated (Paulk et al. 1993). Like the CMM, group one RMMs propose 
centralised control through formal rules and codified procedures as the means to 
coordinate behaviour across an organisation, repeat good process outcomes and avoid 
negative outcomes through preventative measures (Paulk et al. 1993; Strutt et al. 
2006; MacGillivray et al. 2007). Although group one RMMs require that the most risk 
mature organisations are capable of ‘double loop learning’ (Agyris & Schon 1978), 
whereby the organisation can question and change the fundamental basis of their risk 
management, this requirement is confined to the top maturity level (Figure 2.1.). 
Group one RMMs set out the ‘tasks and activities’ of risk management in detail, 
focusing on the tangible actions that lead to desired risk management outcomes (Strutt 
et al. 2006; MacGillivray et al. 2007). These codified processes are expected to be 
expressed in the risk behaviour of individuals. In order that this is achieved, type one 
RMMs require that management directly controls risk by acting on quantitative 
feedback (Strutt et al. 2006; MacGillivray et al. 2007). Thus, coordination is proposed 
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to be achieved by standardisation of processes and outcomes, and direct supervision 
(Mintzberg 1979). Such coordination of behaviour through standardisation of process 
and outcome is arguably problematic when viewed in the context of wider 
understanding of how organisations manage risk and the factors influencing risk 
behaviour. For example, a significant body of literature contends that organisations 
should utilise less rigid modes of coordination in order to achieve better performance 
in dynamic and uncertain environments (Klinke & Renn 2002; Kelly 2009), or when 
coordinating multiple communities of practice, each with distinct knowledge and 
perception of risk (Faraj & Xiao 2006). In these situations, the maintenance of normal 
organisational function is partly dependent on the flexible and emergent behaviour of 
individuals (Hannan & Freeman 1984; Weick et al. 1999; Bigley & Roberts 2001). 
Coordination in such situations involves mutual adjustment between the individuals 
involved (Mintzberg 1979) and cannot rely solely on standardised processes and 
outcomes (Weick 2005). Such complex coordination must be based on the 
development of a shared set of norms and values (Mintzberg 1979; Faraj & Xiao 
2006). The literature suggests that coordination through common norms and values 
does not replace standardised processes and outcomes but provides an additional 
degree of complexity and flexibility to risk management (Faraj & Xiao 2006; Bigley 
& Roberts 2001). Recognition of the role of norms and values is reflected in the 
importance attributed to risk culture. Organisational culture is widely held as a 
critical, if not the most critical factor, affecting risk management maturity (Kelly 
2009) in much of the literature on RMMs (Duodu et al. 2003; HM Treasury 2009); 
enterprise risk management (Kimbrough & Componation 2009; Taylor 2007; AON 
2007); by credit rating agencies (Standard & Poor 2007); by management consulting 
firms (PriceWaterHouseCoopers 2009) and among risk management practitioners 
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(Economist Intelligence Unit 2007; Economist Intelligence Unit 2009). The 
recognition of importance of organisational culture may have influenced the trend 
away from centralised and process orientated, to decentralised and outcome orientated 
risk management (Kelly 2009), however, this has not been incorporated into type one 
RMMs. 
 
2.4. Risk maturity models: organisational cultural depth focus 
 
Type two RMMs (Hillson 1997; Duodu et al. 2003; OGC 2007; HM Treasury 2009) 
explicitly include organisational culture, emphasising the pervasiveness of cultural 
elements such as shared attitudes or understandings towards risk. Type two RMMs 
pay greater recognition to the role of organisational structures, artefacts and practices 
beyond those of codified rules and procedures in determining organisational risk 
maturity. In this way, group two RMMs reflect the trend towards a greater emphasis 
on organisational culture and a move away from process orientated, expert risk 
management (Kelly 2009). In type two RMMs pervasiveness is defined as a common 
set of cultural factors embedded throughout an organisation (Deloitte 2006; 
Economist Intelligence Unit 2007; IRGC 2009). This assumption is apparent in the 
attributes used to describe ‘good’ risk culture such as: ‘a common risk appetite’, 
‘common attitude towards risk management’, ‘common risk awareness’, and 
‘common risk understanding’ (see Table 2.1.). Note that the definitions of risk culture 
in Table 2.1. are taken from ‘grey literature’ (government and industry surveys and 
reports) rather than peer reviewed papers. This reflects the purpose of this literature 
review and research project which is to examine and analyse risk management 
practice. That is, how risk management is enacted and understood by practitioners. 
 37 
This is distinct from the theory of risk and risk management drawn from peer 
reviewed papers which I use to inform the research methodology and analyse of the 
risk management practice observed. The industry and government surveys and reports 
used to populate table 2.1. were selected from reputable organisation that are highly 
influential among risk management practitioners and therefore likely to be 
representative of risk management practice more widely. In particular, three large 
surveys of risk management practitioners (AON 2007; Economist Intelligence Unit 
2009) were included. 
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Table 2.1.: Attributes used to describe or characterise a ‘good’ risk culture in 
practice. Attributes used in this table were only those used directly to describe risk 
culture (stars indicate that the source uses the corresponding attribute). The original 
wording of the indicators has been modified to compile this table but the original 
meaning has been maintained. This table indicates the diversity of indicators used to 
describe ‘good’ risk culture and the inconsistency in their use.  
 
Attribute Source 
Risk maturity 
models 
Enterprise risk management Other 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
A challenge culture X              
“No blame” culture X              
Clear and effective risk 
communication 
X  X   X  X    X X  
Common attitude towards 
risk management 
  X  X          
Common or pervasive 
risk appetite 
        X  X  X X 
Common risk awareness   X       X  X  X 
Common risk 
understanding 
    X    X X X X   
A defined risk appetite  X     X     X   
Degree to which risk 
management structure is 
defined 
 X      X       
Extent to which risk 
management is embedded 
in business functions 
X      X X    X   
Facilitates integrating risk 
management functions 
     X         
Homogeneous and 
pervasive risk culture 
       X      X 
Innovation in response to 
risk 
X              
Risk management linked 
to performance measures 
X   X    X       
Senior management have 
positive attitude towards 
risk management 
  X X    X       
Strong ethical values         X X     
Strong leadership on risk      X      X   
Strong position of risk 
management in 
organisational structure 
      X        
Transparency of risk 
management processes 
      X     X   
 
Sources: (1) HM Treasury (2009), (2) Office of Government Commerce (2007), (3) 
Doudu et al. (2003), (4) Hillson (1997), (5) AON (2007), (6) Funston et al. 
(2007), (7) Standard and Poor (2007), (8) Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (2006), (9) 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004), (10) Reynolds (2003), (11) 
PricewaterhouseCoopers risk culture survey (2009), (12) Economist Intelligence 
Unit (2009) (13) IRGC (2009), (14) Economist Intelligence Unit (2007). 
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The features, attributes or characteristics used to describe risk culture in the risk 
management literature (Table 2.1.) have often been transferred from the literature on 
safety culture (Flin et al. 2000; Guldenmund 2000). Research that associates safety 
culture and performance highlights the importance of a range of cultural factors 
including: communication, learning, management commitment, common values, 
blame culture and leadership commitment (Sorensen 2002; Clarke 1999; Arboleda et 
al. 2003; Mearns et al. 1998; Elmiyeh et al. 2004; Waring 2005; Vredenburgh 2002; 
Flin et al. 2000). However, the risk management literature does not define the 
attributes of risk culture in sufficient detail, applies them inconsistently and contains 
diverse assumptions about what organisational culture actually is. The attributes used 
to describe risk culture variously focus on aspects of organisational structure, 
behaviour, attitudes, and values (Table 2.1.). Most type two RMMs follow the basic 
structure of the CMM and type one RMMS, simply ‘adding on’ risk culture attributes. 
Because the underlying concept of risk maturity is not modified to incorporate risk 
culture, these new attributes are more akin to a collection of unrelated features that 
must be accumulated to achieve risk maturity, rather than being generated by an 
underlying theory of risk maturity. In the remainder of this review, I propose a model 
of risk maturity, define risk culture and offer a theoretical understanding of its 
relationship with risk maturity, drawing on established, existing theory and recent 
findings. 
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2.5. Cultural and behaviour 
 
A critical insight into the relationship between risk culture and pervasive risk 
behaviour comes from ethnographic studies of risk and safety management. One such 
study observed organisational subcultures and the relative agency of proposed risk 
management actions (Howard-Grenville 2006). The observed relationship was that the 
greater the alignment between the proposed action and the dominant organisational 
culture, the greater its influence on risk behaviour (Howard-Grenville 2006). 
Conversely, when proposed actions or routines were not strongly embedded in 
organisational culture they were more likely to be changed and co-opted by 
individuals (Howard-Grenville 2005). The key cultural factors identified were values 
and norms regarding how risk was conceptualised and which risk mitigation strategies 
are preferred. For example, while a purely technical solution to a risk was accepted by 
the organisational subculture that defined risk as impediments to manufacturing 
processes and assumed solutions to be technical and universally applicable; it was 
rejected by the subculture that included stakeholder perceptions as a source of risk and 
thus favoured varied solutions, sensitive to multiple stakeholders (Howard-Grenville 
2006). This relationship between organisational culture and risk behaviour is 
substantiated by a number of similar studies on the relationship between occupational 
subcultures and safety rules, a closely related field (Gherardi et al. 1998; Gherardi & 
Nicolini 2000; Richter & Koch 2004; Antonsen 2009; Knudsen 2009). These studies 
also found that the behaviour of individuals was significantly influenced by 
organisational culture, particularly work related subcultures. Both safety rules and 
safety subcultures contained a perception of the practices and underlying values that 
constituted good safety behaviour. Employee compliance or non-compliance with 
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safety rules was partly determined by whether or not those rules aligned with values 
and norms embedded in subcultures. If safety rules encapsulated a practice or 
underlying value that conflicted with the safety subculture then employees would 
resist behaving in accordance with those rules (Antonsen 2009). These findings 
suggest that elements of safety or risk management (practices and values) that do not 
align with organisational culture are less influential on the behaviour of individuals, 
while those elements that are aligned with organisational culture appear to have 
greater influence on behaviour. Thus, the extent to which a risk management practice 
or value influences behaviour throughout an organisation is, at least partly, 
determined by the degree to which it aligns with organisational culture (Howard-
Grenville 2005; Howard-Grenville 2006). To conceptualise this findings in the 
context of risk maturity I draw on existing theory describing coordination of 
behaviour by shared norms and values (Mintzberg 1979) and cultural depth (Schein 
2004). Schein’s (2004) model of organisational cultural depth, delineates the layers of 
culture, from superficial artefacts (physical manifestations of culture) to deeper values 
and the deepest level; underlying assumptions. This model distinguishes between 
values which are consciously expressed (espoused values) and those which are 
unconscious (underlying assumptions) (Schein 2004; Schein 1986). Additionally 
‘norms’, defined as the social desirability of a particular behaviour, allow us to 
compare the gap between an organisation’s values and the behaviour of individuals 
(as an expression of norms) (Raz & Fadlon 2006). 
  
I propose a relationship between risk maturity and risk culture, whereby the deeper 
risk management is embedded in the layers of risk culture, the greater its influence on 
risk behaviour. Following this, the greater the influence on behaviour the more 
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pervasive ‘good’ risk behaviour becomes and the more risk mature the organisation 
(Figure 2.2.). However, if risk management’s processes or values are not embedded 
deeply into an organisation’s culture, this can undermine the pervasiveness of risk 
management. For example, an organisation may have aligned organisational artefacts 
with risk management, such as creating mission statements on risk and codifying risk 
management processes, but if the espoused values such as managers rhetoric are not 
aligned, then risk management’s influence on behaviour may be limited (Summerill et 
al. 2010). Alternatively, despite leadership’s public expression of appropriate values, 
risk management’s influence on individual behaviour might be limited if people do 
not share a set of taken for granted assumptions relating to risk management. For 
example, an underlying assumption that professionalism requires self-sufficiency 
which conflicts with risk communication objectives (Storey & Buchanan 2008). 
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Figure 2.2.: Conceptual model of cultural alignment. 
This model of cultural alignment proposed that the alignment of risk behaviour and 
risk management is determined by the degree to which risk management is embedded 
in organisational culture. In order for desired risk management processes and values 
to be pervasively expressed in risk behaviour those processes and values must also be 
aligned with cultural artefacts, espoused values, norms and underlying assumptions. 
This figure uses model of organisational culture based the definitions of 
organisational culture by Schein (1986) and Raz and Fadlon (2006). 
 
 44 
2.6. Towards a new model of risk management maturity 
 
I begin with a brief reiteration of current type one and two RMMs. Current RMMs 
can be described in three distinct stages. The first stage, in both type one and two 
RMMs, contains the lowest level of risk maturity, level one, which is distinguished by 
little or no coordination in risk behaviour throughout an organisation. The second 
stage, comprising maturity levels two, three and four, reflects increasing coordination 
of risk maturity behaviour in group one RMMs and increasing embedding of a 
common risk culture in group two RMMs. The third stage, made up of the fifth and 
highest maturity level, is characterised by double loop learning (Agyris & Schon 
1978), meaning the organisation is capable of questioning and changing the 
fundamental basis by which it manages risk. This review suggests that there is a case 
for linking the extent to which risk behaviour is coordinated across an organisation 
and the depth to which risk management is embedded within organisational culture. 
Accordingly, in this RMM, levels two to four will represent increasing coordination 
of risk behaviour driven by an increasingly deep embedding of risk management 
within organisational culture (Figure 2.3.). Initially, at maturity level two, cultural 
embedding is superficial (restricted to artefacts and espoused values) and standardised 
processes and outputs play a prominent role in coordinating risk behaviour and 
driving pervasive risk management. Thus, this new risk maturity level two is largely 
similar to type one RMMs up to maturity level four. In the subsequent levels of risk 
maturity, levels three and four, cultural embedding becomes the dominant driver of 
pervasive risk management. These maturity levels are defined by embedding risk 
management in the less tangible elements of organisational culture: norms and 
assumptions. Thus, this new model of risk maturity is set apart from existing models 
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by directly linking coordination of risk behaviour and risk culture and by capturing 
the progressively deeper embedding of risk management in organisational culture 
which leads to pervasive risk management. The highest level of risk maturity, level 
five, will remain characterised by organisational ability to fundamentally change 
established ways of managing risk in the organisation (Strutt et al. 2006). However, 
this new model level five risk maturity emphasises the ability to question and 
challenge all factors coordinating risk behaviour, including norms and underlying 
assumptions. 
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Figure 2.3.: A new model of risk maturity 
Figure three represents the updated model of risk maturity proposed in this literature 
review. The main feature is that pervasive risk behaviour is achieved by embedding 
risk management processes and values in organisational culture. This model 
recognised the importance of organisational culture in driving risk behaviour. The 
model of organisational culture used is based the definition of organisational culture 
by Schein (1986) and Raz and Fadlon (2006).  
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2.7. Evaluation and implications of proposed maturity model 
 
Although the new maturity model proposed in this literature review describes cultural 
embedding as a linear process I recognised that it is likely to be more complex in 
reality, with values driving the creation of standardised processes which in turn 
establish norms and so forth. However, I argue that representing progress in risk 
maturity in this linear, hierarchal manner does reflect the overall process of 
progressively deeper embedding of risk management in organisational culture, into 
layers of culture that are increasingly less visible, more difficult to change and more 
insidious in their influence on behaviour (Schein 1986). I also put forward the point 
that until artefacts and espoused values are established it is likely to be unclear 
whether or not they will conflict with any established norms or underlying 
assumptions that might exist. It will only be by acting to try and change risk 
behaviour through artefacts and espoused values that I will learn about the nature of 
the organisational culture in which they exist (Weick 1995). 
 
In order to elucidate the proposed model of risk maturity I drew on the risk culture 
attributes identified across the literature. The risk culture attributes most prevalent in 
the literature (Table 2.1.) were used to illustrate the cultural layers (Schein 2004; Raz 
& Fadlon 2006) that underpin the new risk maturity model (Table 2.2.). Thus, I 
provide a tool illustrating the attributes of an organisation as its risk management 
became increasingly embedded in its organisational culture: from superficial artefacts 
to the deeper levels of norms and underlying assumptions. I hope this can be used by 
risk practitioners to identify the degree to which risk management is embedded in 
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their own organisation’s culture and provide a guide to further embed risk 
management. 
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Table 2.2.: Risk maturity attributes by level of organisational culture  
The most prevalent attributes used to describe ‘good’ risk culture categorised by 
Schein (2004)’s typology or organisational culture, representing the most superficial 
layer (artefacts) to the deepest (underlying assumptions). For each layer the 
description of ‘good’ risk culture from the literature was used to create risk maturity 
attributes. These risk maturity attributes describe the features of an organisation 
which has embedded risk management in the corresponding layer. 
Layer of organisational 
culture (Schein, 2004) 
Risk maturity attributes: 
attributes signifying the embedding of risk 
management within cultural layers.   
Sources 
Artefacts: tangible 
manifestations of 
organisational culture which 
both reflect and influence 
deeper culture elements. 
 
Embedding risk management 
with artefacts is a requirement 
for level two risk maturity. 
Clear and effective risk communication: clear 
and effective mechanisms for managers and staff to 
raise risk related issues, widespread access to risk 
information and a clear message on risk from 
organisation leadership. 
(HM Treasury, 2009; Doudu et al., 
2003; Funston et al., 2007; Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu, 2006; Economist 
intelligence Unit, 2009; IRGC, 
2009) 
Defined risk management processes and 
outcomes embedded throughout organisation: 
risk management is embedded in the organisations 
codified processes and measured outputs as a core 
part of organisational function.  
(HM Treasury, 2009; MacGillivray 
et al., 2007; Strutt et al., 2006; 
Paulk et al., 2006; Standard and 
Poor, 2007; Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu, 2006; Economist 
intelligence Unit, 2009) 
Defined and transparent risk management 
structure: risk management roles and 
responsibilities are formally defined, with clear 
board oversight. 
(Office of Government Commerce , 
2007; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 
2006; Standard and Poor, 2007; 
Economist intelligence Unit, 2009) 
Risk management outcomes linked to wider 
performance measures: risk management 
performance is embedded in recruitment and 
performance appraisal for individuals, departments 
and the organisation as a whole. 
(HM Treasury, 2009; Hillson, 1997; 
Deloite Touche Tohmatsu, 2006) 
Espoused values: the 
expressed or desired rational 
for behaviour. 
 
Embedding risk management 
with espoused values is a 
requirement for level two risk 
maturity. 
Leadership behaviour and rhetoric must strongly 
support wider risk culture, particularly culture 
norms conducive to ‘good’ risk behaviour 
(Funiston et al., 2007; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004; 
Reynolds, 2003; Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2009) 
Norms: implicit and explicit 
social rules which define the 
desirability of actions and are 
thus manifest in behaviour.  
 
Embedding risk management 
with norms is a requirement for 
level three risk maturity. 
A challenge culture and a ‘no blame’ culture: 
cultural norms which encourage and rewards 
individuals to challenge or report behaviour they 
think it detrimental to risk management effects.  
(HM Treasury, 2009; Waring, 2005; 
Storey and Buchanan, 2008) 
A common and pervasive risk appetite: a 
common understanding of what is and is not an 
acceptable level of risk in key areas, such as safety, 
driven by a common set of ethical values. 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004; 
Reynolds, 2003; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers risk 
survey, 2009; IRGC, 2009; 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007) 
Senior management have positive attitude 
towards risk management 
(Doudu et al., 2003; Hillson, 1997; 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 2006) 
Underlying assumptions: 
taken for granted values based 
on unconscious beliefs about 
the nature of reality.  
 
Embedding risk management 
with underlying assumptions is 
a requirement for level four 
risk maturity. 
Common risk awareness and common risk 
understanding: a common set of assumptions of 
the nature of risk, where it originates from, how it 
can be managed and how it relates to the 
organisations core purpose. These underlying 
assumptions about risk will influence how 
organisational members perceive and respond to 
risk. 
(Doudu et al., 2003; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004; 
AON, 2007; Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2007; Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2009) 
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2.8. Conclusions 
 
Risk management pervasiveness is a key theme running through the literature on risk 
management maturity. This review reveals two aspects of pervasive risk management. 
The first aspect is the extent to which an organisation is able to influence risk 
behaviour of individuals and thus, coordinate risk behaviour across the organisation. 
The second aspect is an organisation’s ability to deeply embed a common set of 
values, norms and assumptions regarding risk management into to culture of the 
organisation. RMMs fall into two types according to their treatment of pervasiveness: 
one type focuses on pervasive risk behaviour, achieved through standardised 
processes, outcomes and direct management control. The second type focuses on 
embedded a common risk culture and influencing or coordinating risk behaviour 
through ‘soft’ mechanisms such as shared norms and values. Thus, this literature 
review revealed a divide in the literature concerning the relative roles of 
standardization and social processes to achieve pervasive risk management. Further, 
the literature review revealed a lack of clarity and empirical research regarding the 
role and function of cultural and social factors in achieving pervasive risk 
management. In this literature review I have proposed a theoretical model linking 
organisational culture with coordination of risk management. However, empirical 
research is needed to explore and describe how risk management practice is 
coordinated in reality.  
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3. Methodology 
 
Research question: “What factors affect risk management pervasiveness in 
organisations?” 
 
3.1. Methodology selection 
 
3.1.1. Summary 
 
In order to address the research question a wide range of research strategies and 
philosophies were considered (these are described in appendix B). In order to 
understand social phenomena like risk management pervasiveness, it is important to 
analyse social behaviour in a natural setting with sensitivity to researcher influence on 
the observation and analysis of data (Locke 2001; Neuman 2011). Therefore, an 
abductive, qualitative research methodology following a case study strategy was 
selected. Data were primarily gathered through semi-structured interviews. This 
approach provided an in-depth investigation of the informal social and cultural factors 
affecting risk management pervasiveness.  
 
3.1.2. Rationale for qualitative approach 
 
The literature review (chapter 2) highlighted the importance of social and cultural 
factors to risk management pervasiveness. Organisational culture concerns human 
beliefs, attitudes and behaviour built on individuals’ perception and experience 
(Guldenmund 2000; Smircich 1983). Further, organisational culture may not be 
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comprised of a single set of values or assumptions but often contains subgroups with 
differing values or assumptions and is continually evolving (Schein 2004). For these 
reasons a quantitative approach which would require variables to be defined and 
standardised in advance was unsuitable (Denscombe 2007). Therefore, a qualitative 
was selected as most suitable (Denscombe 2007).  
 
3.1.3. Rationale for case study approach 
 
The aim of this research was to contribute to an explanation of risk management 
pervasiveness by identifying and describing organisational factors that affect risk 
management pervasiveness. The literature review (chapter 2) revealed that there is a 
paucity of research evidence addressing risk management pervasiveness that takes 
into account the role of organisational context (social, institutional and cultural 
factors).  
 
Eisenhardt (1989) identifies three aspects of the case study approach that make it 
suitable for explanation building (also referred to as theory building), namely:  
 Constant juxtaposition of conflicting evidence reduces influence of researcher 
preconceptions and increases probability of generating novel theory. 
 Developed theory is likely to be testable and falsifiable. 
 Developed theory is likely to be empirically grounded because theory 
development is closely linked with data gathering and analysis. 
Furthermore, the importance of wider organisational context on organizational 
behaviour (Lounsbury 2008; Johns 2006) makes a case study approach desirable for 
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its ability to take account a wide range of contextual factors, for example individual, 
institutional and cultural (Yin 2008). Therefore, a case study approach, aiming to 
contribute to identify factors which explained risk management pervasiveness, was 
selected as an appropriate method (Yin 2008). 
 
3.1.4. Rationale for abductive approach 
 
The literature review (chapter 2) established that there was little consensus on risk 
culture and other informal organisational processes affecting risk management 
practice. Followed an abductive approach (Kelle 2005) allowed the research to 
explore emergent and unexpected findings while incorporating existing knowledge 
and theories. An adductive approach requires that the researcher attempt to remain 
theoretically agnostic (Henwood & Pidgeon 2006) while retrospectively seeking 
theories that may explain the emergent findings (Kelle 2005) in order not to force the 
data or its interpretation to ‘fit’ existing theory. A grounded approach to data 
gathering, analysis and explanation building that emphasised basing the emergent 
explanation in the empirical data was selected for its compatibility with an abductive 
approach (Locke 2001; Kelle 2005). The researcher employed grounded theory 
methods of data gathering and analysis (constant comparison, inductive coding, and 
theoretical sampling) (Locke 2001; Charmaz 2006; Bazeley 2007) and, once data 
were gathered, considered a wide range of theories when developing an explanation 
for the results (Kelle 2005). It is emphasised that in following abductive logic primacy 
was given to empirical observations and therefore, existing theories were adapted to 
fit the results and not vice versa (Kelle 2005).  
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3.1.5. Rationale for insider perspective and semi-structured 
interviews 
 
The values and assumptions held by individuals within the case study organisations 
were central to the research. By gaining insight into individual values and 
assumptions the aim was to build a picture of how these are shared across the 
organisation (Schein 2004; Howard-Grenville 2006). Therefore, gaining an insider 
perspective on individual’s values, assumptions and perspectives was critical to the 
research. 
 
Semi-structured interviews were identified as the most appropriate way to gain insight 
into actor’s perspectives and thus the affective and cognitive factors affecting risk-
based decisions and behaviour (Crandall et al. 2006). Questions were open ended and 
neutrally phrased (Whyte 1982) in order to emphasis the insider perspective in the 
data gathered. Open-ended questions were also selected to allow flexibility in data 
gathering, facilitate in-depth exploration of the interviewees’ knowledge, establish a 
rapport with the interviewee and thus develop a truer picture of the respondents’ risk 
management behaviour and reasons for it (Robson 2002).  
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3.2. Methods 
 
3.2.1. Case study selection 
 
The case studies were chosen to be examples of organisations attempting to achieve 
pervasive risk management. Two case studies were carried out in two organisations. 
The case studies were conducted in organisations attempting to embed risk 
management at all organisational levels, from strategic to operational. Further, 
medium to large organisations (2000 plus employees) were selected as these are 
typical of organisations attempting to achieve formal, integrated and organisation-
wide risk management processes such as ‘enterprise risk management’ (AON 2007; 
Economist Intelligence Unit 2009).  
 
A multi-case strategy was chosen in order to increase the probability of getting 
relevant data and the credibility findings through replication logic (Yin 2008). 
Following the principle theoretical replication (selecting cases because of expected 
differences) (Yin 2008) case studies were selected in the private sector and public 
sectors because it was expected there may be differences in risk management practice 
between these sectors. Enterprise risk management and efforts to achieve pervasive 
risk management began in the private sector (Arena et al. 2010) but are being 
increasingly adopted by public sector organisations (Power 2004; Kleffner et al. 2003; 
Lenkus 2001). However, there are significant differences between private and public 
sector organisations in areas critical to Enterprise risk management, namely corporate 
objectives (Osborne & Gaebler 1993; Osborne 2000) and internal audit (Goodwin 
2004).  
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Case study one was conducted in a (private sector) power utility. Case study two was 
conducted in a central government department. Both organisations fulfilled the case 
study selection criteria of size (over 2000 employees) and were attempting to 
implement systematic, organisation-wide risk management. Case study two developed 
into two distinct dimensions (knowledge transfer and shared knowledge) that were 
analysed separately (chapters 4.4 and 4.5 respectively) in order to fully investigate 
those themes. The central government department was originally intended to be the 
subject of a single case study; however the two distinct research themes (both relevant 
to core research question) were judged to warrant separate treatment. A total of 
twenty one interviewed were conducted in case study one and twenty two in case 
study two by the researcher (CM). Additional data from twenty three interviews 
(unpublished) carried out in the case study two organisation by Dr. Frank Schiller 
(FS) of Cranfield University were directly relevant to the theme of knowledge transfer 
and were incorporated into ‘case study two – knowledge transfer’. Thus, ‘case study 
two – shared knowledge’ (chapter 4.4), drew on a total of forty five interviews. All 
interviews were analysed by the researcher (CM). 
 
3.2.2. Case study design 
 
Data were gathered through semi-structured interviews comprising open ended 
questions (Whyte 1982; Crandall et al. 2006). Interview questions were open-ended 
and developed based on the literature review. In order to neutrally explore the factors 
affecting risk-based decisions and practices, interview questions focused on those 
decisions and practices without assuming what might be influencing them. 
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Participants were asked to describe their risk management practices and then the 
factors informing and influencing those practices. Questions were phrased slightly 
differently in each case study to make sense to the context of each organisation. For 
example, in case study one of a power utility, some questions referred to managing 
the resilience of the electrical grid, whereas some questions in case study two of a 
government department referred to risk in policy development. The questions asked 
can be found in Appendix C. The questions used by FS in the additional twenty three 
interviews were also open-ended and had a similar focus. They focused on issues of 
organisational learning, asking what knowledge was used for risk management and 
how that knowledge was created and shared. The questions (asked by FS) regarding 
what knowledge was used for risk management were relevant to case study two, and 
were incorporated into that case study.  
 
Following the exploratory aim of this research and abductive methodology (Locke 
2001; Kelle 2005), data gathering and analysis in each case study followed the core 
research question but as the research developed, focused on the emergent themes in 
the data. Thus, the focus of each case study was driven by the data gathered within the 
constraints of the core research question.  
 
Prior to data gathering and finalisation of interview questions a pilot study was carried 
out (Yin 2008) in order to develop and test the interview questions for relevance, 
comprehensiveness and clarity. First, documentation of each organisation’s structure, 
risk management policies and processes were analysed and draft interview questions 
developed. Second, several meetings with key staff including general risk managers 
and relevant senior managers were conducted in order to define the scope of the study 
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and gain senior management support. Third, the researcher conducted informal 
interviews with four to five key employees involved in risk management over the 
course of at least two days during which the interview questions were tested. Finally 
interviews were conducted over a period of several months. In addition, observation 
of organisational artefacts and behaviours while on site were recorded in a field 
notebook and by camera, and were used to supplement interview data. Artefacts 
included posters, notices and internal publications. Interviewee selection, interviewing 
and data analysis are discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
 
3.2.3. Interview methodology 
 
Ethics approval for the following interview methodology was obtained from Cranfield 
University Ethics Board. Prior to each interview a one-page summary of the research 
aims and purpose was emailed to each interviewee so that they were aware of the 
nature of the study. The flexible nature of semi-structured interviews allowed the 
researcher to further explore any interesting topics that emerged during interviews 
(Whyte 1982). Where necessary, the researcher asked follow-up questions via 
telephone or email.  
 
Each interview comprised thirty to forty questions (Appendix C) which were ordered 
in the following manner: 
 Introduction by the researcher and reiteration of confidentiality and right of 
interviewee to terminate interview at any point and withdraw their data at any 
point up until publication of data.  
 Pause to answer any questions the interviewee may have. 
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 Non-threatening warm up questions. 
 Questions on the role of the interviewee regarding risk and risk management. 
 Questions investigating the factors affecting the interviewee’s risk-based 
decisions and behaviour. 
 Questions on how the interviewee deals with typically problematic aspects of 
risk management such as ‘determining risk appetite’ or ‘risk-risk trade-offs’.  
 Straightforward ‘cool-off’ questions and time for interviewee to bring up any 
topics they deem relevant. 
 Closure. 
 
Interviews were carried out face-to-face, one-to-one and in the workplace (with two 
exceptions where this was impossible and the interviews were carried over the phone). 
Interviews were carried out in a private space (private meeting room) where 
interviewees were more likely to speak freely without fear of being overheard. In 
three occasions use of private meeting rooms was not possible and the interviews 
were carried out in noisy cafeterias to minimise the risk of being overheard.  
Interviews were recorded with permission and transcribed verbatim by a professional 
transcription company (see appendix D 
a
 for examples of transcribed interviews and 
appendix E 
a
 for all transcribed interviews). Interviews were transcribed quickly 
(within two weeks of an interview) to allowed data analysis to be carried out 
concurrently with interviewing. This facilitated the ‘emergent and sequential’ nature 
of the grounded research processes whereby emergent results guide subsequent data 
gathering (Lincoln & Guba 1985). Transcribing interviews also allowed data and 
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results to be more rigorously checked and peer reviewed (chapter 3.2.5.). Due to 
technical issues three interviews were not recorded and transcribed verbatim, in these 
cases the interviewer made notes during the interview. In addition, the interviewer 
made notes during all interview on emergent themes which could be explored in 
subsequent interviews. However, in order to retain the focus of the research and not to 
privilege early interviews, all interviewees were asked the questions on the same core 
themes (Appendix C), with additional questions emerging from prior interviews being 
added at the end. Interviews lasted a minimum of one hour, sometimes lasting over 
two hours. Data collection stopped when interviewee responses were easily coded 
within existing codes without necessitating the creation of new codes. At this point it 
was judged that no new substantive information was being gathered. 
 
a
 Full list of transcribed interviews is supplied on CD to examiners but may not be 
available with the thesis when it is published in Cranfield University library. 
 
3.2.4. Data analysis 
 
Data was analysed thematically using Computer Assisted/Aided Qualitative Data 
Analysis (CAQDAS) software (NVivo qualitative data analysis software, 2008). Data 
analysis drew a grounded approach whereby results and conclusions were developed 
through a coding process underpinned by constant comparison between the emerging 
results and the underlying data (Figure 3.1.) (Locke 2001). Data coding was inductive 
and iterative, seeking to identify and categorise variables; identify relationships 
between variables and develop an explanation for the observed phenomena (Bazeley 
2007; Charmaz 2006). Open codes (Anslem Strauss & Corbin 1990) describing the 
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data were generated using a grounded approach by enquiring of the data: ‘what risk-
based decisions or practice are taking place?’; ‘what is affecting or driving the 
described risk-based decisions or practice?’ and ‘what organisational context is the 
risk behaviour taking place in’ (complete transcripts of two interviews with codes 
highlighted can be found in Appendix D 
a
, a full list of codes can be found in 
appendix F 
a
, examples of two complete codes can be found in appendix G). Constant 
comparison between emerging codes and original data helped ensure results were 
grounded in the data (Glaser & Anselm Strauss 1967; Ahrens & Dent 1998). 
Relationships between open codes were identified using the query functions of NVivo 
9
TM
 (NVivo qualitative data analysis software, 2008) and by identifying theoretical 
links between codes. Relationships between open codes were not coded as codes 
themselves, rather they are explored in the discussion and emerge as the core social 
processes and cultural items identified (Appendix J: Complete coding hierarchy). For 
each case study, codes developed were presented in tables giving examples of the data 
supporting each code and the number of data sources (Chapters 4.1-4.3). 
Development of an explanation (Yin 2008) of the observed relationship between the 
codes drew on relevant, peer-reviewed literature (Kelle 2005). This process of 
explanation building was iterative (Yin 2008): drawing on as wide a range of 
theoretical sources as possible to make theoretical statements regarding causal links 
between codes, comparing the statements to the case study data, and revising the 
statements. Explanations were only selected when they offered the best explanation 
the researcher, with reference to existing theory, could offer for the codes and 
relationships between codes identified (Kelle 2005).  
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a
 Full list of codes is made available on CD to examiners but may not be available 
when the Thesis is published in Cranfield University library. 
 
3.2.5. Validity (credibility) and researcher bias (reflexivity) 
 
Credibility (validity) of data gathered during interviews was established by 
triangulation between data sources (interviews and documents) (Yin 2008). In most 
instances codes were only used in the final analysis if they were strongly supported by 
multiple data sources (for example, table 4.1.5. in chapter 4.2.). In situations where 
the diversity of perspectives was relevant then a code was only included if codes 
describing all other perspectives were also included in the final data analysis (see 
example, table 4.3.5. in chapter 4.5.). 
 
 Further verification of results and mitigation of researcher bias was achieved through 
comparison of the results produced by member checking and peer review (O’Leary 
2010; Yin 2008).  For member checking, results were sent to all interviewees and 
feedback requested. However, because of the low response rates further feedback was 
sought from the group risk manager in each case study organisation. During analysis 
of results the researcher regularly discussed coding with his supervisors and peers. In 
addition a more formal peer review of coding was carried out after coding: two 
researchers (JD and FS) who had minimal involvement with the research, were given 
a sample of codes with the title and description missing. The researchers (JD and FS) 
were then asked to describe the codes without input from the researcher (CM). The 
researchers’ (JD and FS) descriptions were then compared to the primary researcher’s 
(CM) descriptions. If there was a disagreement, it was discussed whether the code 
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needed modification and the code modified accordingly (see results of peer review in 
appendix H).  Finally, the researcher strove to be upfront and explicit about theoretical 
influences and his epistemological stance in the research process. Key theories that 
retrospectively influenced interpretation of data and results included sensemaking 
(Weick 1995; Maitlis 2005); schemata and mental models (Harris 1994; Plant & 
Stanton 2012); a constructivist and discourse based view of the firm (Taylor & Van 
Every 2000; Weick 1969); community of practice theory (Brown & Duguid 1991); 
coordination theory (Carlile 2004; Mintzberg 1979); and a knowledge based theory of 
the firm (Grant 1996; Jensen & Meckling 1995). 
 
3.3. Potential methodological weaknesses 
 
3.3.1. Little basis for generalisation 
 
Research following a case study strategy is often criticised in terms of scientific 
generalisation, particularly in comparison to research following sampling logic and 
statistical analysis (Yin 2008; David Buchanan 2012). Multiple cases were not used in 
this research to alleviate this concern because the ‘sample’ number would still be 
statistically insignificant. The research aim and methodology were clear that the 
purpose of this study was not to generate data on a statistically significant sample of a 
larger population (Atkinson & Shaffir 1998). Instead, this research aimed to develop 
an in-depth account of risk management practice and the factors affecting it in two 
organisations that contributed to understanding of risk management pervasiveness. 
The core determinant of whether research can contribute to understanding of a 
concept is whether it develops an internally-valid and in-depth account of the 
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phenomena in question (Buchanan 2012; Tsoukas 2009). The main outcome of this 
research was then to deepen understanding of a concept (pervasive risk management) 
(Tsoukas 2003) relevant to the management of risk both in the public and private 
sectors. Thus, the primary means of generalisation beyond the cases themselves was 
analytical refinement, whereby the case studies expanded existing theories concerning 
the phenomena of interest: in this case risk management pervasiveness (Tsoukas 
2009). In addition, because both a public and private sector organisation were chosen, 
the degree to which the findings might be generalised based on common features to 
other (large) organisations is increased (moderatum generalizations) (Buchanan 
2012). 
 
3.3.2. Researcher influence 
 
The possibility that the researcher may have influenced the responses of the 
interviewees, for example through choice of language or even through his appearance 
or presence, cannot be completely removed (Labov 1971). To minimise this risk, the 
researcher was mindful of his choice of language and aimed to influence the 
interviewees as little as possible (Whyte 1982). The difficult balance to be struck was 
between minimal influence and encouraging the interviewee to be as forthcoming as 
possible. Depending on the interviewees attitude and willingness to talk the researcher 
adapted his interview style. Typically, in each interview the researcher covered all six 
levels in Whyte’s (1982) directiveness scale of interview technique. The researcher 
tried to make interviewees as conformable and relaxed as possible. The researcher 
used simple language and avoided jargon in questions and conversation to avoid the 
interviewee viewing the researcher as an expert in risk management and modifying 
 65 
their responses as a result. To further avoid this eventuality and encourage the 
interviewee to be candid and truthful the researcher impressed upon them he was there 
to ‘learn from them as the expert in managing risk in their own job’.  
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Figure 3.1.: The coding process used to analyse the qualitative data gathered by 
each round of interviews. 
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4.  Case study results 
 
Here the three case studies carried out and the results obtained are described. 
Following the research aim (chapter 1.3) each case study investigated factors affecting 
risk management pervasiveness in organisations. Then, following the exploratory, 
abductive methodology (chapter 3.1.4.), the specific factor explored in each case 
study was determined by the emergent results obtained in each case. Description of 
the results of each case study is preceded by an introduction providing relevant 
background to the emergent themes and details of the precise methods applied. 
 
4.1. Case study one description and method 
 
Case description. Our case study organisation was a power utility, selected as a 
good example of a reliability seeking organisation (Vogus and Welbourne 2003). The 
organisation was chosen because it operates reliably in the face of significant risks 
that were varied, safety-critical and unpredictable. The electrical generation and 
distribution business in the UK was privatised and restructured in 1990. Prior to 
privatisation, electricity distribution was operated by 12 area electricity boards 
(AEBs) in England and Wales. The 12 AEBs were privatized into 12 regional 
electricity companies (RECs). In 2000, the Utilities Act 2000 required separate 
licenses for electrical generation and distribution and the distribution businesses of the 
RECs were renamed distribution network operators (DNOs). The case study 
organisation was formed from two DNOs that were purchased by a large international 
energy distribution and generation parent company. Prior to being merged, the two 
DNOs had existed for over 50 years as discrete entities covering a stable geographic 
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area. The current organisation deals directly with customers but is regulated by the 
UK office of gas and electricity markets, OFGEM. The regulator benchmarks the 
organisations performance against past performance and other DNOs in order to set 
how much the organisation can charge customers, its operating budget and required 
outputs, such as maintenance of the network and customer supply. Thus, the 
organisation must constantly consider operational, business and regulatory risks. 
Employees of the organisation faced serious hazards, primarily working with high 
voltage electricity in remote or hazardous locations, for example active mines and 
fireworks factories. In addition the organisation provided a critical service in the form 
of electricity to approximately five million people over an 80,000 mile power grid. 
The organisation was formed from the merger of two companies, approximately ten 
years ago. Prior to merger, the companies existed for over 50 years as stable entities, 
operating electrical networks of differing design specifications. The organisation 
constantly manages a wide variety of risks. For example, determining inspection and 
maintenance regimes for the organisation’s large, dispersed and varied asset base, 
involves balancing asset risk, health and safety risks, financial risk, long and short 
term risk to customer supply and regulatory risks. Although safety issues were 
prominent, the case study explored the whole range of risks facing the participants 
interviewed.  
  
Method. Data were gathered through 28 semi-structured interviews comprising open-
ended questions, conducted between February and November 2010. Interviews were 
each one to two hours long, conducted in the workplace, recorded with permission 
and transcribed verbatim. The anonymity of interviewees and the organisation were 
preserved. Interviews were completed in three stages to allow theoretical sampling, 
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(Alasuutar et al. 2008) whereby the focus of interview questions in each round was 
informed by data analysis of the previous stage(s). This allowed us to focus on themes 
relevant to the research question as they emerged while remaining open to new 
variables. The three stages comprised: scoping interviews (four); first tranche of 
interviews (twelve) and second tranche of interviews (twelve). In each tranche, 
participants constituted a diagonal cross-section of the organisation, representing a 
broad section of hierarchical and functional divisions, from directors to project 
managers and front line staff. Interviewees were keen to share their views on risk 
management in the Department and discuss their own risk management activities. 
 
4.2. Case study one results 
 
The emergent theme in case study one was the role of experience in risk-based 
decision making and the coordination or risk management. Tables 4.1.1-4.1.7 describe 
the qualitative codes identified in the data. Tables include the number of participants 
whose data contains each code and so indicate the extent to which each code is 
represented in the data. 
 
4.2.1. The use of experience  
The results revealed that experience was used widely to inform risk-based decisions 
(Table 4.1.1.). Participants used the terms ‘judgement’ and ‘professional judgement’ 
to refer to knowledge drawn from their working experience. Experience was used to 
inform risk-based decision throughout the hierarchical levels sampled, including 
strategic risk assessments by directors and operational decisions by front line staff in 
the field (Table 4.1.1.). In fact, ‘first hand experience’ was the most common resource 
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used to inform risk-based decisions reported (Table 4.1.2.).  Experiential knowledge 
was sometimes explicit; for example, the observation that the condition of a substation 
door and general substation maintenance were correlated (code: ‘Front line staff’ 
Table 4.1.1.). In other examples, experiential knowledge was tacit, resulting in 
judgement more akin to intuition (code: ‘Directors’ Table 4.1.1.). Second hand 
experience was also an important for risk-based decisions. Participants not only 
learned from personally experience, but also from the experience of third parties. 
Participants commonly reported seeking out peers or experts to learn from their 
experience and improve their own decisions (codes: ‘expert consultation’ and 
‘colleagues’ Table 4.1.2.):  
 
“[…] I’ve got some really experienced people working here.  So you would use their 
judgement and use their experience to make your own judgements.” 
 
Another key observation on the use of experience was that 27 of the 35 examples of 
decisions based on first hand experience drew on context specific experiences not 
widely held throughout the organisation. For example, the experiential knowledge 
could be more geographically specialised; say, a front line worker’s knowledge of the 
configuration and condition of the electrical hardware in the area they have worked in 
for many years, illustrated by the following: 
 
“I spend most of my electrical days working the X district. But now I'm out in Y and Z. 
Although the variations on the theme are the same I am finding allot different 
electrical equipment, unfamiliar to me. And under those circumstances I need to go 
with someone from that district for a period of time to actually gain their skills.” 
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Experience could also be specific to a particular task, for example repairing damaged 
cables: 
 
“…there’s written criteria if you get a fault on a cable you should be ten metres away 
from that damage before you put in a repair in.  But if you go to that ten metre point 
and through the experience I have, you then can say to that Project Manager ‘well 
this cable is perfectly alright to put a repair on,’ or ‘go x metres further back and 
trying again.’  Because, at the end of the day, I don’t know [in advance] how far the 
soot, carbon and moisture has gone up that cable.” 
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Table 4.1.1.: Description and examples of the codes relating to use of experience 
throughout the case study organisation’s hierarchy. The column ‘n’ indicates the 
number of respondents whose transcript contains the respective code. 
 
Code Hierarchal divisions Illustrative examples n 
use of 
experience 
throughout the 
hierarchy 
 
Judgement 
drawing on 
experience and 
intuition is used 
by individuals 
to enact risk 
management 
policy, rules 
and procedure 
in real life 
situations. This 
is true 
throughout the 
organisation, 
concerning 
risks from 
operational to 
strategic. 
Front line staff “As I go into an unknown substation I notice things. Things 
like the type of lock that on the door, whether its a modern lock 
or an old lock. You can assume to a degree that because they 
have painted those doors that they have got a key to it, that it's 
been maintained. If you approach a set of doors and they are all 
rotten and a guy turned round and said 'oh I thought you looked 
after this, I never had a key to this' then you automatically 
ratchet up your senses. I can do that based on experience from 
the five years as an apprentice with tradesmen.” 
 
“Yes you do use your own judgement on things that go beyond 
those [rules and procedures].  You might go somewhere and 
the gates are locked and it looks as it should, that’s one of the 
procedures to look for.   But around the corner where your list 
of things doesn’t check, there might be something that you’ve 
spotted there that might not be quite right.  So you might have 
to look there first, to see dangers.” 
5 
Middle management 
and engineers 
“But the recognition is, when you’re out there at the 3 o’clock 
in the morning, life’s not like that [the text book example], and 
so with training and experience etc, you try get the right 
behaviours and values. To actually have some more binding 
philosophies or values which actually allow people to make 
judgements on views on risk in a consistent way, recognising 
that you can’t stipulate every single thing that’s going to crop 
up.”  
 
“I’ve got the Network Design Manual that obviously takes that 
in to account.  But because of the variance of the jobs you’re 
then reliant on the design engineer having the competence to 
actually interpret that and apply it to the realistic job solution.  
You’ve got the basics there to work on but then you rely on 
individual judgement to then apply it to the site specific stuff.” 
6 
Senior management “So you might get quantification.  But at the moment I are 
more into judgements and I do that by going out to talk to 
people in the field and our project managers, linesman, jointers 
who are actually touching these assets and getting some 
feedback from them and asking for evidence of their concerns.” 
 
“…when I do the [asset risk] assessment which is semi-
quantitative, I take the qualities of stuff and I make it a 
quantitative by judgement.” 
5 
Directors 
 
“One is qualitative data.  I are a very data heavy organisation.  
Secondly, there is a lot of skill and expertise out there. And 
then a lot of it, it still is a gut feeling about if something’s not 
in the top 5 [risks] because the mechanics of the calculation, 
probability times, whatever, you’re just thinking ‘well that 
doesn’t feel right’.” 
“It’s high.  A lot of judgement.  It’s good, because I’ve had risk 
processes in the past which have been so driven by spread 
sheets.  Especially the high-impact, low-probability ones, never 
appear, so they just never appear anywhere when you do it 
using expected values, and those are the ones that really do 
come and hit you.” 
2 
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Table 4.1.2.: Descriptions and examples of the open codes relating to the 
resources actors use to aid risk-based decision making. The column ‘n’ indicates 
the number of respondents whose transcript contains the respective code. 
 
Code Description of resource used to 
aid risk-based decision making 
Illustrative example n 
Risk 
Management 
tools 
Risk management tools, such as 
ALARP or other heuristic 
decision making tools. 
“I think, one of the models is the HSE ALARP 
principles, all those sorts of models, are at the 
fundamental part of it.” 
2 
Industry best 
practice 
Codified industry standards. “Design based on codes of practice, standard 
applications, standard plans, and you would look at 
standard protection scenarios.” 
2 
Data Qualitative or quantitative data on 
impacts and probabilities. 
“One is qualitative data.  I are a very data heavy 
organisation.” 
3 
Colleagues’ 
experience 
Respondent relied on the 
experience of peers in the work 
place. 
“A lot of it is down to the experience of the people 
that you’re with.  As to any risk really, any of the 
risks.  You might be the most experienced person 
there, but you can miss something obvious that one 
of the apprentices picks up on.” 
7 
Superiors Decision is escalated to more 
senior actors. 
“If I felt through my own experience and the people 
I’m working with, their experience, that this risk 
was beyond our control, then I’d go higher up.” 
8 
Codified rules Official rules and procedures 
rendered in text. 
“You’ve got your power systems ops manual and 
you’ve got your distribution safety rules.  They’re 
your bibles along with your jointing instructions 
what’s come with every joint.  They’re the pieces 
of paper that you’ve got to follow.” 
8 
Expert 
consultation 
Judgement of actor, perceived to 
have greater knowledge and 
experience. 
“There is a lot of skill and expertise out there, so 
it’s talking to the people who may be closer to 
understanding.” 
10 
Individual 
experience 
Respondent relies on their own 
experience in decision making.  
“I would probably be a little bit more vigilant when 
I am going into the customer ones, because I know 
from experience that they will probably have been 
neglected from a safety point of view.” 
 
11 
 
 
 
4.2.2. Experience and risk decision complexity 
By observing the context of risk-based decisions (Table 4.1.3.) in relation to the 
resource used to inform the decision, insight is gained into the different roles those 
resources play. The use of first and second hand experience in decision making tended 
to coincide with complex risk decisions, situations not covered by codified rules and 
decision made under time pressure (Table 4.1.4.).  
 
The complexity observed in association with the use of experience was typified by 
uncertainty and ignorance (Stirling 1998) (Table 4.1.5.).  For example, complexity 
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arose from a work environment distributed over a wide geographic area, including 
urban, rural, industrial and post industrial settings and technology of varied design 
and age. Therefore, few risk-based decisions were routine and involved an unknown 
element, for example, asset condition or novel combinations of older and newer 
technology. This, coupled with direct contact with customers, meant that routine 
responses and general rules were not always appropriate or sufficient, requiring 
employees to make decisions drawing on experience (Table 4.1.5.). 
 
The involvement of multiple risks further increased the complexity of decisions (code: 
‘multiple risk categories’ Table 4.1.3.). For example, dealing with customer 
complaints may require balancing the risk to reputation against financial risk, while 
also considering the regulatory risks of setting precedents or not meeting regulatory 
minimums. The organisation’s explicit risk appetite and espoused values (Schein 
1986) typically considered risks in isolation, requiring employees to decide how to 
address trade-offs between multiple risks. For example, the organisation’s dedication 
and clear value to never compromise safety, created a dilemma for decision makers in 
an environment where some residual safety risk was unavoidable if business 
objectives were to be met. To overcome this, participants relied on their own values 
and experience to translate an uncompromising commitment to safety into a 
practicable action. The author does not suggest such a strong commitment to safety is 
not highly desirable. Rather, it is emphasised that the importance of employees’ 
decisions, drawing on their expertise, to enact that commitment into practicable, real-
world action, illustrated by the following: 
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“I’ll use the snow as a good example.  I’ve got over a thousand commercial vehicles 
and they’re out throughout the whole of our organisation’s patch.  So I had all of that 
snow.  The safest thing would’ve been to tell everybody to stay at home, would’ve 
been reduced chance of any kind of road traffic accident, personal injury, third party 
injury.  You’ll have no safety events at work today but I won’t be there, you won’t 
have a business. I’m sure my boss would’ve said “Yes it’s all very good but after a 
while you’re not going to get paid because actually I’m paying you to come to work.” 
So I’ve got to do work and I’ve got to do it as safety as possible and it’s then down to 
leaders like me, people who report to me to set the values and to stand by them. So is 
safety a priority?  I think it comes down to the values set of the managers.” 
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Table 4.1.3.: Descriptions and examples of the codes relating to the context 
within which risk-based decisions were taken. The column ‘n’ indicates the number 
of respondents whose transcript contains the respective code. 
 
Code Description of risk-based decision 
context 
Illustrative example n 
High time 
pressure 
The decision maker is under high 
time pressure. 
“When it was getting down to sort of time 
constraints.” 
6 
Beyond 
experience 
The decision maker does not have 
experience of this risk. 
“If it’s a risk that you’re not common with or you 
don’t know that well.” 
4 
Conflict 
between rules 
and expertise 
The decision maker’s judgement 
conflicts with the codified rules on a 
risk. 
“… a way of stripping cables.  And in our rule 
book, that’s the wrong word.  In the jointing 
procedure it says you can flame torch it and take it 
off with a flat bladed knife and personally that’s 
more dangerous in my mind than using the tool 
that can’t cut you physically whereas a sharp knife 
can.” 
4 
Risk is 
predictable and 
well known 
The risk is stable and well known, 
uncertainty is low. 
“We’re not innovative, leading-edge technology 
type selling or stuff like this.  So the risks I have 
do stay relatively constant.” 
4 
Complex risk 
decision 
The risk decision occurs in varied 
and unpredictable contexts.  
“No two joints alike.  And it’s totally different 
doing a joint on a bench and a joint hole filled 
with water.  And it’s even worse when you come 
to do it at night when you’re working with 
artificial light and you get all these shadows and 
all that sort of business.” 
 
“…whereas I have no idea; kids jump into 
substations, whatever.  I have no idea.  I can’t 
control 94,000 substations.”  
11 
Risk is not 
covered by 
codified rules 
The particular risk or its context is 
not adequately covered by codified 
rules or procedures. 
“I would say the rules don’t cover it because there 
are certain – when I mainly identify these sort of 
risks on sort of standby, when it’s at night and it’s 
a fault situation and it’s completely different to 
like a text book scenario basically.” 
“And the rules aren’t very – they’re perfectly 
written out to meet standards, but they don’t really 
cover – there was one particular thing that didn’t 
really work out very well.” 
7 
Multiple risk 
categories 
The decision involves multiple risk 
categories, for example reputation, 
financial and regulatory. 
“The, the primary driver on this is safety.  
Although financial impact has got to be taken into 
account.  And all the time I've got to take the Euro 
successive law so far as is reasonably practicable.” 
10 
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Table 4.1.4.: Overlap between codes suggesting relationships between resources 
used to inform risk-based decision making and decision context. The number in 
each column and row intersection indicates the number of data sources (interview 
transcripts) in which the codes overlap (the number in brackets is the total number of 
times the codes overlap within those data sources). The strongest relationships 
between codes are shown in bold numbers. 
 Resource used 
to support risk-
based decision: 
Context of risk-based decision: 
Beyond 
experience 
The 
decision 
maker does 
not have 
experience 
of this risk 
Conflict 
between 
rules and 
judgement 
The decision 
maker’s 
judgement 
conflicts with 
the codified 
rules on a risk 
Time 
pressure 
The 
decision 
maker is 
under 
time 
pressure 
Multiple 
risks 
The decision 
involves 
multiple risk 
categories 
Risk is not 
covered by 
codified rules 
The risk or its 
context is not 
adequately 
covered by 
codified rules or 
procedures 
Complex 
risk decision 
The risk 
decision 
occurs in 
varied and 
unpredictable 
contexts 
Colleagues, the 
experience of 
peers in the 
work place 
2(10) 0 1(7) 0 1(4) 0 
Data, 
qualitative or 
quantitative 
data on risk 
0 0 0 0 0 1(5) 
Superiors, 
decision is 
escalated to 
more senior 
actors 
2(8) 3(11) 1(7) 0 3(11) 1(4) 
Expert 
consultation, 
judgement of 
actor thought 
to be an expert 
3(11) 0 1(7) 0 3(12) 1(6) 
Individual 
experience, 
respondent 
relies on own 
experiences 
1(5) 1(5) 5(10) 2(10) 6(16) 4(14) 
Industry 
standards, 
codified 
industry 
standards 
0 0 0 0 0 1(5) 
Risk 
management 
tools, heuristic 
decision 
making such as 
ALARP 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rules, codified 
official rules 
and procedures  
1(7) 3(12) 0 0 0 0 
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Table 4.1.5.: Description and examples of the code ‘Risk management complexity 
necessitates judgement’. The column ‘number of respondents’ indicates the number 
of respondents whose transcript contains the respective code.  
Code Description Illustrative example n 
Risk 
management 
complexity 
necessitates 
judgement. 
The acceptability of a 
particular hazard and the 
appropriate mitigation 
depend on the context, 
which can be highly 
variable. Therefore risk 
management behaviour is 
accordingly flexible and 
varied. This makes it 
difficult to create standard 
rules and procedures to 
manage risk, therefore 
judgement must be relied 
upon. 
 “Whereas on the East you would only have 132 
to 33 and a 33 to 11 with one bar coming off it. 
So there’s lots of resilience in the East network 
by design…The West network tends to be quite a 
lot higher, higher loaded as a default. So when 
you have another outage or a fault it puts even 
more strain on the equipment that’s left there. So 
you’ve got to – even your risk – what, if you 
want to come up with a single formula, you can’t 
really do that either. It’s got to be really based on 
what you know, what the network and how it’s 
designed.” 
“Two transformers, for example within 
generation, you could quantify that risk quite 
easily, in terms of its probability and severity, in 
a certain situation. But then apply that into a 
group of transformers for which there maybe 200 
transformers of a similar type within central 
networks, each one of those 200 being located in 
different proximities, or different circumstances - 
different connectivity models. How – the 
difficulty comes in how do you actually – how 
do you capture the risk, if you like?”  
“And particularly once again in services the 
variability of what's going to happen is, the 
variability is huge. And you have to be able to 
make a sensible interpretation on the spot as to 
what you are going to do. You know, in a factory 
you can control most of the conditions. You 
know, hotel, if your’ dealing with people in any 
shape or form, in a restaurant, airline passengers 
or whatever, then it’s different, so if your’ 
dealing with people it’s different. And if you’re 
dealing with the variability in the environment 
that I have to deal with its different too.” 
 
“The problem that you’ve got is you can set that 
plan in place a fair distance in front of you, as 
you approach the time and you get closer and 
closer you’ve got to start looking at what faults 
you’ve got in the network, because they may not 
have been there at the time I did the initial 
planning. So, so the risk itself, there’s no magic 
formula. It’s got to be based on the 
circumstances that you’re presented with 
operationally more often than not.” 
13 
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4.2.3. Respect for experience  
 
Individuals in the power utility constantly used their experience to query formal rules 
and procedures, for example questioning whether the formal procedure for stripping 
wires was the safest. However, when this resulted in a conflict between the decision 
maker’s judgement and codified rules, the effect was not ‘rule breaking’. Rather, 
decision makers tended to follow the rule if the consequences were minor (for 
example if the task might take longer) and refer the problem to a superior if the 
consequences were significant (if there was a risk of injury or significant reputational 
damage) (Table 4). If referred to a superior, then following dialogue (Shotter 1993) 
between operational and managerial employees a rule or procedures might be upheld 
or altered to reflect the initial judgement. Such bottom up feedback, drawing on 
employee experience, was welcomed and taken seriously throughout the organisation. 
For example, employees were not expected to follow rules if they thought doing so 
was unacceptably risky: 
 
“But obviously that’s the whole idea of doing this risk assessment so that you apply 
the rules and in doing that risk assessment if there’s a problem with applying those 
rules to that particular site.  Then you feed that back and you say “Well actually I 
can’t apply that rule.”  And you get some agreement in how you would progress.” 
 
Experiential knowledge also informed the development of rules and procedures. For 
example, new site management guidelines, based on industry standards, were 
substantially modified after feedback from managers experienced with such sites. In 
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this case, the first draft guidelines, while meeting all regulatory requirements, were 
deemed impracticable by the managers experienced with site management:  
 
“I’ve recently written our contractor safety and engagement policy. But it was totally 
focussed on building a power station which I don’t do. So the idea of having a fence 
all around the site, inducting contractors to work on each site, each site having a site 
owner, which the policy asks for, I cannot do. If I turn up to work on your house I’m 
sure the neighbours wouldn’t want us to put a fence all around your street and have 
some chap stood there with the yellow hat saying “You’ve got to sign in.”  And, that’s 
the problem, I’ve got a retail business, I’ve got a generation business, I’ve got the 
home, and I’ve got a wires business.  And they’re totally different.  So then it landed 
with me to review: I said “This cannot work in [XXXX].”  So the compromise was a 
[XXXX] Arrangements Document which says ‘I recognise the policy but within 
[XXXX] this is how I will discharge the policy.’”   
 
Behind this extensive and open use of experiential knowledge was a widespread 
respect for experience (code: ‘Respect for experience’ Table 6), defined as 
recognition that the experience of others may be of value to one’s own decision 
making. For example, respect for experience is expressed by the willingness of a 
manager to delegate a decision to a more experienced but junior colleague (Table 6). 
Respect for experience encouraged individuals to consult others who they perceived 
to have relevant experience and legitimised experiential knowledge as a valid form of 
knowledge to inform risk based decisions. Thus, respect for experienced encouraged 
communication of risk relevant knowledge and the incorporation of experiential 
knowledge into rules and procedures. In contrast, when participants did not feel like 
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their expertise was valued or reflected in rules or procedures, there was a degree of 
resistance to compliance. For example, an operational employee judged procedures 
for conducting risk assessments as inefficient and as a result treated it as a ‘tick box’ 
exercise: 
 
“For example I can understand the procedure where you have to have risk 
assessments and they have to be recorded.  But for us to record the same thing every 
day for six months, to me and to a lot of people, seems sort of “Why?” […] But we’re 
doing this and it turns out, well it does it ends up that you’re just writing one down 
just for the sake of it, because you’ve got to in case somebody turns up […] I’m not 
saying I don’t work safe and I don’t pick the hazards out.  But that bit of paper 
doesn’t sort of do anything to make us any safer.” 
 
In summary, respect for experience was a widely shared value amongst participants 
that encouraged the sharing and use of experiential knowledge. This helped ensure 
that rules and procedures reflected operational realities and that when they did not, 
operational and managerial staff could work together to come to a solution. Thus, it 
helped avoid issues of compliance because operational employees perceived rules and 
procedures as ineffective or inefficient ways to manage risk.  
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Table 4.1.6.: Descriptions and examples of codes relating to the relationship 
between experience and risk-based decision making. The column ‘n’ indicates the 
number of respondents whose transcript contains the respective code. 
 
Code Description Illustrative example n 
Respect for 
experience 
The participant describes 
language or behaviour 
recognising that the 
experience of others is of 
value to risk-based decision 
making, particularly examples 
of one actor actively seeking it 
and learning from the 
experience of another. 
“EDS or a Project Manager […] they rely on your 
judgement. Generally what happens is [if the project 
manager is inexperienced] he relies on myself as having 28 
years of experience to his 2½.  So yes he might have been 
my boss but he also listens to what I have to say and he’s 
developing from that as well.” 
 
“I would expect is that if they haven't got certain types of 
experience that they have counselled somebody who has 
got that knowledge.” 
12 
Importance of 
shared 
experience for 
communication 
Relevant experience of the 
line manager facilitates 
sharing of experiential 
knowledge between line 
manager and operational 
employee. 
“No disrespect but you get a manager that’s a manager, but 
they've got no coal face experience. The other way you get 
a manager that has experience and been promoted to his 
position. So it’s allot easier to talk sense to this guy.” 
“Yes, the more remote the manager is from the task the 
more difficult it becomes to have him fully understand 
your decision that was made.” 
10 
Experienced line managers’ 
ability to understand 
subordinate’s decisions 
improved subordinates’ 
confidence in decisions. 
“If they [line manager] are giving you the authority to do 
it, that they understand the authority that they’re actually 
giving you and it sort of slightly boosts your confidence in 
thinking ‘Well they know what they’re on about.  They 
trusted me to do it.’  So it sort of increases your own 
judgement and it makes you feel more independent, as it 
were.” 
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4.2.4. Shared experience, communication and coordination 
 
In addition to respect for experience, having some degree of shared experience was 
also important for communication (code: ‘Importance of shared experience for 
communication’ Table 4.1.6).  Where operational staff and line managers had some 
relevant shared experience, their ability to communicate with each other, and 
confidence in each other’s judgement, was increased. Experienced line managers used 
their understanding of the decisions faced by front line staff to reinforce ‘good’ 
decisions through positive feedback. While operational staff felt that experienced line 
managers were better able to understand their decisions and thus gained confidence in 
their own expertise when experienced line managers endorsed their decisions. 
Conversely, if line managers lacked relevant experience, participants felt they were 
unable to communicate fully their decisions and this undermined their confidence 
(code: ‘Importance of shared experience for communication’ Table 4.1.6). 
 
Where communication was limited or ineffective, a lack of coordination between 
individuals and groups within the organisation was observed (Table 4.1.7). Most 
often, ineffective communication lead to a lack of coordination between employees 
with an operational focus and those with a more strategic focus, for example a focus 
on commercial or regulatory issues (Table 4.1.7). Lack of coordination did not take 
the form of systematic rule breaking but rather a lack of understanding and 
engagement between coordinating parties. For example, operational staff felt that 
some managers with a commercial or regulatory focus did not understanding the 
rationale behind some operational risk management practices: 
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“[…] with some of the things I do at operational level its pretty clear cut.  I think 
there’s perhaps some misunderstanding from a commercial regulatory aspect as to 
why I do certain things. So at the moment a lot of people are doing things but 
probably they don’t know the reason, the full reasons why they’re doing it.  So at the 
moment I would think in certain areas of the company it could be questioned “Why do 
I do this long way of doing it when I could just do that?”  And they don’t know the 
reasons or the other knock on effects if I don’t do it sort of thing and the full reasons 
why I do it in a certain way.” 
 
In summary, shared experience was important for communication across the 
organisational hierarchy. With shared experience, employees were able to 
communicate more effectively, make joint decisions and mutually coordinate their 
practices. However, where communication was limited, coordination across hierarchal 
divisions began to break down. For example, failure to communicate the benefits of 
strategic asset risk assessment lead to a lack of engagement by the business units 
required to report asset condition, reducing the quality of data available to the 
strategic risk assessment (Table 4.1.7). 
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Table 4.1.7.: Descriptions and examples of codes relating to the relationship 
between coordination and communication. The column ‘n’ indicates the number of 
respondents whose transcript contains the respective code. 
 
Code Description Illustrative example n 
Lack of 
coordination 
and 
communication 
Lack of coordination between 
individuals and groups within 
the case study that is related 
to ineffective communication. 
“Network strategy may go and ask some of the 
businesses for some support for collecting data and 
evidence [for an asset risk register].  And some of the 
other businesses will say “That’s not my responsibility, 
that’s your responsibility.”  And support is not as good as 
it could be.[…] So from the local level when they’re 
getting the input they’re not seeing any actions as a 
result.  It seems, the process seems to be too slow.  Now I 
understand they [network strategy] are looking at risk 
management strategy for the next 5/10 or even 20 years 
time. So the [asset risk register] project I suppose what 
they should say to business units is they need to (a) sell 
the merits of what they’re doing and successes at an early 
stage and possibly go out in the business for quick wins.  
So the people who are providing the information actually 
see something happening.  And I think that’s one of the 
failings of the AERO project.” 
“So you’re always going to have in this type of business 
and this industry you’re going to always have to have 
policies and procedures which is absolutely the right 
thing to do. The one problem with that is then being able 
to communicate the information held within them 
policies to the masses so they can understand and follow 
the procedures. If I’m honest I don’t think that’s 
something We’re so good at.  I tend to communicate too 
much by email, I communicate too much by operational 
bulletin – that relies on an individual reading it, then 
understanding.  I think from an organisation I don’t put 
enough time and effort into holding proper briefings, 
proper training sessions and potentially questioning and 
challenging the individual about their level of 
understanding.  A lot of that relies upon the people who 
know the activity, who know it probably better than 
others which might be people like authorising officers or 
very experienced engineers then actually portraying that 
through a buddy system – I’ll show you how to do it, I 
know how to do it so I’ll show you.” 
9 
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4.2.5. Declining experience 
 
Four participants expressed concerns about diminishing experience in the organisation 
which they attributed to declining opportunities to learn from peers. For example, loss 
of social spaces where staff could share experiences and increasing preference for 
classroom training over apprenticeships, illustrated by the following: 
 
“I don't think they are giving these people enough time with the more experienced 
tradesmen, because you can learn allot more by sometimes watching a qualified 
tradesman’s approach.” 
 
Others perceived that because older, more experience staff were leaving the 
organisation and not being replaced, a source of experience was being lost, illustrated 
by the following: 
 
“I was fortunate to come through with all these mature engineers who were very 
knowledgeable, very practical but they also had the technical competencies.  They 
were allowed to leave almost on block and as a result I almost became a very young 
workforce. And all that experience then fell on just a few heads and shoulders. And 
the danger is that I’ve actually, most of us have gone into management roles so I 
don’t find enough time to get out into the field to pass on the experience in the 
practical, real world...  I think it’s had certainly an impact when you look at the 
operational incidents within the business…” 
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4.3. Case study two description and method 
 
Case study two description.  
 
Regulatory and political context 
The Government handling of public risk has been a major focus of political and public 
sector reform in the United Kingdom (UK) since the early 1990s.  Risk management, 
is now a central role of the State that it shares with other parties (risk generators, the 
insurance sector, citizens, trade bodies, companies). It is a key means of managing 
risks to and from the environment, including high profile and emotive risks such as 
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), terrorism and nuclear energy. UK 
government guidelines on risk management (OGC Office of Government Commerce 
2007; HM Treasury 2009) are heavily influenced by the COSO (2004) ERM model, 
retaining the emphasis on risks to strategic objectives, risk appetite and internal 
control. Adaptations to the specific requirements of risk management in the public 
sector include (i) sharing the responsibilities and costs for risk management with 
parties beyond the State; (ii) the distinction between strategic, policy development and 
policy delivery risks; and (iii) ensuring the regulation of risk is transparent, 
proportionate and targeted to where it can have most effect (OGC Office of 
Government Commerce 2007; HM Treasury 2009) 
 
The case study organisation 
The case study was carried out within a UK central government department 
responsible for managing a number of risks, including risks of strategic importance to 
the UK. The Department has considerable expertise in risk assessment and 
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management of a number of primary risks (Michael Power 2004). The Departments 
management of primary risk involves identifying and assessing hazards, exposure 
routes and vulnerability, both quantitatively and qualitatively, as well as concern 
assessments (risk perceptions, social concerns, socio-economic impacts). Drawing on 
this expertise the Department has produced generalised guidelines on risk 
management of certain primary risks and plays an active role guiding international 
and national legislation and regulations.   
 
Risk governance structure of the case study Department  
The Department’s strategic approach to risk management follows ERM (COSO 2004) 
principles defining risk as threats to departmental objectives.  An added complication 
of ERM in the public sector emerges here: the Department is vertically integrated with 
other governmental bodies. Therefore the departments risk management must take 
into account the, potentially differing, objectives of these other organisations when 
considering, for example, reputational risks. This is often politically sensitive and is 
not managed explicitly.  
Delivery of policy in the Department is achieved through a mixture of programmes, 
projects and ongoing activities, which are differentiated on the basis of risk.  
Programmes are bodies of work to deliver a specific policy outcome, often of strategic 
importance, and their governance and reporting arrangements reflect their higher risk 
status. The programme and project management (PPM) processes used typically 
require regular reporting of risks to programme boards.  Projects are less high profile 
bodies of work delivering predefined outputs contributing to a programme or for 
example, delivering a new IT system. Projects receive accordingly less governance 
oversight. Ongoing activates refers to every-day work with no fixed endpoint or 
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outcome. Ongoing activities typically received little high level oversight. The 
strategic contribution of each activity type is communicated and monitored through 
portfolio management tools, showing how this contribution is woven into policy work 
at lower levels in the department.  
 
The policy cycle 
 At the heart of the Department’s function is the policy cycle, which guides how 
policy is designed, developed and delivered.  The Department’s risk management 
policy states that risks should permeating the entire policy cycle rather than being 
restricted to, for example, an appraisal of the risks of a final set of policy options. In 
the early stages of the cycle, a main concern is in building an appropriate evidence 
base, including probabilities and consequences of any risks, to support the 
identification and comparison of policy options. Moving on to policy appraisal, 
guidance on the analysis of the risks for policy options exists in HM Treasury’s 
‘Green Book’ on economic appraisal in Government (“The Green Book: appraisal and 
evaluation in central government,” 2013).  Here, the emphasis is on supporting the 
cost-benefit analysis and (policy) impact assessments that guide the selection of an 
optimal policy design.  Risk is viewed in terms of the uncertainty associated with 
cost-benefit data.  In the later stages of the cycle the focus shifts to delivery risks: to 
managing those hazards that may disrupt achieving policy objectives. At this point the 
Department asks its Ministers to consider the options for translating policy goals into 
deliverable solutions through regulations and incentives. One of the Department’s 
general risk management goals is to make good, risk-informed decisions, and so these 
Ministerial submissions on policy intervention must be backed by impact assessments 
that present risk trade-offs and balances that Ministers and senior managers can 
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consider. The policy cycle also contains a series of approval ‘gates’ (decision points) 
that must be navigated before a proposed activity can proceed to the next stage. These 
gates operate at the central or lower levels, depending on the nature of the proposed 
policy and the amount of new investment required.  They involve challenge and 
scrutiny of policy by senior managers, supported by a team of reviewers.  Approval 
gates generally only apply to high profile and new programmes and projects as they 
move through the policy cycle, however, if an on-going function requires additional 
funding approval must be sought.  Finally, after policy is delivered its efficacy should 
be assessed in order to promote learning and improve future policy development and 
risk management therein. 
 
Case study two method. Case study two in a central government department 
developed two distinct dimensions. Dimension one concerned knowledge sharing and 
sources of knowledge informing risk management (chapter 4.4.); and dimension two 
concerned the effect of shared perceptions of risk management on risk management 
practice (chapter 4.5.). After initial open coding (Figure 3.1.) each dimension was 
coded and analysed separately in order to fully develop each dimension. Further, an 
additional 23 interviews carried out in the same central government department by 
another researcher (FS) were used to supplement the results regarding dimension one 
(chapter 4.4.).  
 
The case study data comprised (a) semi-structured interviews, (n = 22) between 
February and June 2011; and (b) document analysis. Interviews lasted one hour, 
comprised twenty five open-ended questions and were conducted in private. 
Questions focused on risk management practice and decision making. Participants’ 
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identity was made anonymous in data analysis and use. Interviewees were selected 
from policy teams, identified by the Department’s policy cycle as a key area where 
risk management was embedded in policy-making. Eight policy teams were selected 
to be as representative as possible and included small and large teams; teams working 
on new and older policy areas; and teams working on high and lower profile policies. 
Each policy team leader and one to three subordinates (depending on policy team size 
which ranged from three to over ten) were interviewed. Details on interviews roles 
and policy areas can be found in appendix K.  Interviewees were keen to shared their 
views on risk management in the Department and discuss their own risk management 
activities. Documents used were internal reports and policy documents, including 
reports on prior research on risk management commissioned by the department. 
 
The additional data incorporated into dimension one (chapter 4.4.) derived from 23 
semi structured interviews were carried out between August 2009 and March 2010. 
These interviews were carried out by FS and followed a similar interview protocol: 
lasted one hour, were conducted one to one in private and participants’ identity was 
made anonymous in data analysis and use. In contrast to the core 22 interviews 
conducted by CM, the interviews (carried out by FS) sought to capture a broad sample 
of individuals from a range of functional groups and hierarchical levels including 
specialist advisors to policy teams. Interviews carried out by CM and FS did not 
overlap in terms of individuals or policy teams.  
 
4.4.  Case study two – dimension one: sharing knowledge 
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One theme in case study two was the role of informal communication in risk 
management. Results relating to this these are presented in this chapter. Tables 4.2.1-
4.2.3. describe the qualitative codes identified in the data. Tables include the number 
of participants whose data contains each code and so indicate the extent to which each 
code is represented in the data. 
 
4.4.1. Risk-based decisions  
 
Policy teams were responsible for risk-based decisions at project and operational 
levels and for informing risk-based decisions at programme and strategic levels 
(Figure 4.2.1.). Policy teams typically comprised two to ten individuals lead by a 
middle ranking civil servant, for example a project manager, who did not report 
directly to the board. Each policy team was responsible for one stream of work within 
a policy area overseen by a senior civil servant (senior responsible owner) who 
reported directly to the board. Integration of risk into policy development at all levels 
was codified by the department’s ‘policy cycle’ (Figure 4.2.2.) which identified the 
appropriate risk management activities at each stage of policy-making. The following 
risk management activities were largely delegated to policy teams: identifying and 
assessing risks associated with policy options, managing delivery risks and evaluating 
the efficacy of the risk management of delivered policies. Thus, policy teams were 
responsible for identifying policy risks and managing delivery risks. Policy risks 
related to the policy objectives, for example ensuring levels of nitrate in ground water 
meet European Union directives, and were used to inform selection of policy options 
by senior decision makers (strategic and programme decisions). Delivery risks were 
defined as risks to the successful implementation of chosen policy options, for 
 93 
example risks relating to ability to deliver project goals; delivery bodies’ capability to 
enforce policy; and secondary risks (Power et al. 2009), such as public and media 
responses to policies. In chapters 4.2.3.2 and 4.5.3. I describe the knowledge sources 
used to inform risk-based decisions taken by policy teams. 
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Figure 4.2.1.: The hierarchy of risk-based decisions that underpins the risk 
governance structure of the case study, adapted from The Strategy Unit (2002). 
 
Figure 4.2.2.: The policy cycle which describes the process of policy development 
in the case study department.  
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4.4.2. Knowledge sources 
 
The most mentioned source of knowledge informing risk-based decisions was 
individual experience (Table 4.2.1., code: individual experience). Other sources of 
knowledge included; external stakeholders, other policy teams, specialist advisors and 
delivery bodies (Table 4.2.1.). External stakeholders included: civil society groups, 
regulated industries, non-governmental organisations, pressure groups, media and any 
affected parties. Communication between policy teams was predominantly informal 
(Table 4.2.1., code: informal communication between policy teams). Communication 
with external stakeholders was both formal and informal (Table 4.2.1.) and often 
complex, involving negotiation, conflict resolution, and issue formulation, as 
illustrated by the following quote: 
 
“I've been having two, three meetings in the past month and every month the 
[regulated industry representative] don't agree, or somebody else doesn’t agree with 
the findings that the [delivery body] have come up with. So at the last meeting I 
invited an expert in [XXXX].  And [regulated industry representative] are perfectly 
happy because he suggested ‘Let's go back and let's find out if it's 1 milligram or 2 
milligram’.  So to find solutions I do involve other people who need to be at the 
meeting.  I call them in.”   
 
Formal mechanisms for lateral knowledge transfer between policy teams, such as 
written reports of lessons learned, were viewed as important by only five (out of 45) 
interviewees (Table 4.2.1., code: codified lessons learned). Interviewees primarily 
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mentioned formal process of transferring knowledge between policy teams to 
highlight their paucity (Table 4.2.3., code: lack of formal knowledge sharing).  
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Table 4.2.1.: Sources of knowledge used to inform sub-strategic risk-based 
decisions in a central government department. 
Source of knowledge used 
to inform risk management 
Description Illustrative example Number of 
sources  
Individual experience The participant describes 
relying on experience to 
inform risk-based decisions. 
“The longer you’re in a department, the 
more you realise, and you can work from 
experience, in terms of what does and 
doesn’t work.” 
“[…] someone has not had experience of 
working in the delivery front end working 
in Government, at times the way they 
approach problems and solutions is not the 
best way.  I think you do need to have that 
breadth of experience from knowing in 
reality ‘this is what happens’, ‘this is how 
people will operate and this is how they 
move’.” 
23 
External stakeholders (lateral 
knowledge transfer) 
The participant describes 
communication with 
individuals or groups from 
outside their organisation 
informing risk-based 
decisions. 
“Your understanding of the risk has to be 
informed by your dialogue with them 
[stakeholders] about what could go 
wrong,” 
“So they [stakeholders] bring out their own 
risks and those get discussed at the table 
and to mitigate them actions are taken…” 
15 
Informal communication 
between policy teams (lateral 
knowledge transfer) 
The participant describes 
informal communication with 
members of other policy 
teams informing their risk-
based decisions. 
“It’s important having the right network of 
contacts, knowing who the people are to 
talk to throughout the department.  There’s 
no, as far as I’m aware, sharing of risk 
experience that goes on other than 
informally.” 
“[…] I do work a lot with other policy 
teams and I do get a lot of feedback from 
them on successes.” 
6 
Specialist advisors (lateral 
knowledge transfer) 
The participant describes 
communication with 
specialist advisors within 
their organisations informing 
their risk-based decisions. 
“[…] sometimes that’s legal risks actually 
so you do talk to the legal team.” 
“[…] you are required to bring the experts 
on board.” 
6 
Delivery body*  The participant describes 
communication with 
members of a delivery body 
informing their risk-based 
decisions. 
“[The delivery body] being our agency, 
I've a lot of trust in them […] they go on 
the ground and make checks.” 
“[…] a lot of what I do has implications 
for service delivery partners.  So I would 
tend to try and get them on to the project 
board.”   
6 
Codified lessons learned  The participant describes 
formal reports of part risk 
management practice 
informing their risk-based 
decisions. 
“You can’t forget the lessons you learn 
from a [crisis].  Whenever I do have a 
[crisis] I learn lessons from it, I do lessons 
learned reports and see what went well, 
what went badly and try and learn.” 
“I think a lot of people who’ve worked on 
things that have been quite high profile, 
whether they’ve gone well or not well 
there will be lessons learned, logs or 
documents or things in some types.” 
5 
* Government agency responsible for implementing policy developed in case study department. 
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4.4.3. Factors promoting and limiting knowledge transfer 
 
A widespread ‘culture of collaboration’ (Table 4.2.2, code: Culture of collaboration) 
placed normative pressure on policy makers to utilise knowledge the knowledge of 
peers and stakeholders in policy-making. The culture of collaboration was evident in 
espoused values (Schein 1986) expressed by participants portraying an inclusive, 
collaborative approach to risk management as desirable: 
 
“There is expertise and you know if you don’t use it then it’s silly.  And you are 
required to bring the experts on board.  Even to the extent where you’re encouraged if 
someone else has done something very similar to you go and have a chat with them, 
see what problems arose.”   
 
Although formal mechanisms in place to transfer knowledge on risk, such as 
requirements to report risks or centralised risk registers, primarily functioned to 
aggregate knowledge for senior decision makers, I observed that risk registers also 
indirectly facilitated knowledge transfer within policy teams (Table 4.2.2, code: risk 
registers and team communication).  Risk registers achieved this by requiring policy 
makers to make their knowledge of risks explicit and visible to others. However, only 
seven of the twelve policy teams interviewed currently used a risk register. 
Participants described increased participation within policy teams due to risk 
knowledge being made more explicit:  
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“I have a nice up to date risk register. So I’ve got the benefit of the entire team being 
aware of these risks, being able to update from their various areas, and to keep an eye 
on these risks. Whereas if you have a less well organised system you’re essentially 
relying on possibly just the one individual, presumably a bit higher up, who’ll be 
aware of it and is keeping an eye on things.” 
 
The most widely reported factor limiting knowledge transfer was lack of formal 
processes and mechanisms to capture and disseminate knowledge, particularly the 
knowledge of employees when they changed roles or left the organisations (Table 
4.2.3, codes: lack of knowledge retention; lack of formal knowledge sharing). The 
context specific knowledge of risks in a policy area, such as in-depth knowledge of 
how best to engage with key stakeholders, was felt to be particularly prone to being 
lost through staff turnover: 
 
“The corporate memory seems to consist of people working there currently and how 
long they’ve been there, rather than actually, you know, further back, and learning 
from other policy areas I wouldn’t say happens much at all, certainly not at my 
level.” 
 
This problem was seen to be accentuated by human resources management practices 
that encouraged rapid rotation between roles; 
 
“We’re moving away from the situation where people got to know their subject areas 
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and were familiar with them, to a culture where we’re going to dip in and out of 
projects much more frequently.  So there’s a big risk as people move from one project 
to another, you don’t actually capture the experience they gain, before they move on.”   
 
 Participants reported that lack of resources limited their ability to transfer and utilise 
knowledge. This included lack of financial resources and of time (Table 4.2.3, codes: 
lack of human capital; lack of time). For example, limited financial resources 
sometimes meant that participants could not consult with stakeholders or scientific 
experts as much as they liked. Five interviewees cited lack of time and resources as 
the main reason that evaluations of risk management performance were not carried 
out:  
 
“…because resource and money are always a problem, I suspect that when you get to 
that part of the cycle, there are other things to be done…and doing a proper 
evaluation is going to take time and money and often I think the pressure is to use that 
time and money to do something new.  And I think that’s a kind of institutional 
problem really.” 
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Table 4.2.2.: Factors promoting knowledge transfer in a central government 
department 
Factors promoting 
knowledge transfer 
Description Illustrative example Number 
of sources  
Culture of collaboration Participants describe 
normative pressure, 
arising from shared values 
and assumptions, to 
consult widely when 
making risk-based 
decisions. 
“There is expertise and you know if you 
don’t use it then it’s silly.  And you are 
required to bring the experts on board.  
Even to the extent where you’re 
encouraged if someone else has done 
something very similar to you go and 
have a chat with them, see what problems 
arose.”   
23 
Risk registers and team 
communication 
Risk registers facilitate 
greater within team 
communication on risk. 
“I will discuss the risk register at every 
partnership board meeting, to make sure 
that things haven’t changed.” 
22 
 
Table 4.2.3.: Factors limiting knowledge transfer in a central government 
department 
Factors limiting 
knowledge transfer 
Description Illustrative example Number 
of sources  
Lack of knowledge 
retention 
Knowledge is lost when 
employees change or 
leave roles. 
“You lose staff and you lose 
understanding, especially local 
knowledge, local issues and local 
problems” 
14 
Lack of financial 
resources 
Lack of financial 
resources limits the time 
and effort participants can 
commit to knowledge 
transfer. 
“Where I might let ourselves down is 
consulting with hard to reach 
[stakeholder] groups.  That might not 
necessarily be the department’s fault 
because they have lots of guidelines on 
how I communicate with different people 
but now I have a budget reduction and it 
is harder to do certain things”  
14 
Lack of time Limited time reduces the 
knowledge transfer 
activities participants can 
engage in. 
“[…] sometimes if you just had a bit 
more time you could plan around it better 
and really think through what it is I are 
doing.” 
10 
Lack of formal 
knowledge sharing  
Paucity of formal 
mechanisms to transfer 
knowledge laterally 
between policy teams 
“Even if you do capture it [experience], 
there’s no real mechanisms for sharing it 
across the department.” 
4 
 
 
4.5. Case study two results – dimension two: shared knowledge 
  
The second emergent theme in case study two was how shared perceptions of risk 
management affected risk management pervasiveness. Here those results are detailed. 
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Tables 4.3.1-4.3.7. describe the qualitative codes identified in the data. Tables include 
the number of participants whose data contains each code and so indicate the extent to 
which each code is represented in the data. 
 
4.5.1. Patterns of risk management practice  
 
Analysis revealed considerable variety in risk management practice across the policy 
teams surveyed. Risk management practice observed fell into two categories, that 
which reflected the Department’s formal rules and procedures regarding risk (code: 
‘formal risk management practice’, Table 4.3.1.) and that which did not (code: 
‘informal risk management practice’, Table 4.3.1.). Formal risk management practice 
was explicit, following a systematic methodology, such as risk registers and written 
risk assessments. Informal risk management practice was based on logic or process 
that was not made explicit, for example, individual intuition. Eleven participants 
thought that risk management practice, but particularly informal risk management 
practice, varied considerably between individuals and policy teams; 
 
“[…] how that [informal risk management] manifests itself, does differ from work 
area to work area.  I, for instance, have external stakeholders on most of our project 
boards but not every policy area in [the Department] will do things that way.” 
 
In particular, managing and communicating risk with stakeholders, and assessing risk 
were felt to be inconsistent across policy teams; 
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“I don’t think there’s guidance about that [risk communication with stakeholders], 
not that I’m aware of.  And I think it has to be issue specific.  I think it depends on 
your particular work area and your relationship with your stakeholders.  So, well 
firstly I’m not aware of any sort of particular guidance on that.  Secondly I think the 
rest of it is very variable, I guess the models depend entirely on who you’re dealing 
with and what your particular policy area’s like.   
 
“…there isn’t a clear externally defined way of measuring the importance of the risk, 
in terms of having a proper risk matrix; where you understand “This is what defines 
low, this is what defines medium,” or whatever else. Consequently you have a huge 
range in different assessments, and what different rag [red, amber, green] ratings 
actually mean, which is deeply unhelpful as a general rule.” 
 
 This trend was consistent throughout all the policy team members interviewed, 
overall each policy team describing a mixture of formal and informal risk 
management elements (Table 4.3.1.). It is important to note that informal and formal 
risk management was not delineated by policy teams, rather all teams displayed 
aspects of formal and informal risk management practice. For example, the formality 
of a policy team’s risk management practice may vary from one project to another; 
 
“No I don't [use a risk register] and maybe I should.  I inherited this programme.  [In 
previous projects] I was using risk registers and issue logs. But this programme was a 
large programme that was up and running but with no real resource input.” 
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Beyond the mixture of formal and informal risk management practice observed, a 
smaller number of respondents (n=5) described examples where policy development 
was not driven by risk, or where risk played a minor role (code: ‘not driven by risk at 
all’, Table 4.3.1.). Finally, some respondents (n=4) described exampled were, 
although formal risk management processes were being carried out, engagement was 
superficial and the extent to which risk was actually informing policy was negligible 
(code: ‘going through the motions’, Table 4.3.1.). 
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Table 4.3.1.: Pervasiveness of risk behaviour within and across policy teams 
This table illustrates the codes describing the pervasiveness of risk behaviour within 
and across policy teams. The results show that risk management is constituted of a 
mixture of formal and informal practices. Formal risk management is defined as with 
an explicit logic and evidence base, and following a repeatable method. Informal risk 
management is defined as with an intangible or otherwise invisible logic and evidence 
base, which is therefore un-auditable or repeatable. Furthermore a number of 
participants admitted that risk did not play a significant role in their work, or that 
their engagement in risk management was tokenistic. Participant’s perception of 
whether risk management was pervasive throughout the Department was roughly 
equally split between those who thought it was not pervasive and those who thought it 
was. 
 
Code Description Example 
  
Number of 
respondents 
(number of 
codes) 
Formal risk 
management 
practice 
Risk management 
practice that 
follows codified 
protocol and is 
explicit. 
“I update it [risk register] on a monthly basis.  And 
I have meetings every two weeks where I discuss 
our policy in each and every strand of our work and 
what's coming, which basically is the main 
document that keeps us on track.  And then that 
feeds into the wider project board document that 
goes out.” 
18 (56) 
 
 
Informal risk 
management 
practice 
Risk management 
practice that 
follows an implicit 
logic and method 
not obviously 
related to codified 
protocol 
“I think with the stuff I’ve been doing, you know 
the day to day business I’ve been doing for years 
and probably you don’t think that much in terms of 
formal risk management.  Maybe you do it kind of 
instinctively.” 
20 (79) 
Not driven by 
risk at all 
The participant 
describes a 
situation where 
their behaviour is 
not driven by risk. 
“No [risk does not inform policy], because usually 
by the time our economists have calculated what 
the impact on small businesses will be it’s too late 
to change the policy.  In my experience, you’re 
already so committed that actually what it [risk] 
does is inform the way you present the policy but it 
doesn’t change the policy.” 
5 (11) 
Going through 
the motions 
Actor does actions 
that are formally 
required, but this 
does not lead to 
increased risk 
awareness or more 
risk informed 
decisions. 
“I think in policy sometimes it just seems to be that 
I are filling in forms for the sake of filling in forms 
and I don't know if I are really doing PPM properly 
there but that's the way - sometimes an organization 
sets something in place and I do it because I have to 
do it.” 
4 (5) 
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4.5.2. Affect of formal governance on risk management practices 
 
Formal risk management practice predominantly took place within programmes or 
projects and managing delivery risk (Table 4.3.2.). These are areas which have more 
formal, hieratical governance (Tsai 2002) for risk, namely, standardized reporting of 
risk to programme boards and the use of PPM processes to manage policy delivery; 
 
“If you have got quite a formal programme that’s being managed using PPM there’ll 
be a risk register somewhere.” 
 
In contrast, informal risk management behaviour was largely found within on-going 
work and during policy formulation: both areas with less formal governance and 
process (Table 4.3.2.); 
 
“I worked previously in a much more reactive environment XXX. It was much less 
programme and project managed. As a result I think risk was less systematically 
approached there.” 
 
 It should be noted that, although most did, some projects did not formally manage 
risk despite governance mechanisms requiring it (Table 4.3.2.); 
 
“[…] on my projects when they were first set up, I put some risks together in the kind 
of project plan.  The programme itself is risk managed, because the [XXX] Unit’s run 
as a programme with lots of projects, [so there is] a risk kind of tool that in theory’s 
there and I can put into but I just don’t particularly pay much attention to it.” 
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Investigation of the factors driving and shaping (Table 4.3.3.) risk management 
practice further supports the emerging trend. Formal risk management behaviour was 
largely driven by codified processes and leadership expectations (Table 4.3.4.). In 
contrast, informal risk management behaviour was shaped by experience, and internal 
consultation and collaboration (Table 4.3.4.). Five of the nine participants who 
explicitly stated that the risk management they were engaged in was not driven by 
codified processes were referring to informal risk management practices (Table 
4.3.4.). 
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Table 4.3.2.: When and where risk management is pervasive 
This table shows the overlap between codes. Each column and each row represent 
one qualitative code. The number in each column and row intersection indicated the 
number of data sources in which the codes overlap (the number in brackets is the total 
number of time the codes overlap within those data sources). This table illustrates the 
distribution of formal and informal risk management practices by stage in the Policy 
Cycle and type of governance. The results illustrated show that formal risk 
management tools are predominantly used to manage delivery risk. However, there is 
a greater tendency for delivery to be managed with minimal attention to risk (code 
‘not driven by risk at all’). Furthermore formal risk management tends to take place 
in the context of ‘programmes or projects’ rather than ‘ongoing work’.   
 
 
Delivery or pre-delivery risk: 
Risk management pervasiveness codes: 
not driven by risk at all 
‘Participant does risk 
management actions that are 
formally required, but 
without making risk 
informed decisions.’ 
Formal risk 
management 
practice 
‘The participant 
describes a situation 
where risk 
management process 
is explicit and 
formalised.’ 
Informal risk 
management 
practice 
‘The participant 
describes a situation 
where risk 
management process 
is implicit and ad 
hoc.’ 
managing delivery risk  
‘Risks which threaten the 
implementation of a policy.’ 
3 (34) 9 (51) 1 (10) 
Pre-delivery risk (policy 
formulation) 
‘Risks identified during the 
development of a policy prior to its 
implementation.’ 
1 (20) 0 11 (42) 
Programme or project 
‘Work sits within a more formal 
governance structure with a 
programme or project board, clear 
objectives and deadlines.’ 
1 (25) 15 (112) 4 (31) 
On-going work (no project)  
‘Work is on-going with no clear end 
point in terms of objectives or time, 
governance often less formal.’ 
0 0 7 (41) 
Clear target  
‘Work has a clear and explicit 
objective.’ 
0 4 (30) 0 
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Table 4.3.3.: Factors driving and shaping risk management practice 
This table illustrates the codes describing the factors which drive and shape risk 
management practice. Driving risk management behaviour is defined as causing the 
participant to initiate or otherwise engage in risk management activities.  
Code Description Example Number of 
respondents 
(number of codes) 
Informal 
consultation 
and 
collaboration 
Risk behaviour is 
shaped by informal 
consultation and 
collaboration 
between 
employees. 
“It gets discussed very thoroughly to the point 
where everybody throws in their bit and then 
they decide whether it's a definite threat or I 
could live with it.” 
 
18 (86) 
Leadership 
expectations 
Risk behaviour is 
influenced by 
direct line 
managers and 
team leaders (and 
the requirements 
and pressure they 
put on their 
subordinates as 
regards risk 
management).  
“If you are working for somebody who is very 
ambitious and wants to get ahead, the pressure 
on you to make sure everything is correct is 
going to be great.” 
16 (37) 
Codified 
processes 
Explicit, set in text, 
processes drive 
peoples risk 
behaviour and 
influence their risk 
based decisions 
“They do actually have to go through business 
cases and strategic…  Outline strategic business 
cases, risk registers etc.  So they’re forced to go 
through some of this.  Which the established 
areas don’t have to do.” 
16 (68) 
Experience Professional 
experience shapes 
risk behaviour. 
“The longer you’re in a Department, the more 
you realise, and you can work from experience, 
in terms of what does and doesn’t work.” 
13 (40) 
Stakeholders The relative 
importance of a 
risk is influenced 
by external 
stakeholders and 
their perception of 
the risk. 
“And I’ve thought it isn’t a potential risk but 
then I go and I have a meeting with another 
stakeholder and something similar might arise. 
And then it becomes an issue and it’s sort of 
gathering that and then taking it and trying to 
appraise for that.” 
12 (40) 
Not formal 
guidance 
Risk behaviour is 
explicitly not 
informed by formal 
guidance. 
“In terms of risk in this job I haven’t seen any 
sort of formal risk guidance that outlines how to 
assess risk and deal with risk.” 
9 (17) 
Training Past training 
received drives 
current risk 
behaviour. 
“It’s risk training from the past, I’ve done a lot of 
good training stuff.  So, there’s online guidance 
on running programmes and projects, which, has 
the risk around – risk management is just, it’s a 
basic part of how I manage projects within [the 
Department].”  
7 (17) 
Normative The shared 
perception that 
risk is something 
that is important 
and should be a 
part of policy 
development. 
“So you know everyone is very conscious of risk 
and yes you’re aware that it’s something you 
should do but also so is your boss and so on and 
so forth.” 
7 (10) 
Individual 
pragmatic 
legitimacy 
Risk management 
is seen as 
something that 
benefits policy 
development. 
“But also I think at the end of the day people 
realise it’s [risk management] the sensible thing 
to do anyway really.” 
6 (8) 
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Table 4.3.4.: Relationship between risk management drivers, shapers and risk 
management practices 
This table shows the relationship between codes. Each column and each row 
represent one qualitative code. The number in each column and row intersection 
indicates the number of data sources in which the codes overlap (the number in 
brackets is the total number of times the codes overlap within those data sources). 
This table shows the following. Where formal processes drive risk management the 
use of more formal risk management tools is prevalent. Informal risk management is 
largely informed and shaped by experience, and internal consultation and 
collaboration. Where formal guidelines are explicitly not relied upon, risk 
management tends to be informal. Formal risk management is defined as with an 
explicit logic and evidence base, and following a repeatable method. Informal risk 
management is defined as with an intangible or otherwise invisible logic and evidence 
base, which is therefore un-auditable or repeatable 
 
Codes describing: 
Factors driving and 
shaping risk 
management behaviour 
Codes describing: Risk management behaviour 
going through the 
motions 
‘Participant does risk 
management actions 
that are formally 
required, but without 
making risk informed 
decisions.’ 
not driven by risk 
at all 
‘The participant 
describes a 
situation where 
their behaviour is 
not driven by risk.’ 
formal risk 
management 
‘The participant 
describes a 
situation where 
risk management 
process is explicit 
and formalised.’ 
informal risk 
management 
‘The participant 
describes a 
situation where 
risk management 
process is tacit and 
intangible.’ 
codified process  
‘Explicit, codified 
processes drive peoples 
risk behaviour and 
influence their risk based 
decisions.’ 
2 (32) 1 (21) 13 (123)* 1 (23) 
experience 
‘Professional experience 
shapes risk behaviour.’ 
0 0 2 (33) 6 (45) 
internal consultation and 
collaboration 
‘Risk behaviour is shaped 
by consultation and 
collaboration between 
employees.’ 
0 1 (13) 0 10 (69) 
not codified guidelines 
‘Risk behaviour is 
explicitly not informed by 
formal guidance.’ 
1 (24) 1 (24)  5 (58) 
 
* Of those codified processes driving risk behaviour Project Management Processes (n=11) and Gateways 
(required processes to gain approval and funding for projects) (n=5) where the most significant. 
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4.5.3. Institutional and cultural factors 
 
The culture in the department had several other features which suggest it is inherently 
compatible with the diverse risk management practice observed. First, participants 
(n=14) perceived top-down control to be predominately outcome focussed; 
 
“I’ve never been overly concerned with the process; it’s more the outcome, and I 
think you need that. I think that [the Department] acknowledges that everybody works 
differently, and that what works for somebody might not work for someone else.” 
 
Secondly, participants (n=12) expressed a closely related assumption that risk 
management had to be flexible and devolved in order to accommodate the context 
specific aspects of risk; 
 
“I don’t think there’s guidance about that [risk management], not that I’m aware of.  
And I think it has to be issue specific.  I think it depends on your particular work area 
and your relationship with your stakeholders.” 
 
4.5.4. Perception of risk and risk management 
 
Investigation of the conceptualisation of risk management among interviewees 
revealed diverse perceptions, with no strong common understanding of the purpose of 
risk management, the main beneficiary of risk management and the effect of formal 
risk management (Tables 4.3.5. and 4.3.6.). For example, five participants described 
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risk management in risk averse terms, as a means to reduce risk and avoid mistakes in 
policy development (code: ‘avoid mistakes’, Table 4.3.5.); 
 
“I would hope that as a result of taking a risk based approach, there is less of a 
tendency for the Department to make bad policy and policy which has to be 
reversed.” 
 
While other participants with a more risk seeking attitude (n=4) viewed risk 
management as a means to take more risk and push forward policy development 
(code: ‘take on risks’, Table 4.3.5.); 
 
“Risk management allows you to actually make decisions and get on and do things 
instead of just, kind of, being paralysed by the fear of something going wrong.” 
 
There was also little common consensus on whom or what the main beneficiary of 
risk management was among participants (Table 4.3.5.). Participants were largely 
split by those who believed the end customers (main parties affected by policy) were 
the main participant (codes: ‘direct stakeholder’ and ‘the public’, Table 4.3.5.); 
 
“I think the whole organisation benefits from it but, ultimately, one would hope that 
those people who are going to use, or be part of, the policy, those people who’ll be 
subject to the policy. Whether that be somebody in local government or an individual 
or someone else, can feel that the policy itself has been properly thought through, and 
that where there may be risks to their particular interest, those risks have been taken 
into consideration.” 
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And those who identified the Departments or Government’s reputation as the main 
beneficiary (codes: ‘Department’s reputation’ and ‘Government’s reputation’, Table 
5); 
 
“In terms of the risk management, I suppose it benefits [the Department]'s reputation 
among other Departments because I seem to be, not being a maverick Department  
going ahead and doing things without consulting people.” 
 
Participant’s perception of the purpose of formal risk management was similarly 
varied (Table 4.3.6.), including a range of positive and negative perceptions. Positive 
perceptions of the effect of formal risk management included that it helped prioritises 
risks and risk mitigation (n=5); it focussed attention onto risk (n=5) and that it 
facilitated participatory risk management by making risks explicit and visual and thus, 
more accessible for a wider range of individuals to quickly engage with (n=5) (Table 
4.3.6.); 
 
“I find having a formal risk register has been very useful […] it encourages 
everybody within the team, regardless of where you are to comment and to flag things 
which wouldn’t happen otherwise.” 
 
Negative perceptions of formal risk management were also present (Table 4.3.6.). For 
example, the perception of six participants that risk management was primarily a tool 
make their risk management activities visible to superiors and not a means to inform 
 114 
their policy-making with risk; (code: ‘demonstrate risk management activity’, Table 
4.3.6.); 
 
“They’re [risk management processes] a useful way of demonstrating or 
communicating that you’re thinking about risk […] but they don’t necessarily make 
you think about risks if that makes sense.” 
 
At a more extreme level, five participants viewed formal risk management as 
meaningless bureaucracy (code: ‘unnecessary bureaucracy’, Table 4.3.6.) and 
therefore resisted engaging in those risk management practices; 
 
“[…] there is still a lingering feel in the department, particularly amongst policy 
officials, that anything to do with PPM [project and program management] which 
would encompass things like risk registers is a meaningless burden.  It’s just stupid 
processes that you have to go through but there’s no value to it.  So that means people 
aren’t really going to be paying attention to it.” 
 
The overall lack of consensus regarding risk was reflected in the variety of core risks 
driving policy development. The risks that were attributed particularly high 
importance (core risks) were identified by the relative emphasis placed on risks by 
participants (Table 4.3.7.). For example, if a participant emphasised one risk through 
quantity of iterations or choice of language it was coded as a ‘core risk’. Although 
risk of European Union (EU) infractions and negative stakeholder responses were the 
most common core risks, there was no core risk that was identified by all participants 
(Table 4.3.7.).    
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Table 4.3.5.: Conceptualisation of risk management 
c 
This table describes how participants conceptualised what and who risk management 
was for. This reflects underlying assumptions about risk management’s role within the 
organization. The data shows an overall lack of consensus as to what and who risk 
management was for. The main perceived beneficiaries were the reputation of the 
Department and the end customer. Perceptions of the purpose of risk management 
were more diverse. Purposes described ranged from producing good policy, to 
benefitting the reputation of policy makers, to benefitting the individuals involved in 
developing policy.  
 
Main code and sub-codes Number of respondents (number 
of codes) Main code Sub-codes 
Beneficiary of risk management – 
the participants’ perception of who 
or what the main beneficiary(ies) of 
risk management are. 
Direct stakeholders  9 (10) 
Department’s reputation 8 (9) 
Minister(s) responsible for policy 6 (6) 
Government’s reputation 4 (5) 
The public 4 (6) 
Project team 3 (3) 
Person formally responsible for risk 3 (3) 
Main code Sub-codes  
Purpose of risk management – the 
participants’ perception of the 
purpose of risk management. 
Avoiding making mistakes 5 (6) 
Make decisions despite risks 4 (5) 
Incorporating and balancing 
stakeholder interests 
3 (4) 
To produce better policy 3 (4) 
Meet bureaucratic demands 3 (3) 
Benefiting the Department’s 
reputation 
2 (2) 
Benefiting Government’s reputation 2 (2) 
Covering your back 2 (4) 
Tool to push individual agenda 2 (2) 
Increasing risk awareness 2 (2) 
Facilitate proactive risk 
management 
2 (2) 
Prioritising limited resources 1 (2) 
 
c Examples of data behind codes within Table 4.3.5. can be found in appendix I. 
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Table 4.3.6.: Perceived effect of formal risk management 
d 
This table describes how participants perceived formal risk management. Perceptions 
are varied. Perceptions of the effect of formal risk management range from: 
improving risk management; to benefitting project management and an unnecessary 
bureaucratic burden. Of particular note is the perception that formal risk 
management is desirable as a way to make explicit and thus demonstrate risk 
management activity to superiors. This suggests some participants perceive that their 
superiors have a positive attitude towards risk management and expect to be gain 
personal benefit from being seen to manage risk.   
 
Main code and sub-codes Description Number of 
respondents (codes) Main code Sub-codes 
Perceived effect 
of formal risk 
management  
Formal risk 
management is 
defined as with an 
explicit logic and 
evidence based, 
and following a 
repeatable 
method. 
Demonstrate risk 
management activity 
Formal risk management allows 
individuals to make visible their risk 
management activities, particularly to 
superiors.  
6 (9) 
Help prioritise risks 
and work 
Formal risk management helps organise 
work by identifying goals, priorities and 
deadlines.  
5 (9) 
Facilitate participatory 
risk management 
Codifying risks and making them explicit 
allows a wider number of individuals to 
be aware of the risks and engage in risk 
based decision making. 
5 (9) 
Unnecessary 
bureaucracy  
Formal risk management activities do not 
benefit or change risk behaviour.  
5 (9) 
Prompt attention on 
risk and risk 
management 
Formal risk management reminds staff to 
be aware of risks and to engage in risk 
management activities. 
5 (8) 
Facilitate proactive risk 
management 
Formal risk management encourages 
forward looking risk management. 
4 (5) 
Help keep track of 
risks 
Formal risk management helps 
individuals keep aware and up-to-date 
with risk. 
3 (4) 
Keeping aware of 
project plan 
Formal risk management keeps 
individuals aware of project progress 
and thus identify upcoming tasks and 
priorities. 
2 (2) 
Formally assign risk 
owners 
Formal risk management identifies risk 
owners and thus assigns responsibility. 
1 (1) 
Helps identify risks Formal risk management increases the 
likelihood of identifying risks. 
1 (1) 
 
d Examples of data behind codes within Table 4.3.6. can be found in Appendix I. 
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Table 4.3.7.: Core risks driving risk management 
This table shows the driver or risk that was the main factor influencing participants 
risk behaviour. The results indicate that overall the main factors were a desire to 
avoid EU infraction and to avoid a negative response from stakeholders.  
 
Core driver or risk: Example Number of 
respondents 
(number of codes) 
Avoiding EU infractions “Risk is everywhere, and you've got to mitigate risk 
because I'd get infractions if I don't.” 
7 (12) 
Avoiding negative stakeholder 
response 
“A lot of mine is around stakeholders so what 
stakeholders’ views are likely, well and consumer 
views.  So if I go down a certain path how a 
stakeholder’s going to respond to it.” 
5 (8) 
Risk to the Department’s reputation “And against the reputational damage that it might 
do to the Department.” 
4 (4) 
Managing limited resources “[…] more recently I suppose money and 
resources.” 
3 (6) 
Risk to UK Gov or minister 
reputation 
“I guess I’d be more focused on the reputation risk 
to the Department.” 
3 (3) 
Balancing stakeholder interests “I have to – I walk a tightrope between the 
obligations of the European directives and the 
desires of people who would like there to be less 
regulation.” 
2 (2) 
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4.6. Summary of results. 
 
Through describing the processes and actions of two organisations seeking to achieve 
pervasive risk management (Chapters 4.2., 4.4. and 4.5.), the case studies revealed 
some of the social processes (Burgess 2010) and cultural factors (Johnson 1992) 
involved. Social processes are defined as ways of thinking and interacting that 
establish patterns of behaviour within social groups (Burgess 2010). For example 
‘imitation’ is a social process which transmits new ideas between groups and 
individuals and ‘subjugation’ is a social process which affects the distribution of 
power with groups (Burgess 2010). Cultural factors are defined as shared values and 
beliefs which affect group behaviour (Johnson 1992; Schein 2004). 
 
The findings of case study one described how experiential knowledge was used and 
shared within the organisation. Case study one also revealed the relationship between 
sharing experiential knowledge, communication and coordination. Case study two 
described both the sources of information used to inform risk management and 
patterns of risk management practice across the policy teams interviewed. Case study 
two revealed the importance of informal, lateral communication to risk management; 
and the relationship between participants’ perceptions of risk management and their 
risk management practice. In the following chapter these findings will be analysed 
with reference to the relevant literature in order to identify common themes and 
develop an explanation for them.  
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5. Discussion 
 
Introduction. Here the premise and context of this research, as set out in more 
detail in the introduction and literature review, are recapitulated. This research deals 
with how organisations can achieve pervasive risk management, defined as risk 
management that is coordinated and consistent. There is a growing body of literature, 
in the fields of risk management maturity (Strutt et al. 2006) and enterprise risk 
management (Kimbourgh and Componation 2009), that argues effective risk 
governance requires risk management practice that is coordinated and consistent 
across an organisation. Further, there is increasing demand put on organisational 
leadership to control risk management across the entirety of organisations to provide 
assurance to stakeholders (Arena et al. 2010). However, the proliferation of risks 
faced by organisations (Power 2004; Power et al. 2009) and necessary involvement of 
multiple individuals (Weick 2005) and stakeholders groups (Klinke & Renn 2012) 
makes achieving pervasive risk management challenging. This is particularly the case 
where risks are difficult to quantify and where the relevant expertise is distributed 
across an organisation, requiring the delegation of risk management responsibility 
(Fraser & Henry 2007).  
 
The literature review (chapter 2) identified key questions on how organisations can 
achieve pervasive risk management. It revealed uncertainty on the role of informal 
aspects of organisational life, such as organisational culture, in achieving pervasive 
risk management. The research that followed subsequently focused on the social 
processes and cultural factors that affected how the case study organisations 
coordinated their risk management practices. In summary, this research shows that, in 
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the two organisations researched, to achieve pervasive risk management, aligned with 
corporate objectives and with employee ‘buy-in’, risk managers needed to ensure 
local expertise was valued, risk relevant knowledge was shared laterally and vertically 
across the organisation, and that a shared understanding of risk management’s 
purpose is established and maintained. The novelty of these findings is to identify and 
describe social processes through which risk culture can affect the pervasiveness of 
risk management. The implication for risk management is that pervasive risk 
management cannot always be achieved through formal processes alone. Further, by 
developing an explanation for how the social processes and cultural factors identified 
affect risk management practice, the findings provide guidance on how organisations 
might achieve pervasive risk management, particularly in complex and dynamic 
environments.  
 
Discussion overview. In chapters 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 the case studies are discussed 
separately. The case studies reveal three social processes that affected risk 
management pervasiveness: informal communication; deference to expertise and 
representation (Asch 1987) (Table 5.1.). Representation is defined as the cognitive 
process by which individuals predict the impact of their actions on the wider 
organisation or group they are a part of (Asch 1987). Further, three cultural factors 
necessary for those processes to produce coordinated risk management are identified 
from the case studies: respect for experience; a culture of collaboration and a shared 
strategic vision of risk management (Table 5.1.).  
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Table 5.1.: Summary of social process and cultural factors affecting risk 
management practice identified in the case studies. 
Chapter Context Social process Cultural factor (s) Effect on risk management pervasivenessc 
5.1. Power Utility 
(Case study 
one) 
Deference to expertisea Shared experience; 
Respect for experience 
(a high value attributed 
to direct experience) 
By promoting communication and utilisation of 
experiential knowledgeb, shared experience and 
respect for experience facilitated coordination 
and understanding between operational and 
managerial employees. 
5.2. Government 
Department 
(Case study two 
– knowledge 
transfer) 
Informal, lateral 
communication 
Culture of collaboration The informal communication driven by the 
cultural of collaboration facilitated the 
aggregation of knowledge and development of a 
common understanding on risk issues. However, 
without formal support informal communication 
was vulnerable to knowledge loss through staff 
turnover and resource pressures. 
5.3. Government 
Department 
(Case study two 
– shared 
knowledge) 
Predicting the wider 
impact of individual risk 
management actions 
(representationd ) 
Common understanding 
of the purpose and 
function of risk 
management 
Lack of a common understanding of the purpose 
and function of risk management lead to lack of 
individual engagement in risk management 
processes and uncoordinated risk management 
practice. 
 
a  ‘Deference to expertise’ refers to the delegation of decision making rights to those perceived to have the highest relevant 
expertise rather any other criteria, such as seniority (K E Weick et al. 1999). 
b ‘Experiential knowledge’ refers to knowledge gained from first-hand experience of the phenomena to which the knowledge 
relates. It includes specific knowledge: knowledge that cannot be easily shared through a symbolic language or numbers, for 
example tacit knowledge. 
c ‘Pervasiveness’ refers to the extent to which risk management is embedded and coordinated across an organisation. 
d Representation refers to the process by which individuals imagine how their actions will affect their social group (Asch 1987). 
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In chapters 5.4 and 5.5 the common themes between the case studies are discussed. 
An important common theme that emerges between the case studies is ‘coordination 
through mutual adjustment’. Coordination through mutual adjustment is defined as 
reciprocal coordination between interdependent parties and is a particularly flexible 
and adaptive form of coordination (Thompson 1967; Mintzberg 1979). Chapters 5.4 
and 5.5 discuss how the social processes identified in the case studies (Figure 5.1.) act 
to integrate risk relevant knowledge distributed across organisational members and 
stakeholders, allowing those actors to coordinate their risk management practice 
through mutual adjustment. 
 
In chapter 5.6 the social processes identified in the case studies (Table 5.1.) and the 
explanation of their function (chapters 5.4. and 5.5.) are integrated to build an model 
describing how these social processes interact to affect risk management 
pervasiveness (Figure 5.2.). Finally, chapter 5.7 revisits the literature review (chapter 
2) in light of the research findings and explores the role of the social processes 
identified (Table 5.1.) in achieving pervasive risk management in complex 
environments that require adaptive risk management.  
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5.1. Case study of a power utility company: respect for experience, 
shared experience and coordination. 
 
The findings of this case study of a power utility company (chapter 4.2.) revealed how 
experience informed risk-based decisions in an organisational context and how that 
knowledge was utilised in a coordinated manner. 
 
Although all knowledge is arguably derived from experience (Kolb 1984), experience 
in the context of expertise and naturalistic decisions, experience refers to knowledge 
gained from direct experience of the subject of that knowledge (Lipshitz et al. 2001; 
Hoffman 1996) or from practice that simulates experience of the subject (Ericsson & 
Charness 1994; Barnett & Koslowski 2002). For example, knowledge gained from 
playing chess would develop expertise, while the knowledge gained from reading 
about chess would not (Ericsson 2006). The critical difference being that direct 
experience of playing chess (or anything else) can result in a richer knowledge that 
includes tacit knowledge (tacit knowledge can only be gained through direct 
experience) (Polanyi 1966). Thus, for the purposes of case study one and this 
research, ‘experiential knowledge’ and ‘experience’ are defined as knowledge gained 
from direct experience of the subject of that knowledge. As such experiential 
knowledge may include specific knowledge (Jensen & Meckling 1995), such as tacit 
knowledge (Polanyi 1966). This is in contrast to ‘general knowledge’ (Jensen & 
Meckling 1995) that can be gained and communicated without the need for direct 
experience, for example by reading a book on the subject.  
 
In case study one of a power utility interviewees described drawing on experience to 
inform risk-based decisions with specialised and context specific knowledge (chapter 
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4.2.1., Table 4.1.1.), particularly when faced with unpredictable and dynamic risks 
(chapter 4.2.2., Tables, 4.1.3. and 4.1.4., code: ‘complex risk decision’, and Table 
4.1.5.). Interviewees reported that utilising experiential knowledge in risk-based 
decision making allowed their responses to risks to be more adaptive than could be 
achieved by codified rules and procedures alone (chapter 4.2.2. and Table 4.1.5.). This 
is consistent with what would be predicted by naturalistic decision making theory that 
ascribes the ability of experts to make sense of complex and unusual circumstance to 
their experience (Klein 2008; Lipshitz et al. 2001). The other context associated with 
use of experiential knowledge, time pressure (Tables 4.1.3. and 4.1.4., code ‘high time 
pressure), is also consistent with contexts in which intuitive expertise is typically used 
(Agor 1986).  
 
However, the findings also illustrated that experiential knowledge did not act in 
isolation of other factors influencing risk-based decisions (Table 4.1.2.) and crucially, 
interacted with codified processes and rules (chapter 4.2.3.). This occurred through 
two main mechanisms: first, using experience to assess whether the response specified 
by a codified rule seemed appropriate; and second, using experience of a specific 
context to adapt the codified, generic response to a risk (chapter 4.2.3.). A key finding 
of case study one was that a widespread ‘respect for experience’ (Table 4.1.6., code: 
‘respect for experience’) encouraged and legitimised this use of experiential 
knowledge, particularly in relation to formal rules (chapter 4.2.3.). Respect for 
experience is defined as ‘recognising that the experience of others may be of use to 
the individual, actively seeking it and learning from it’ (chapter 4.2.3. and Table 
4.1.6.). The effect of respect for experience was that interviewees often supplemented 
their own experience with that of others (chapter 4.2.1. and table 4.1.2., code: 
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‘colleague’s experience’) and felt able to openly use that experience in their risk-
based decisions (chapter 4.2.3. and Table 4.1.6.). By legitimising the explicit use of 
experience to inform risk management practice (chapter 4.2.3. and Table 4.1.6.) 
respect for experience contributed to the situation observed in the power utility where 
experiential knowledge was regularly used to create and adapt rules (chapter 4.2.3.). 
For example, the respect for the experience of a low ranking member of staff repairing 
cables led to that individual’s experiential knowledge being widely consulted, learned 
from and integrated into operational guidelines (chapter 4.2.1. pp. 69). Such 
delegation of decision rights on the basis of expertise and regardless of seniority is 
referred to as ‘deference to expertise’ (Weick et al. 1999). The effect of deference to 
expertise, driven by respect for experience, was that risk management rules and 
procedures were adapted to operational realities (chapter 4.2.3.). However, in contrast, 
where participants felt that their expertise was not valued or reflected in rules and 
procedures this sometimes lead to a lack of engagement and ‘buy-in’ to those rules or 
procedures (chapter 4.2.3.). For example, the requirement to complete a new risk 
assessment on everyday of a project even if the situation had not changed, rather than 
modify a single risk assessment as needed, was resented by some employees who 
treated it as an unnecessary process (chapter 4.2.3. pp. 79). Therefore, these results 
indicate that by encouraging experiential knowledge to be shared and used, respect for 
experience facilitated coordination between operational and managerial staff by 
helping to avoid rules being developed that did not reflect practical operational 
realities. This finding is consistent with those of Antonsen (2009) and Knudsen 
(2009) who found that the inability of operational staff and their managers to 
communicate effectively and establish a common understanding of safety issues led to 
administrative processes that did not reflect operational realities and rule breaking as a 
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means to compensate for those inadequate processes. However, the findings of this 
case study are distinct in A) providing a positive example of coordination being 
successfully achieved through deference to expertise and B) identifying an underlying 
cultural factor ‘respect for experience’ driving that process. A limitation of these 
findings is that interviewees may have been reluctant to report more extreme lack of 
compliance such as rule breaking. 
 
Another factor affecting communication and coordination between operational and 
managerial staff in the power utility was shared experience (chapter 4.2.4. and Table 
4.1.6., code: ‘importance of sharing experience for communication’). Overlapping 
experience between individuals spanning hierarchal groups (such as between 
operational staff and line managers) facilitated communication of experiential 
knowledge (Table 4.1.6.) and coordination (Table 4.1.7) between those groups. Where 
operational and managerial staff shared relevant common experience they were able 
to communicate more effectively and had more trust in each other’s judgement (Table 
4.1.6.). However, where relevant common experience was lacking, communication 
and trust were reduced (Table 4.1.6.), which in turn negatively impacted the 
coordination (Table 4.1.7). For example, a failure to communicate the value of 
strategic asset risk assessment to business units lead to reluctance on the part of those 
business units to adapt their behaviour (increase reporting of local asset condition) to 
meet the needs of those carrying out strategic asset risk management (chapter 4.2.4. 
and Table 4.1.7.). These findings are consistent with research into coordination which 
finds that shared experience provides the common knowledge allowing individuals to 
share and understand experiential knowledge which is otherwise difficult to transfer 
(Carlile 2004) and conversely, lack of shared experience between organisational 
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subgroups limits knowledge sharing between those groups (Brown & Duguid 2001). 
However, the findings of this case study go further, identifying and describing the role 
of shared experience in coordinating risk management practice between individuals in 
operational and managerial roles. This is highly relevant to achieving pervasive risk 
management as many organisations find coordinating strategic and operational risk 
management particularly challenging (Economist Intelligence Unit 2009; AON 2007). 
Therefore, it is also significant that there was some indication that shared experience 
and experience in general were declining in the power utility due to a reduction in 
opportunities, such as apprenticeships or supervisory roles, for experienced staff to 
pass on experience (chapter 4.2.5.). Therefore, investigating the effect of different 
methods to actively manage experience and facilitate sharing experiential knowledge 
on achieving pervasive risk management would make an interesting topic for further 
research.   
 
Summary. Case study one of a power utility identified ‘respect for experience’ as a 
key cultural factor that encouraged experiential knowledge to be widely shared and 
used in risk-based decision making in that organisation. In particular, respect for 
experience encouraged and legitimated the delegation of risk-based decisions to junior 
but experienced employees, a process referred to as ‘deference to expertise’ (Weick et 
al. 1999). This benefited risk-based decisions through a more accessible and richer 
body of expertise, and facilitated mutual coordination (Mintzberg 1979) between 
employees across hierarchical levels. The case study also reiterated the importance of 
shared experience to communication and coordination between organisation 
subgroups. These findings on respect for experience and shared experience are 
important because effective and timely sharing of knowledge is viewed as critical to 
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organisational ability to respond to risks in a proactive and adaptive manner 
(Grabowski & Roberts 1996; Bierly 1995). In particular experiential knowledge 
(expertise) can be critical to organisational ability to respond effectively to dynamic 
and novel risks (Weick et al. 1999; Weick 2010).  
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5.2. Case study two of a government department: lateral 
communication. 
 
Case study two of a central government department (chapter 4.4.) revealed the 
importance of lateral knowledge transfer between policy teams, colleagues and 
stakeholders to the organisation’s ability to coordinate the actions of the diverse and 
numerous actors involved in complex environmental risks. 
 
 Lateral knowledge transfer, defined as transfer of knowledge horizontally across 
hierarchal or functional divisions within organisations (Walczak 2005), was the most 
common source of knowledge used to manage risk reported by the policy teams 
interviewed (Table 4.2.1., codes: ‘external stakeholders; informal communication 
between policy teams; specialist advisors’). For example, through communication 
with civil society groups and regulated industries, policy teams gained knowledge of 
how stakeholders perceived risks and how they might respond to policy options. Thus, 
informal communication was critical to the policy teams’ ability to gain the specific 
(Jensen & Meckling 1995), contextual knowledge required to effectively manage risk 
(chapter 4.4.2). The importance of communication with stakeholders revealed in this 
case study is illustrated by one policy, developed by the case study department, which 
arguably failed due to insufficient communication with key stakeholders during the 
policy’s development. The policy was not sufficiently informed by consultation with 
stakeholders, with the result that when it was publicised it was a surprise for key 
stakeholders and the public. The consultation and impact assessment were published 
four months after the policy was announced. Subsequent protest from non-
governmental organisations, religious leaders and newly founded single issue groups 
made effective use of social media to mobilise widespread condemnation of the 
 130 
policy. Indicative of the lack of communication between those developing the policy 
and stakeholders, government advisors reported being shocked at stakeholders’ 
negative response. One senior Government advisor was quoted by national media 
sources as saying: 
 
"I were so enamoured of this idea across the board. I love that kind of thinking ... it 
blinded us to the political implications.” 
 
Following the negative stakeholder reaction, support for the policy, which had 
previously been high among senior officials, dwindled and the policy was abandoned. 
The highly public nature of the failed policy caused reputational damage to the 
department and those involved. In the following sub-chapter (5.2.1.) the 
organisational and cultural factors that affected the lateral communication observed 
are discussed. 
 
5.2.1 Factors affecting lateral communication 
 
The department’s culture of collaboration (Table 4.2.2., code: ‘culture of 
collaboration’) was a key driver behind the extensive informal communication 
observed. This culture of collaboration was described by participants (n=23) as a 
shared assumption that good policy making required consultation with others who had 
relevant knowledge or had an interest in the policy in question (chapter 4.4.3.). For 
example, policy makers felt an expectation to speak to colleagues who had worked in 
similar policy areas or consult external experts in the policy area. However, the 
findings also revealed two weaknesses associated with the informal communication 
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driven by this culture of collaboration: vulnerability to loss of knowledge through 
staff turnover (Table 4.2.3., code: ‘lack of knowledge retention’) and vulnerability to 
time and resource pressures (chapter 4.4.3.).  Further, reliance on informal processes 
to inform risk management is neither systematic nor controlled (MacGillivray et al. 
2007). Therefore, the results suggest that in order to further develop the risk maturity 
of this department and others like it, explicit communication that supports (not 
replaces) informal, lateral communication are necessary, for example: extended 
handover times, mentoring, corporate ‘yellow pages’ and greater use of cross 
functional project teams (Bollinger & Smith 2001).  
 
A key contribution of this case study is to offer insight into how lateral 
communication might be supported more generally. The use of risk registers increased 
knowledge transfer within policy teams (Table 4.2.2., code: ‘risk registers and team 
communication’). By requiring team members to make risk management knowledge 
explicit as numbers or text, risk registers facilitated knowledge transfer by creating a 
common language for risk knowledge (Grant 1996) and a forum where knowledge 
could be aggregated and shared (Moynihan & Landuyt 2009). Not all the policy teams 
sampled (seven out of twelve) used risk registers, therefore a first step towards 
enriching communication in the department would be to increase use of risk registers. 
However, the greater challenge is to develop mechanisms that achieve the same affect 
between policy teams and the wide range of experts and stakeholders they interact 
with. Such a mechanism must capture key risk relevant knowledge and make it widely 
accessible, both in the language used to represent the knowledge and the location 
where the knowledge is stored. Innovative research in this area, for example 
development of interactive models and ‘games’, will be critical to building the risk 
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management capability of the public sector by increasing the range of knowledge that 
can be effectively used to develop risk management interventions, increasing the 
quality and legitimacy of risk-based decisions therein.  
 
Summary. The case study of the central government department (chapter 4.4.) 
identified some aspects of how knowledge informs environmental policy-making. An 
extensive network of informal, lateral communication was important to the 
department’s ability to manage complex, environmental risks (Table 4.2.1). This 
network of communication allowed risk managers to gain and integrate knowledge on 
the perspectives of all the stakeholders involved, and provide stakeholders with 
information (chapter 4.4.2.). This reciprocal communication allowed risks to be 
managed in a way that all stakeholders could positively engage in, resulting in 
coordinated behaviour (chapter 4.4.2.). However, as described in this chapter, where 
communication was insufficient stakeholders may deliberately resist a policy rather 
than coordinate their actions to it. A significant factor driving the lateral 
communication observed was a culture of collaboration that effected normative 
pressure on policy makers to communicate with individuals and groups who had 
relevant knowledge or interest in the risks involved (Table 4.2.2.). The research also 
identified two weaknesses of the informal communication observed: vulnerability to 
losing knowledge through staff turnover and vulnerability to time and resource 
pressure (Table 4.2.3.).  
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5.3. Case study two of a government department: shared 
understanding. 
 
The case study of a central government department (chapter 4.5.) described the 
variation in risk management practice across the policy teams sampled and indentified 
possible explanatory factors. 
 
The overall picture of risk management practice in the department was a mixture of 
formal risk management practice driven by top-down factors (codified rules and 
leadership expectations) and informal risk management practice, influenced by 
bottom-up factors, peers and individual experience (Table 4.3.4.). Engagement with 
risk management processes and coordination of risk management activity varied 
between risk management teams: high in some and low in others (chapter 4.5.1. and 
Table 4.3.1.). The findings illustrate where risk management practice was coordinated 
(well defined project and programmes) and where it was uncoordinated or absent 
(policy formulation and ongoing work) (Table 4.3.2.).  These findings compliment 
descriptions of diversity in institutional risk management practice (Arena et al. 2010; 
Mikes 2009; Power 2008) with an account of variations in the risk management 
practice of individuals and teams. In particular, this case study provides a description 
of the dissociation between the formal descriptions of risk management and actual 
risk management practice predicted by Arena et al. (2010) and Power (2008). 
 
The findings identify the extent to which the department’s formal risk governance 
processes were effective in embedding risk management in policy development. For 
example, in high profile policy areas formal risk governance did predominantly shape 
the risk management practices of policy teams: evident in the association between the 
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presence of risk governance elements (codified processes and project management 
structures) and formal risk management practice (Tables 4.3.2., 4.3.4.). However, risk 
management was largely informal or absent outside of formal programmes and 
projects (Table 4.3.2.). Resistance to engaging positively with risk management 
processes was also observed, for example where risk management practices were 
either ignored or only superficially complied with (Table 4.3.1., codes: ‘not driven by 
risk at all; going through the motions’). Further, some risk management practice was 
varied and uncoordinated across the policy teams sampled, particularly the assessment 
of risk and participation of stakeholders in risk management (chapters 4.5.1. and 
4.5.2.). Risk management practice also varied within policy teams, for example one 
policy team leader interviewed who had previously used formal risk registers reverted 
back to informal risk management when moving to a new policy area (chapter 4.5.1.). 
This suggests that, despite widespread awareness of risk management, governance 
structures and processes in place, risk management was not consistently or deeply 
embedded in policy-making practice and culture of the department. This finding is 
further supported by the relative lack of norms and pragmatic legitimacy supporting 
risk management (Table 4.3.3., codes: ‘normative; individual pragmatic legitimacy’).  
 
Overall, the department’s culture displayed characteristics of an organic corporate 
culture (Deshpande et al. 1993); namely, a focus on results over process and the 
assumption that flexibility and devolved decision making were necessary (chapter 
4.5.3.). While this cultural context is conducive to the variability in risk management 
practice observed, it does not explain why some policy teams engaged positively with 
formal processes while others did not. Nor, for example, does it explain why some 
policy teams were more, or less, risk-seeking than others. 
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However, the lack of engagement with risk management observed (Table 4.3.1., 
codes: ‘not driven by risk at all; going through the motions’) can be explained by the 
lack of consensus on risk management’s purpose and function between the individuals 
interviewed (Tables 4.3.5. and 4.3.6.). ‘Purpose’ refers to an understanding of what 
risk management is for and who benefits from it. For example, does risk management 
primarily benefit the Department or stakeholders? ‘Function’ refers to understanding 
of how risk management achieves its purpose. For example, does risk management 
function by minimising mistakes, or allowing policy teams to take on more risk and 
therefore, opportunities? Drawing on the coordination theory concept of 
‘representation’ which proposes that the ability of an individual to coordinate her 
actions with a wider group is partially dependant on her ability to imagine how her 
actions will affect that group (Asch 1987), the observed lack of a shared 
understanding of purpose and function of risk management (Tables 4.3.5. and 4.3.6.) 
is a plausible driver of uncoordinated risk management practice observed (Table 
4.3.1.).  For example, understanding the purpose of risk management to be ‘protecting 
the Department’s reputation’ (Table 4.3.5., code: ‘department’s reputation’) may 
result in risk management activities which differ from those driven by an 
understanding that the purpose of risk management is to ‘create value for 
stakeholders’ (Table 4.3.5., code: ‘direct stakeholders’).  The findings also suggest 
that the varied perceptions of risk management affected coordination through formal 
processes and governance mechanisms: participants who resisted engagement with 
risk management processes (Table 4.3.1., codes: ‘not driven by risk at all; going 
through the motions’) also described the function of risk management as ‘a means to 
avoid blame’ (Table 4.3.5., code: ‘covering your back’) or as ‘unnecessary 
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bureaucracy’ (Table 4.3.6., code: ‘unnecessary bureaucracy’ and Table 4.3.5., code: ; 
‘meet bureaucratic demands’).  
 
These findings build on research into high reliability organisations (La Porte 1981) 
which found that they achieved coordinated yet flexible practice through shared 
norms (Faraj & Xiao 2006), objectives (Bigley & Roberts 2001) and ‘sensitivity to 
operations’ (Weick et al. 1999). Sensitivity to operations describes the common 
ability of actors in high reliability organisations to maintain a real-time understanding 
of how their actions interrelate with the wider organisation’s actions and processes 
(Weick & Roberts 1993; Weick et al. 1999). This shared understanding of the wider 
system allows the coordinating parties to predict how their actions will affect the 
group and adjust them accordingly (Asch 1987; Weick & Roberts 1993). Further, the 
work of Howard-Grenville (2005) on organisational routines, is consistent with 
variability in risk management practice observed and the absence of bottom up buy-in 
to risk management (Table 4.3.3.), because this made it more likely for risk 
management processes to be co-opted for individual agendas that may or may not 
align with the department’s risk management objectives. However, the results of this 
case study extend the prior art by identifying the importance of shared understanding 
of the function of risk management to coordination (in addition to shared objectives 
and awareness of wider system functioning). Further, this case study adds to previous 
research describing the effect of shared understanding at an organisational or team-
based level (for example, Weick et al. 1999; Faraj and Xiao 2006) with a description 
of how a shared understanding, or lack of, affected individual risk management 
practice. Finally, a key contribution of these findings is the observation that a shared 
understanding of risk management’s purpose and function not only affected 
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coordination through informal means but also coordination through rules and 
procedures. The implication of this finding for risk managers is that even where rigid 
coordination through standardisation is sought (Mintzberg 1979), a level of shared 
understanding on risk management’s overall purpose and function is still required. 
However, the author acknowledges that making the purpose of risk management 
explicit is problematic. The espoused rationale for risk management practice may 
differ from actual rationales and unconscious heuristics or beliefs driving behaviour. 
Further, it is questionable if it is feasible or desirable that all persons hold a single 
understanding as to the purpose and function of risk management given the contextual 
nature of risk management. However, from a governance perspective it still maybe 
important to establish an explicit and codified statement on the purpose and function 
of risk management that reflects the ambition of the organisations leadership and acts 
as a focus of discussion. As such, it will will act as a reference point for risk 
communication and action (Carlile 2004; Taylor and Van Every 2002), facilitating the 
coordination of risk management. It will also define the tool and metrics required to 
operationalize a truly enterprise-wide risk management system (Arena 2009). 
 
Summary. The lack of a common understanding of the purpose and function of risk 
management observed in this case study (Tables 4.3.5, 4.3.6.) is likely to have 
contributed to the lack of consistency and coordination in risk management practice 
observed (Table 4.3.1.). Thus, the findings of this case study suggest that a common 
understanding of the purpose and function of risk management is essential to achieve 
risk management that is consistent and coordinated across the whole organisation, at 
least in the organisation researched. Finally, a key finding in this case study is that 
efficacy for both formal and informal coordination mechanisms were affected by the 
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extent to which employees had a common understanding on the purpose and function 
of risk management (Table 4.3.6.). The implications for those aiming to achieve 
pervasive risk management are: first, that individual ability to coordinate their risk 
management actions with those of the wider group is partly dependant having a shared 
strategic understanding (of the purpose and function of risk management); and 
second, formal governance mechanisms alone are therefore insufficient. 
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5.4. Cross case analysis: The role of dialogue in coordination 
 
In both organisations studied, dialogue between colleagues, stakeholders and across 
the chain of command emerged as an important mechanism of knowledge transfer and 
coordination. Dialogue refers to forms of communication that allow the parties 
involved to understand each other’s perspective (Shotter 1993; Pearce & Littlejohn 
1997). For example, come to understand the values, assumptions and experiences that 
underpin the perspective of others, even if they do not agree with that perspective 
(Gadamer 1993). The three core processes of dialogue are suspending belief (Stewart 
et al. 2005), empathy (Rogers 1980) and establishing a shared way of speaking 
(Gadamer 1993).  
 
Dialogue describes the communication observed in both studies that played an 
important role in shaping risk management practice (chapters 4.2.1., 4.2.3., and 4.5.2., 
Tables 4.1.2., 4.2.1. and 4.3.3.). The term dialogue reflects the nature of the 
communication observed, which involved transferring knowledge and creating shared 
meaning between individuals who sometimes had quite different perceptions and 
experiences of risk. The importance of dialogue to this thesis is the reciprocal transfer 
of knowledge it facilitated and resulting mutual coordination of risk management 
practice between individuals (Chapters 4.1 and 5.1) and between the organisations and 
their stakeholders (Chapters 4.2.3. and 5.2.). Dialogue achieved this by allowing the 
coordinating parties to take into account the knowledge of other involved parties 
when managing risks. In case study one of a power utility, vertical transfer of the 
specific knowledge of operational staff (for example, conditions of local electrical 
substations) to those responsible for creating and enforcing rules and procedures (for 
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example, determining optimal inspection regimes for all substations) allowed those 
parties to coordinate their behaviour in complex environments where standardized 
procedures were not always appropriate (chapters 4.2.2., 4.2.3. and Table 4.1.3., 
4.1.7.). In case study two of a central government department, horizontal knowledge 
transfer between peers and stakeholders played an important role in creating mutual 
understanding between risk managers and stakeholders (chapter 4.4.2., 5.2. and Table 
4.2.1.). For example, by engaging in dialogue with regulators, scientific experts and 
the regulated industries, risk managers were able to develop a mutually acceptable 
definition and assessment of a risk (chapter 4.4.2. pp.90). Conversely, there were 
examples of uncoordinated behaviour due to lack of dialogue in both case studies. For 
example, in the power utility inadequate communication between line managers and 
operational staff lead to a lack of engagement by operational staff that reduced the 
efficacy of strategic risk management (chapters 4.2.3., 4.2.4. and Table 4.1.7.). In the 
government department, failure to engage stakeholders in dialogue contributed to 
those stakeholders rejecting a policy, resulting in the policy being abandoned with 
associated reputational damage (chapter 5.2. pp.111). Dialogue was most prominent 
when risks where complex (dynamic and unpredictable) (Tables 4.1.3., 4.1.4.) and 
when formal rules where minimal or judged inadequate (chapter 4.2.2., Tables 4.1.4., 
4.3.4., chapter 4.5.2. and Table 4.3.2.). Thus, the coordination observed, and the role 
of dialogue therein, is consistent with ‘coordination through mutual adjustment’ 
(Mintzberg 1979), which is typically achieved through reciprocal communication and 
associated with coordinating behaviour in the most complex and uncertainty 
environments (Carlile 2004). This is significant given the prior emphasis on 
coordination through standardization in the risk governance literature (chapter 2.3, pp. 
35). 
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A key finding is that the use of dialogue to inform risk management observed in the 
case studies was not limited to situations where rules were absent or minimal. This is 
important because it indicates that informal coordination mechanisms, such as 
dialogue, do not act in isolation from formal coordination mechanisms, such as 
through rules of codified processes. In the power utility dialogue also informed 
decisions when rules were present. This also predominantly occurred where risks 
were complex and unpredictable (chapters 4.2.2. and Tables 4.1.4, 4.1.5.). In these 
situations dialogue was a means by which local experience supplemented established 
rules and guidelines to inform risk-based decisions (chapter 4.2.3.). For example, line 
managers relied on the specific knowledge (Jensen & Meckling 1995) of operators to 
identify when standard operating procedures might not be the safest way to execute a 
task and then, working with their line manager, determine how best to proceed (i.e. 
whether to follow, reject or adapt the formal procedures) (chapter 4.2.3.). Participants 
in case study one widely viewed the integration of experiential knowledge into risk-
based decisions through dialogue as necessary because codified rules alone could not 
produce behaviour that was sufficiently adaptive to effectively manage complex risks 
(chapter 4.2.2. and Table 4.1.5.). For example, standard designs for electrical 
networks were not always sufficient given unusual geography or unusual 
combinations of old and new technology (Tables 4.1.1., 4.1.5.). Such interaction 
between operational staff, managerial staff, rules and experience reflects the classical 
definition of coordination through mutual adjustment: an adaptive, communication 
intensive method of coordination used when more inflexible methods of coordination, 
such as coordination through standardization, are inadequate (Mintzberg 1979). 
Further, in case study one it was observed that the efficacy of dialogue (as a means to 
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shared knowledge and establish a common understanding) was partially dependant on 
the communicating parties having sufficient shared experience (chapters 4.2.4. and 
Table 4.1.6., code ‘importance of shared experience for communication’). This was 
true from the perspective of both managers and managed. Managers were more 
confident in their ability to judge the competence of those they managed when they 
shared some experience (Table 4.1.6.) and those managed felt between able to 
communicate with their line manager when he or she had relevant experience (Table 
4.1.6.) 
 
In case study two of a central government department, risk management was more 
informal, often occurring with minimal prescriptive rules (chapter 4.5.1. and Table 
4.3.1., code: ‘informal risk management practice’) and the relationship between rules 
and specific knowledge was less apparent. However, the findings here did also reveal 
an association between dialogue and specific knowledge: interviewees associated lack 
of ability to engage peers in dialogue (because they had left the role or organisation) 
with loss of context specific knowledge relevant to risk management (chapter 4.4.3.). 
For example, rapid rotation of staff between different policy areas was associated by 
some participants with an inability to gain to pass on specific knowledge (chapter 
4.4.3. and Table 4.2.3., code ‘lack of knowledge retention’). Thus, in both 
organisations studied, dialogue is associated with the integration of specific 
knowledge into risk-based decisions which in turn facilitated coordination of risk 
management practices between colleagues and with stakeholders. Thus, the novel 
contribution of these findings is to describe how informal dialogue interacts with 
formal rules and processes to shape risk management practice that is coordinated, yet 
also flexible enough to adapt to a dynamic and varied environment. 
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Core finding. Dialogue contributed to coordinating risk management through 
mutual adjustment by facilitating the integration of knowledge distributed across 
employees and stakeholders in both the organisations researched (Figure 5.1.). In 
particular dialogue allowed front line employees and line managers to coordinate their 
behaviour by integrating specific knowledge (Jensen & Meckling 1995) with the 
general knowledge encoded in rules and procedures (Figure 5.1.). Further, the transfer 
of specific knowledge, such as tacit knowledge gained through direct experience, was 
dependant on a degree of shared knowledge between the communicating parties.  
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5.5. Cross case analysis: Non-dialogue based coordination 
 
5.5.1. Deference to expertise 
 
Dialogue was not the only process of coordination observed in the case studies. In 
both organisations integration of distributed knowledge to inform and coordinate risk 
management was also observed through a process called ‘deference to expertise’, 
which is the delegation of decisions to those with the greatest (relevant) expertise 
regardless of hierarchy or any other factor (Weick et al. 1999). Deference to expertise 
was most evident in the case study of a power utility (case study one) where it was 
driven by a widely shared ‘respect for experience’ that encouraged the communication 
of experiential knowledge and its explicit use in risk-based decisions (chapters 4.2.3., 
5.1.2. and Table 4.1.6.). Respect for experience is defined as a high value attributed to 
concrete, experiential knowledge and those who held it. For example, respect for 
experience encouraged the delegation of the decision on how to repair a damaged 
cable to a junior but more experienced employee rather than the more senior project 
manager (chapter 4.2.1., pp. 64). Thus, rather than transfer experiential knowledge to 
the decision maker through dialogue (chapter 5.4.), the relevant knowledge was 
integrated into risk management decisions by delegating the decision to the 
experienced party. In the case study of the central government department (case study 
two), deference to expertise and respect for experience were less apparent. However, a 
respect for experience was implicit in the rationale behind the department’s outcome 
focused culture (chapter 4.5.3.), which gave considerable discretion on how to 
manage risks to policy teams. The rationale for the outcome focused culture given by 
participants (n=12) was that because risk management had to flexible in order to 
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accommodate the specifics details of risks it had to be largely delegated to policy 
teams, who would be most familiar with those specifics (chapter 4.5.3.). The 
implication being that operational decisions on how to manage risks were being 
delegated to policy teams on the basis they had the most relevant expertise. The 
significance of this finding is that it expands the role of deference to expertise from a 
means of decision allocation (Weick et al. 1999) to include facilitation of coordination 
of risk management practice. 
 
Here an explanation for the relationship between deference to expertise and 
coordination through mutual adjustment observed in case studies one and two is 
offered. One way to coordinate action without the need to share knowledge is to use 
standardised rules (Grant 1996; Mintzberg 1979). However, as case study one 
indicated rules and procedures are sometimes insufficient in unusual or novel 
circumstance (chapters 4.2.2. and Table 4.1.5.). In these situations the adaptability of 
coordination through mutual adjustment is required (Mintzberg 1979). This can be 
achieved through transferring knowledge, for example through dialogue (chapter 
5.5.). However, transferring knowledge can be difficult and time consuming, 
especially with regards specific knowledge (Grant 1996; Brown & Duguid 2001). To 
avoid the costs associated with knowledge transfer, decisions can instead be delegated 
to individuals with the relevant knowledge (Jensen & Meckling 1995) as was 
observed in case study one and to a lesser extent in case study two (chapters 4.2.3., 
4.5.3. and Table 4.1.6.). Thus, deference to expertise offers an alternative means (to 
dialogue) to integrate specific knowledge into risk-based decisions and thus 
coordinate risk management practice between those who had relevant specific 
knowledge and those who did not.  
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Core finding. In both organisations researched, deference to expertise, driven by a 
respect for experience, integrated specific knowledge into risk-based decisions 
(Figure 5.1.). This contributed to the coordination (through mutual adjustment) of risk 
management practice, particularly between those who had local, tacit knowledge on 
risks and those who did not.  
 147 
Figure 5.1.: Summary of the role of ‘dialogue’ and ‘deference to expertise’ in 
achieving pervasive risk management observed in case studies of a Power Utility 
and a Central Government Department. The transfer of risk-relevant knowledge 
(represented by the arrows) achieved through dialogue and deference to expertise 
allowed risk-based decision makers to draw on the knowledge distributed across 
multiple individuals and stakeholders, as well as formal rules and procedures. This 
allowed decisions makers to adapt actions to account for colleagues, stakeholders 
and rules, resulting in adaptive and coordinated behaviour. Effective dialogue and 
deference to expertise depended on a shared respect for experience and sufficient 
shared knowledge.   
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5.5.2. Shared strategic understanding 
 
In case study two of a central government department it was also observed that lack of 
a common understanding of the purpose and function of risk management undermined 
the coordination of risk management (chapters 4.3., 5.3.). The relevance to 
coordination is that shared knowledge, such as a common understanding of risk 
management’s purpose, forms the basis of shared mental models which can play an 
important role in coordination through mutual adjustment.  Shared mental models are 
used by groups to achieve coordination through mutual adjustment without the need 
for rules or intensive communication (Mathieu et al. 2000; Cannon-Bowers et al. 
1993). Mental models are structured bodies of knowledge that allow individuals to 
describe, explain and predict events in their environment by recognising relationships 
between objects in that environment and constructing expectations on the likely result 
of those objects interacting (Rouse & Morris 1986). When group members share 
elements of their mental models they can predict the actions and resource 
requirements, including information requirements, of their fellow group members and 
how their own actions may influence the wider group (Mathieu et al. 2000) without 
the need to follow predefined procedures or for constant communication (Stout et al. 
1999). This cognitive process of predicting the impact of ones actions on the wider 
group is called ‘representing’ (Asch 1987). Actors can then coordinate their behaviour 
based on their representation of how their actions will affect the wider group (Asch 
1987). Thus, when communication is limited and task uncertainty precludes 
coordination through rules or standardised processes (Mintzberg 1979), coordination 
(through mutual adjustment) can be achieved through shared mental models.  
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The findings of case study two (chapters 4.5, 5.3.) described what would be expected 
when a shared mental model is absent. The lack of common understanding of the 
purpose and function of risk management (chapter 4.5.4.. and Table 4.3.5.) 
corresponded to the uncoordinated risk management practice and lack of engagement 
with risk management processes observed (chapter 4.5.1. and Table 4.3.1.). Thus, the 
findings indicate that in the absence of a strong central message on risk management’s 
purpose and how it achieved that purpose, a variety of interpretations existed that 
resulted in the diverse and sometimes uncoordinated risk management practice 
observed (chapter 5.3). For example, perceptions of risk management’s purpose 
ranged from the outward looking, ‘to benefit stakeholders’ to the introspective, ‘to 
benefit the organisation’s reputation’. While perceptions of how risk management 
functioned ranged from: ‘reducing the number of policy mistakes made’; to ‘allowing 
decision to be taken despite risks’, and even that ‘risk management was an 
unnecessary bureaucracy’ (chapter 4.5.4. and Table 4.3.5.). It is important to note that 
this shared understanding (or lack of) is a broad strategic understanding of the purpose 
and function of risk management. This corresponds with research into coordination in 
high reliability organisations where adaptive coordination is partly achieved through 
shared objectives (Bigley & Roberts 2001). However, these findings also identify the 
importance of a shared understanding of the function of risk management in addition 
to its purpose. The implication of this is that those wishing to achieve pervasive risk 
management must not only communicate the objectives of risk management but also 
how risk management will achieve those goals.  
 
A key insight from case study two regards the interaction between shared mental 
models (or lack of) and formal risk governance mechanisms (rules and procedures). It 
 150 
was observed that diverse perspectives of the purpose and function of risk 
management also had an affect of the perception and implementation of formal risk 
management processes (chapter 4.5.4. and Table 4.3.6.). Some interviewees had 
positive perceptions of formal risk management processes, for example that it helped 
focuses attention of risk, and positively engaged with those processes. For example, 
five participants used a risk register to facilitate communication and knowledge 
sharing within their teams (chapter 4.5.4. and Table 4.3.6.). In contrast, five 
participants viewed formal risk management processes as an unnecessary 
bureaucracy, resulting in the reduction of formal risk management processes to ‘box-
ticking’ exercises which did not significantly inform risk-based decisions making in 
their teams (chapter 4.5.4. and Table 4.3.6.).  
 
Core finding. In the case study of a central government department (case study two) 
the lack of a shared understanding of the purpose and function of risk management 
undermined coordination of risk management practice, including coordination through 
standardization (rules and procedures). This finding suggests that establishing a 
shared understanding of the strategic purpose and role of risk management contributes 
to coordination of risk management (through mutual adjustment) (Figure 5.2.).  
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5.6. The big picture: Interaction between social processes and 
rules during coordination 
 
A strong theme across the three social processes identified (dialogue, deference to 
expertise and representation) is their interaction with rules and processes. None of the 
social processes occurred in isolation. Dialogue and deference to expertise both 
allowed local, experiential knowledge to be integrated with rules, thus facilitating 
coordination between operational and managerial staff (chapters 5.4., 5.5.1.). 
Participant’s inability to coordinate behaviour through representation (Asch 1987) 
(due to lack of a shared strategic understanding) undermined coordination through 
rules and procedures by generating diverse perspectives of the purpose of formal risk 
management processes (chapter 5.5.2.). Therefore, the core finding arising from this 
research is that coordination through mutual adjustment emerged from the interaction 
between these three social processes (dialogue, deference to expertise and 
representing), rules and the knowledge distributed across an organisation (Figure 
5.2.). The overall process is made cyclical by recognising that the experiences 
resulting from risk management practice are the basis on which knowledge is formed 
(Kolb 1984) (Figure 5.2.). A key insight illustrated in Figure 5.4. is the role of the 
three social processes as pathways by which experience of risk management practice 
can inform subsequent decision making and practice creating a possible pathway for 
organisational learning. Organisational learning is a key component of risk 
management maturity (Strutt et al. 2006). This is particularly interesting given the 
observed use of the three social processes to generate adaptive responses to dynamic 
or unpredictable risks (Tables 4.1.3., 4.1.4.). The relationship between the social 
processes identified in this research (Table 5.1.), adaptive risk management and 
organisational learning would be an interesting topic for future research.  
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Figure 5.2.: Depiction of the core findings derived from case studies researching 
coordination of risk management in a Power Utility and a Central Government 
Department. Three social processes (dialogue, deference to expertise and 
representation) that affecting the coordination of risk management practice were 
identified. Through these processes organisational actors were able to integrate risk 
relevant knowledge that was distributed across organisational members and 
stakeholder groups. This facilitated coordination of risk management practice, 
particularly the adaptive, mutual adjustment associated with dynamic, unpredictable 
risks. Further, the ability of these social processes to generate coordinated behaviour 
was dependant on the cultural factors listed in ‘Box 1’.  
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5.7. Revisiting the literature review in light of results 
 
In the literature review (chapter 2) it was hypothesised that coordinated risk 
management practice would first be achieved through codified rules and procedures 
(required for risk management maturity level 2 – Figure 2.3.) and then increasingly by 
embedding risk management in cultural factors (required for risk management 
maturity levels 3 and 4 – Figure 2.3.) (Chapter 2.6.). By identifying a number of 
cultural factors that contribute to the coordination of risk management (Table 5.1), 
this research supports the claim that achieving coordinated risk management is 
associated with embedding risk management in organisational culture in addition to 
codified rules and processes. However, the neat progression of cultural embedding 
progressing from espoused values to assumptions as coordination increases (Figure 
2.2.) was not apparent in the findings of this research. Rather, the findings described a 
collection of social processes mediating the relationship between organisational 
culture and coordination of risk management practice (Table 5.1. and Figure 5.2.). 
The significant of these findings, developed in chapters 5.4. to 5.6., is to provide 
insight into the role of informal social processes and cultural factors in achieving 
pervasive risk management and high levels of risk management maturity.  
 
Here that insight is summarised. This research described how the processes of 
dialogue, deference to expertise and representation (driven by respect for experience, 
a culture of collaboration and a shared strategic understanding) underpinned the 
coordination of risk management practice (chapters 5.4., 5.5., 5.6., and Figures 5.1., 
5.2.). The coordination described was often adaptive, in the context of dynamic and 
unpredictable risks (chapter 4.2.2. and Tables 4.1.4., 4.1.5). In case study one of a 
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power utility, dialogue and deference to expertise were means to access local, 
experiential knowledge that was used to adapted rules and procedures to specific 
contexts in a coordinated manner (chapters 4.2.1., 4.2.3.2. and Tables 4.1.1., 4.1.5.). 
In case study two of a central government department, informal, lateral 
communication integrated the wide range of knowledge sources relating to 
environmental risks involving multiple stakeholders and perspectives (chapter 4.2.3.2. 
and Table 4.2.1.). Coordination of this nature, where actors mutually adapt to each 
other’s changing needs, is termed coordination through mutual adjustment (Mintzberg 
1979). As observed in this research (chapters 5.4., 5.5.), coordination through mutual 
adjustment is underpinned by the integration of knowledge through communication 
(knowledge transfer) (Grant 1996; Carlile 2004). Knowledge transfer and integration 
are essential to coordination through mutual adjustment, because, without up-to-date 
understanding of how their actions will impact others and their environment, actors 
are not able to coordinate their actions in a dynamic environment (Asch 1987). 
Drawing these findings together, this research suggests that as risks become more 
complex and require adaptive risk management, the cultural factors and social 
processes identified (Table 5.1.) become increasing important as they underpin an 
important means of adaptive behaviour in organisations: coordination through mutual 
adjustment (Mintzberg 1979). Given that adaptive risk management is a requisite for 
risk maturity levels four and five (Strutt et al. 2006), the social processes and cultural 
factors identified in this research (Table 5.1.) contribute to achieving those maturity 
levels (Figure 5.3). Thus, a core contribution of this research is to expand 
understanding of risk management maturity and what is required to achieve a high 
level of risk maturity.  
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Further, the relationship between consistent and coordinated risk management and 
dialogue, deference to expertise and a culture of collaboration described in this 
research provides a possible explanation for the correlation observed by Kimbrough 
and Componation (2009) between organic organisation cultures and successful 
implementation of enterprise risk management. Organic cultures (Deshpande et al. 
1993) are characterised by collaboration, lateral communication and flexible patterns 
of behaviour. Thus, the findings of this research suggest that by facilitating 
knowledge transfer of specific knowledge and the purpose of risk management, these 
attributes of organic cultures enable implementation of enterprise risk management by 
ensuring that risk management procedures reflected operational realities and that 
operational staff and stakeholders bought-in to risk management because they 
understood why it was being done.  
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Figure 5.3.: The relationship between coordination through mutual adjustment 
and risk maturity. The case studies of a Power Utility and a Central Government 
Department revealed that adaptive risk management was at least partially achieved 
by coordination through mutual adjustment. In turn coordination through mutual 
adjustment was achieved through social processes of dialogue, deference to expertise 
and representation. Adaptive risk managed is a requirement of the highest levels of 
risk management maturity (levels 4 and 5) (Strutt et al. 2006). 
 
 
 
 157 
6. Conclusion and summary 
 
This thesis describes the cultural and social attributes of two organisations that 
affected their ability to achieve pervasive risk management (Table 5.1. and Figures 
5.2., 5.3.). The core findings of two case studies are as follows: 
 Shared experience, respect for experience, a culture of collaboration, and 
shared strategic understanding of the purpose and function of risk management 
are cultural factors that contributed to achieving pervasive risk management 
(Table 5.1.) 
 Those cultural factors affected pervasiveness through the social processes of 
dialogue, deference to expertise and representation (Figure 5.2.), which are 
mechanisms for the integration of the knowledge distributed across 
organisations and their stakeholders. This contributes to the coordination of 
risk management through mutual adjustment (Figure 6.1.). 
 These social processes did not occur in isolation but in interacted with rules 
and procedures (that coordinate risk management through standardization) 
(Figure 5.2.).  
 The social processes and cultural factors identified (Table 5.1. and Figure 5.2.) 
contribute to organisational ability for adaptive risk management (Figure 5.3), 
a requisite for maturity levels 4 and 5 (Strutt et al. 2006). 
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Figure 6.1: Cultural and social factors that affect coordination of risk 
management practice through mutual adjustment. Shared experience, respect for 
experience, a culture of collaboration, and shared strategic understanding of the 
purpose and function of risk management are cultural factors that contribute to 
achieving pervasive risk management. They do this by facilitating coordination 
through mutual adjustment (Mintzberg 1979) by promoting knowledge transfer and 
shared mental models between organisational actors and stakeholders. 
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Summary of core argument. Here the core findings and conclusions of this 
thesis, with reference to the relevant literature, are summarised. Pervasive risk 
management, defined as risk management that is widely embedded and coordinated, is 
a core element of risk maturity (Chapter 2.2.). Mechanisms for the coordination of 
risk management practice addressed in risk maturity models and enterprise risk 
management emphasise centralised control, formal rules and codified procedures 
(Chapter 2.3.). These coordination mechanisms are example of ‘coordination through 
standardization’ (Mintzberg 1979). Coordination through standardization is sufficient 
where tasks are well understood and relatively stable (Mintzberg 1979). However, 
given the prevalence of risks characterised by uncertainty, ambiguity (Klinke & Renn 
2002) and variability (Vaughan & Seifert 1992; Siu 1994) this is problematic. A 
significant body of literature contends that organisations should utilise less rigid 
modes of coordination in order to achieve better risk management performance in 
dynamic and uncertain environments (Bigley & Roberts 2001; Faraj & Xiao 2006; 
Kelly 2009). This is reflected in the highest level of risk maturity, adaptive, that is 
characterised by open-loop learning (Strutt et al. 2006). The logic behind this is that 
organisations must be adaptive in order to respond to the unexpected and therefore, 
cannot rely only on standardized responses to risks.  
 
Coordinated behaviour that remains adaptive to a changing situation requires that the 
coordinating actors communicate their changing interdependencies to each other 
(Carlile 2004) and use shared mental models to predict changing interdependencies 
where communication is limited (Mathieu et al. 2000). This process of adaptive 
coordination based on knowledge transfer and common knowledge is termed 
‘coordination through mutual adjustment’ (Mintzberg 1979; Thompson 1967). 
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However, the requirement for adaptability when managing risk in complex 
environments does not replace the requirement for coordination through 
standardization but requires additional coordination mechanisms that are more 
flexible (Bigley & Roberts 2001; Faraj & Xiao 2006).  
 
This thesis builds on the claim that achieving pervasive risk management in complex 
environments requires coordination by mutual adjustment and cannot be achieved 
through standardised processes and outcomes alone (Bigley & Roberts 2001; Weick 
2005; Faraj & Xiao 2006). The novel contribution of this thesis is to describe some of 
the social processes and cultural factors involved in coordination of risk management 
through mutual adjustment (Chapter 5. and Figures 5.2., 6.1 and Table 5.1.). In both 
case studies it was observed that when supported by specific cultural factors that 
aligned with risk management goals these social processes facilitated coordination 
through mutual adjustment and thus, contributed to achieving pervasive risk 
management (Table 5.1. and Figure 5.2.). In case study one of a power utility 
(chapters 4.2. and 5.1.), shared common experience and respect for experience 
facilitated the sharing and utilisation of experience in risk-based decisions through 
dialogue and deference to expertise, contributing to organisation ability to coordinate 
risk management practice and enriching the knowledge informing risk-based 
decisions. In case study two of a central government department (chapters 4.4. and 
5.2.), a culture of collaboration encouraged widespread informal, lateral 
communication that played an important role in accessing and integrating the wide 
range of knowledge relevant to managing environmental risks. Further, in case study 
two (chapters 4.5., 5.3.), the lack of a common understanding of what risk 
management was for (purpose) and how it achieved that purpose (function) resulted in 
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uncoordinated risk management. These findings describe two organisations and 
cannot be assumed to be generally true of other organisations. However, the 
underlying processes of knowledge transfer and shared mental models are thought to 
be fundamental to coordinating action in all teams and organisations (Mintzberg 1979; 
Mathieu et al. 2000; Carlile 2004).  Therefore, because the social processes and 
cultural factors identified in this thesis (Table 5.1.) affect knowledge transfer and 
shared mental models it is reasonable to hypothesise that they may affect risk 
management pervasiveness in other organisations. In summary, shared experience, 
respect for experience, a culture of collaboration and a common understanding of the 
purpose and function of risk management all contributed, through the social processes 
of dialogue, deference to expertise and representation, to the ability of the 
organisations researched to generate the adaptive and coordinated behaviour required 
for mature risk management in complex environments (Figures 5.2., 5.3.).  
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6.1. Summary of novelty 
 
The novel contribution of this research as described in the previous section and 
chapter 5 is briefly summarised as follows: 
 
 The research provides a close description of the heterogeneity and 
disjointed nature of risk management practice within the two case studies. 
This provides empirical of the importance of coordination to achieve pervasive 
risk management. 
 The research identified a number of social processes and associated cultural 
factors that affected the ability of the two organisations studied to achieve 
consistent and coordinated risk management practices. The social 
processes identified are: dialogue, deference to expertise and 
representation. The cultural factors identified are: shared experience, 
respect for experience, a culture of collaboration and a shared strategic 
understanding. The method of coordination is identified as coordination 
through mutual adjustment. The findings also expand understanding of the 
role of one of the social processes, deference to expertise, from allocation of 
decision rights to also include coordination. The social processes identified 
represent possible causal links between risk culture and pervasive risk 
management. Thus, they contribute to the debate on the balance between 
standardisation and social process to achieve pervasive risk management. 
 The research identifies and develops a general mechanism by which the 
social processes identified facilitated coordination: the integration of 
distributed knowledge, including experiential and tacit knowledge.  
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 The research identifies a relationship between coordination through 
mutual adjustment and organisational ability to adapt to a dynamic and 
unpredictable risk environment. This expands understanding of the 
organisational attributes required for maturity levels four and five (Strutt et al. 
2006b) and, together with the social processes and cultural factors identified, 
contributes to a richer description of organisational risk management 
maturity.   
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6.2. Implications for risk management 
 
There has been a trend in risk management towards an emphasis on bureaucratic 
processes and control through internal audit to coordinate risk management across 
organisations (Fraser & Henry 2007; Arena et al. 2010). However, the findings of this 
thesis have illustrated how informal social processes and cultural factors relating to 
knowledge transfer and shared mental models can play a key role in coordinating risk 
management practice (Figure 6.1.), particularly when risks are dynamic and uncertain 
(Figure 5.3.). Critically, this thesis found that those informal social processes also 
affected risk management practice coordinated by formal rules and processes (Figure 
5.2.). The implication for risk management is that achieving pervasive risk 
management that is coordinated and consistent across an organisation, cannot always 
be achieved through codified processes and internal control alone. Therefore, those 
attempting to achieve pervasive risk management can not only rely on embedding risk 
management in codified processes and explicit rules, but also in the shared mental 
models and social processes of knowledge transfer identified (Table 5.1.). Briefly, this 
thesis suggests that to achieve pervasive risk management it is necessary, but not 
sufficient, for risk managers to ensure local expertise is valued, knowledge is shared 
laterally across their organisation and that a shared understanding of risk 
management’s purpose is established and maintained. 
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6.2. Self-assessment 
 
The following three questions were compiled as a short self assessment for risk 
management practitioners or auditors to assess the extent to which an organisation 
displays a capability for adaptive and coordinated risk management, based on the 
social processes and cultural factors identified in this research (Figure 5.2. and Table 
5.1.). 
 
1. Do employees regularly break or bend rules in order to achieve risk management 
objectives? 
If employees regularly have to bend of break rules to meet risk management 
objectives, for example to maintain personal safety, then it is possible that dialogue 
between operational and managerial staff is insufficient.  An active dialogue between 
operational staff and managerial staff is required to develop and adapt rules to either 
more specifically meet risk management objectives or to allow more flexible 
behaviour depending on the dynamism and complexity of the risk environment. 
Effective dialogue requires that managerial staff have sufficient experience to 
understand the operational reality that rules and procedures are intended to be applied 
in. 
 
2.  Are projects often revised at an advanced stage due to new information brought to 
light by colleagues or stakeholders? 
This may be indicative of insufficient lateral communication within the organisation 
and with stakeholders. If those managing risks do not put considerable effort into 
identifying and communicating with relevant persons or groups at an early stage in 
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projects they cannot be reasonably claim to have A) consulted all persons with 
relevant expertise and, B) identified potential conflicts of interest with other 
organisational groups or external stakeholders. In addition to formal requirements to 
consult, establishing an expectation that project managers must engage and 
collaborate with peers and stakeholders is important to encourage lateral 
communication. Such a normative pressure, or culture of collaboration, will 
encourage the rich network of informal communication that can proactively identify 
relationships both within an organisation and external with stakeholders.  
 
3. In novel or unexpected circumstances, do employees retain a sense of purpose and 
act according to the core values of the organisation? 
If employee response to novel or unexpected circumstances tends to diverge from risk 
management objectives and core values, there is likely to be a conflict between risk 
management and cultural norms or underlying assumptions. For example, if 
employees do not adapt their routine behaviour to meet rare or unusual customer 
requirements not covered by existing procedure or rules. In this situation, the problem 
is not with the rules and procedures, which are adhered to in normal circumstances, 
but rather the lack of a shared understanding of the purpose of risk management and 
how risk management contributes to organisational objectives. Establishing and 
communicating a clear vision of the role that risk management plays in achieving 
strategic objectives is important for coordinating risk management practice, 
particularly in unusual circumstances not addressed by established rules and 
procedures.  
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7. Critical review of research 
 
The most obvious limitation of this research is the degree to which the findings can be 
confidently generalised beyond the two case study organisations. This is an intrinsic 
feature of the qualitative, theory building methodology employed for this research. 
Data was collected in two organisations, which does not make a strong case for 
statistical generalisation to a wider population of organisations. However, statistical 
generalisation was never the intention of this research, which instead aimed to 
develop an in-depth understanding of a target phenomena (Denscombe 2007), in this 
case risk management pervasiveness, and in doing so contribute to a theoretical 
understanding of how organisations achieve pervasive risk management.  Further, the 
concepts and knowledge developed through case studies can be generalised through 
further research (Gummesson 1991): through analytic generalisation the findings 
developed from these two case studies can be used as a comparison or guide in future 
case studies (Yin 2008). 
 
The narrow focus of this research on two organisations is balanced against the deep 
access to those organisations that was achieved. Thus, rather than only interviewing 
risk managers or other senior managers as done by the surveys by the Economist and 
AON (AON 2007; Economist Intelligence Unit 2009), this research was able to 
capture the knowledge of individuals from a wide range of roles and seniority in each 
organisation. In addition, the case study method allowed the research to draw on a 
wider range of data sources, for example document analysis and observation, to gain 
contextual knowledge relevant to the phenomena of interest. Thus, while external 
generalizability is weak, internal validity is strong, i.e. the research offers a credible 
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and in-depth understanding of how these two organisations coordinated their risk 
management activities.  
 
By conducting two case studies in different organisation that were both attempting to 
achieve pervasive risk management the research allowed a cross case analysis that 
identified some common themes. Both organisations met the case study criteria of 
being large organisation attempting to achieve pervasive risk management, however, 
they also had considerable differences. Therefore, while any common themes 
identified can be treated with more confidence from those identified in a single case 
study, care must be taken not to loose sight of the differences between the 
organisations. For example, while dialogue emerged as a strong common theme in 
both organisations, in the power utility it was predominantly vertical while in the 
central government department it was predominantly horizontal. Therefore, as the 
concepts developed in this research are tested or refined in further research (analytical 
generalisation) it will be important to retain the organisation specific findings. 
 
A further limitation of this thesis is that the research method did not have a strong 
longitudinal aspect (it did not gather data over a long time period – data gathering 
occurred over a period less than one year in each organisation). For this reason the 
research was not able to gain insight into how risk management practices can become 
persistent (over time). The literature review (chapter 2.) suggested that embedding a 
common set of cultural factors in an organisation may contribute to achieving 
persistent risk management. Therefore, a longitudinal study exploring how 
organisations can achieve risk management that is not only pervasive but also 
sustained would be an interesting future research project.  
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Researcher bias is a key concern associated with this form of research. In order to 
minimise this risk, developing results and conclusions were regularly checked with 
peers and colleges. More developed results were also checked by peers (who had not 
been previously involved in the research) and by members of the case study 
organisations. Further, the grounded theory method of constant comparison (Strauss 
& Corbin 1990) facilitated self-reflection on the part of the researcher to identify any 
bias in interpretation of the data.  
 
An assumption underlying this research is that social processes (Burgess 2010) and 
structure (Giddens 1984) affect risk management practice. It is assumed that the social 
processes and cultural factors identified were, at least partially, responsible for the 
observed patterns of risk management practice. However, it could also be assumed 
that risk management practice affects social processes and organisational culture. 
Indeed strong constructivist conceptualisations of organisations place all generative 
actions at the level of individuals (Taylor & Van Every 2000). For example, 
MacGillivray et al. (2007) assumed that cultural factors indicative of mature risk 
management were a result of changing behaviour not vice versa. However, there is 
research evidence, based on in-depth and long term case studies, that organisational 
culture is a significant influence on risk management practice. Arena (2010) found 
that enterprise risk management frameworks, although ostensibly identical, resulted in 
different behaviour influenced by organisational culture. Howard-Grenville (2006) 
found that the distinct interpretations of risk by organisational subcultures could result 
in different behavioural responses to risk. Therefore, it is a reasonable assumption that 
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the social processes and cultural factors identified affected risk management practice, 
and one that merited investigation. 
 
It is also necessary to recognise that while we are used a definitions of expertise and 
experience and expertise based on natural decision making (Klein 2008l; Lipshitz et 
al. 2001; Hoffman 1996) wider definitions of experience are more diverse. For 
example, experience and expertise may be associated with ‘hands on experience’; age; 
scientific expertise and peer recognition to name a few (Nowotny, 2003). Therefore, 
exploring how experience and expertise are conceptualised in organisations and how 
this affected the use of knowledge through deference to expertise would be a 
worthwhile area of future research.  
 
Finally, this research was not able to assess the influence of national cultures, as both 
case study organisations were in the UK. This might be an interesting topic for future 
research. In particular, achieving pervasive risk management in multi-national 
organisations that may contain strong subcultures would make fascinating research. 
However, given the depth of existing research on the affect of national culture on 
organisational behaviour care would have to be taken not to duplicate efforts.  
 
7.1. Future research 
 
Building on the critical review and the work presented in this thesis a number of 
possible future research topics have been identified: 
 
 171 
 Conduct additional case studies in a wider variety of organisations, for 
example smaller and more risk seeking organisations, in order to further refine 
and test the findings of this thesis (Eisenhardt 1989). Further case studies 
would follow a similar methodology to this research. Data generated could 
add to the findings of this research (refining the findings) for example 
identifying additional social processes or cultural factors involved. Further 
case study would also confirm or conflict with the findings of this research, 
strengthening or weakening the generalisability of those findings respectively. 
 A longitudinal study exploring the organisational factors involved in 
sustaining risk management capability.  This research did not identify factors 
related to the sustainability of pervasive risk management. The literature 
review (chapter 2) suggested that embedding risk management in 
organisational culture may affect the persistence of risk management 
behaviour. However, a longitudinal study over a period of years would be 
required to investigate this. 
 Investigating the effect of different national cultures on risk management 
pervasiveness. This study was limited to case studies of UK based 
organisations. In order to 1) assess whether the findings apply to other 
national cultural contexts; 2) investigate the affect of national culture on risk 
management pervasiveness would require further case studies in 
organisations based in countries other than the UK. 
 Testing the generalisability of the findings using quantitative methodologies, 
for example a standardized survey encompassing a large sample of 
organisations. A survey that tested for the presence of the social processes and 
cultural factors identified in this research, as well as assessments of risk 
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management pervasiveness could be used to determine the generalisability of 
the findings. This will require operationalising the constructs and processes 
identified in this thesis. The limitations of such an approach would be an 
inability to take into account distinct organisational contexts and therefore, to 
identify other social processes and cultural factors involved.  
 Given the role of experience and expertise in risk management identified in 
this research and the research of others (Weick et al. 1999) it would be 
interesting to explore how expertise was perceived in organisations and how 
that affected risk management capability. Although this research clearly 
defined experience and expertise, how they are actually perceived in an 
organisation may have implication for risk management practice and 
capability. For example, it may be significant if expertise is equated simply 
with quantity of experience, or, if expertise is equated with formal 
qualification.  
 
Further, the following research questions have been identified that would build on 
this thesis and add to understanding of risk governance: 
 
 Does richness of informal communication affect organisational ability for 
proactive and adaptive risk management? 
 How can organisations balance the benefits derived from allowing employees 
to use their expertise against the need for internal control and accountability 
to external stakeholders? 
 How can organisations achieve sustained risk management capability? 
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 How can senior risk managers utilise the distributed expertise of 
organisational actors to inform strategic risk management decisions? 
 How can informal communication within organisations be supported? 
 How is expertise defined in an organisation and what affect does this have on 
risk management practice? 
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Appendix A: Coordination theory literature review 
<Tables and figures are found after the references> 
 
Coordination within organisations and teams is defined as managing the 
interdependencies between the actions of individuals and subgroups (Malone & 
Crowston 1994). This involves: identifying interdependencies (Carlile 2004);  
controlling actions of the coordinating actors (Grant 1996) and facilitating 
communication and decision making between the actors (Grant 1996; Carlile 2004). 
Interdependencies are defined as situations were two or more actors must interact with 
each other in order to meet their goals (Litwak & Hylton 1962). Interdependencies fall 
into three basis types: pooled, sequential, and reciprocal (Table A.1.) (Thompson 
1967). Pooled interdependence refers to a situation where the actors involved share a 
common resource or output but are otherwise independent. For example, where 
branches of an organisation operate independently but rely on the wider organisation 
for their success. Therefore, if one branch underperforms the whole organisation is 
threatened, thus threatening the other branches too (Thompson 1967). Sequential 
interdependence refers to a situation were the actors involved are in linear, non-
symmetrical, producer-consumer relationships. For example, an assembly line where 
the outputs of one actor’s actions form the inputs for another actors actions and so 
forth (Thompson 1967). Reciprocal interdependence also describes a situation where 
one actor A’s output becomes the input for actor B but now the relationship is 
cyclical, so actor B’s output is also the input for actor A. For example, in the 
relationship between aircraft maintenance and flying crews, the maintenance crew’s 
output is a flyable aircraft, which is the flying crew’s input allowing them to 
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‘produce’ the maintenance crew’s input: an aircraft needing servicing (Thompson 
1967). These forms of interdependence are not mutually exclusive, rather reciprocal 
interdependence presumes the existence of sequential which presumes the existence 
of pooled (Thompson 1967). However, whether sequential or reciprocal 
interdependence is required depends on the complexity of the task, with reciprocal 
interdependence necissary for the most complex tasks (Thompson 1967; Weick 2005). 
For example, pooled and sequential interdependence is appropriate for tasks where the 
inputs and subtasks are sufficiently well known in advance that rules and plans to 
ensure those inputs and subtasks are carried out in a timely and appropriate manner 
can be made (Thompson 1967). However, where the task involves significant 
uncertainty, for example, identifying and responding to the emergence of a novel 
disease (West Nile virus) then reciprocal interdependence between multiple experts is 
required (Weick 2005). 
 
Typologies of coordination mechanisms 
 
Thompson: Thompson (1967) also described three types of coordination based on the 
work of March and Simon (1958) which he associates with different types of 
interdependence. The three forms of coordination identified by Thompson (1967) are 
standardization, coordination by plan and coordination by mutual adjustment. 
Standardization refers to rules which constrain the actions of the coordinating actors. 
The rules must be internally consistent and appropriate for the situations they are 
applied to, therefore, the situations to which they apply must be relatively stable and 
not too diverse (Thompson 1967). Coordination by standardization is considered 
appropriate to pooled interdependence (Thompson 1967). Coordination by plan 
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entails creating schedules which control the actions of the interdependent actors 
(Thompson 1967). Thompson (1967) describes this as a more flexible form of 
coordination than standardization and associates it with sequential interdependence. 
Finally, coordination by mutual adjustment is defined by involving the transfer of new 
information between the interdependent actors and emphasises communication 
(Thompson 1967). Mutual adjustment is based on March and Simons (1958)’s 
‘coordination by feedback’. The greater the variability and unpredictability involved 
the more mutual adjustment is relied upon for coordination (Thompson 1967; March 
& H. Simon 1958). Mutual adjustment is associated with reciprocal interdependence 
(Thompson 1967). Thompson (1967) also notes that standardization, planning and 
mutual adjustment, in that order, are increasingly communication and decision 
making intensive and therefore, increasingly expensive for the organisation.  
 
Mintzberg: Building on the work of Thompson (1967), Mintzberg (1979) produced a 
seminal work on the structure and coordination mechanisms of organisations. 
Mintzberg (1979) identified five mechanisms of coordination: mutual adjustment, 
direct supervision, standardisation of work, standardisation of outputs, and 
standardisation of skills (Table A.2.; Figure A.1). Mintzberg (1979) places these 
coordination mechanisms on a continuum, as organizational work becomes more 
complex the appropriate coordination mechanism goes from mutual adjustment, to 
direct supervision, to standardisation (in the following order of preference; work, 
outputs then skills), before reverting back to mutual adjustment for the most complex 
tasks (Figure A.2). Mintzberg (1979) caveats this by stating that while organisations 
will favour one form of coordination over the others depending on task complexity, 
all organisations must use all five simultaneously. For example, even for relatively 
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simple tasks, such as assembly lines, that can be highly standardized, unpredictable 
events such as machine breakdowns or employee sickness require adaptive responses 
through leadership (direct supervision) and informal communication (mutual 
adjustment). We note that by ‘task complexity’ Mintzberg (1979) seems to be 
referring to aleatoric uncertainty causing the inability to predict all of the actions and 
interdependencies required for the task. Mintzberg (1979) gives the Apollo Eleven 
moon landing as an example of a complex task where, despite highly specialised 
division of labour, at the beginning of the task no-one knew exactly what was required 
to complete the task. Therefore, the specialists involved had to mutually adjust to each 
other as the task developed.  
 
Grant: Grant (1996) identifies four main mechanisms for coordination: (1) rules and 
directives, defined as standards controlling the interactions between organisational 
members (Ven et al. 1976); (2) sequencing, defined as the organising of activities 
sequentially by time such that each actors inputs into the overall process at the correct 
time (Nonaka 1990); (3) routines, defined as stable yet varied patterns of behaviour 
that occur without formal rules and directives (Hutchins 1991; Pentland & Rueter 
1994); and (4) group problem solving and decision making, defined as personal, 
interactice and communication-instensive integration of knowledge used for unusual, 
complex and important tasks (Galbraith 1973; Perrow 1967; Hutchins 1991).  
 
Malone and Crowston: In their review of coordination theory, incorporating 
computer science, organisation theory and management science, Malone and 
Crowston (1994) identify eight different types of dependency and associate each with 
an appropriate coordination process (Table A.3.). However, Malone and Crowston 
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(1994) do state that their list is not exhaustive and that each coordination processes 
they identify represents a range of possible real world processes. For example, 
coordination  managing the dependency arising from requiring a shared (and finite) 
resource (Table A.3.) may involve, setting rules such as ‘first come first served’, more 
complex rules establishing market-like bidding or direct supervision by management. 
They also give special attention to ‘group decision making’ and ‘communication’, 
which they describe as coordination processes in their own right and essential to 
almost all other forms of coordination (Malone & Crowston 1994). Group decision 
making is a defined as a decision made by multiple individuals which can be achieved 
though authority (the leader decides); by voting; or by consensus (Malone and 
Crowston 1994). Regarding communication, Malone and Crowston (1994) briefly 
consider a syntactic issue (Carlile 2004), namely the need for a common language, for 
example email or computer conferencing, as a mechanism for transferring knowledge 
between individuals.  
 
There is considerable overlap between the typologies of interdependencies and 
coordination mechanisms describes. In table A.3. we match the dependencies and 
coordination processes identified by Malone and Crowston (1994) with Thompson 
(1967)’s and Mintzberg (1979)’s typologies of interdependencies and coordination 
mechanisms respectively. In table C.4. we match Mintzerg (1979)’s types of 
coordination, Thomson (1967)’s typology of independencies and examples of 
coordination methods from Grant (1996) and Malone and Crowston (1994). However, 
we caveat tables A.3. and A.4. with the following observation. The relationship 
between coordination mechanism (Mintzberg 1979) and some dependencies varied 
according to the complexity of the task. For example, the coordination mechanisms 
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associated with coordinating a relatively simple task/subtask dependency (Malone and 
Crowston 1994) could be direct supervision (Mintzberg 1979) were one individual 
could decide the goal and allocate subtasks to achieve that goal. However, for more 
complex task/subtask dependencies, for example involving a complex manufactured 
product, a single supervisor could not coordinate the whole process and coordination 
required standardization (Mintzberg 1979). Finally, were the task is so complex 
(uncertain) that all subtasks cannot be identified a priori, such as for the Apollo 
eleven moon mission, then mutual adjustment through communication must be relied 
upon (Mintzberg 1979). 
 
Mutual adjustment 
 
Mutual adjustment is primarily used for coordination under conditions of uncertainty 
and complexity (Mintzberg 1979; Grant 1996). The flexible and adaptive coordination 
characteristic of mutual adjustment is achieved through two mechanisms, 
communication (or knowledge transfer) and shared mental models (shared 
knowledge) (Mintzberg 1979; Grant 1996; Mathieu et al. 2000). Communication is 
the favoured mechanism to integrating knowledge and making group decisions 
underpinning mutual adjustment (Mintzberg 1979; Grant 1996). However, where 
communication is constrained mutual adjustment occurs through shared mental 
models (Mathieu et al. 2000). We now review knowledge transfer and shared mental 
models in more detail. 
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Knowledge transfer / communication 
‘Knowledge transfer’ requires particular attention as, in addition to being a method of 
coordination in itself it also plays a role in almost all other methods of coordination 
(Malone & Crowston 1994; Grant 1996). Knowledge transfer refers to the movement 
of knowledge from one part of an organisation to another (Szulanski 1996; Argote 
1999). The transfer of knowledge between actors in an organisations underpins both 
communication (Carlile 2004) and the integration of knowledge to produce value 
(Grant 1996). Transferring knowledge is often expensive and difficult, therefore, the 
transfer of knowledge between organisational subgroups with different specialised 
knowledge (domain specific knowledge) is a key coordination challenge (Argote & 
Ingram 2000; Grant 1996; Carlile 2004). 
 
Knowledge can be categorised as ‘specific’ and ‘general’ based to the ease with 
which it can be transferred. Specific knowledge is defined as knowledge that is costly 
to transfer from one individual to another (Jensen & Meckling 1995). It can take the 
form of idiosyncratic knowledge (Hayek 1945; Grant 1996) (knowledge routed in a 
particular context, for example in-depth knowledge of the personalities of key 
stakeholders); esoteric scientific knowledge (Jensen & Meckling 1995) (knowledge 
that although general in application is difficult to transfer due to the high level of 
background knowledge required); and tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1966; I. Nonaka & 
von Krogh 2009; I. Nonaka 1994) (knowledge which is grounded in practice and 
difficult to explicitly express, for example, expertise developed through many years of 
experience working with a particular technology). Specific knowledge is often 
difficult to aggregate without loosing informational content, because it cannot be 
expressed in a common language without the removal of its defining feature: 
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information regarding “particular circumstances of time and place” such as location, 
time and quality (Hayek 1945; Jensen & Meckling 1995; Grant 1996). For this reason 
integrating distributed knowledge simply by transferring it to a centralised location 
can be inefficient when specific knowledge is involved (Jensen & Meckling 1995). 
Therefore, organisations that rely on specific knowledge to deliver value tend to 
devolve decision making to those who have the knowledge rather than attempt to 
aggregate it in a central location (Jensen & Meckling 1995). 
 
General knowledge, also referred to as ‘knowing about’ or ‘explicit knowledge’, is 
defined by its relative ease of communication through codified symbols such as a 
written language or numbers (Grant 1996; Jensen & Meckling 1995) without the need 
for shared experience and practice (J. S. Brown & Duguid 2001). General knowledge 
can also be effectively aggregated, for example quantifiable knowledge on cash flows, 
sales, and inventories can be easily collected from multiple sources and meaningfully 
aggregated at a central location (Grant 1996). Issues involved in transferring general 
knowledge are syntactic, pertaining to establishing a common language to represent 
the knowledge and a means to transfer the knowledge, for example electronic mail or 
shared databases (Carlile 2004).  
 
The transfer of knowledge between actors requires some level of common knowledge, 
defined as a shared body of knowledge that allows for communication between actors 
(Carlile 2004; Grant 1996). Common knowledge functions as a ‘cross boundary 
object’ that facilitates communication between individuals and groups with different 
knowledges (Carlile 2004). Common knowledge can take the form of a shared 
language or other symbolic communication; shared meaning, shared purpose (Carlile 
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2004), commonality of specialised (domain specific) knowledge or shared recognition 
of the specialised knowledge and skills other team members (Grant 1996). Thus, 
general knowledge is easily communicated because, by definition the requisite 
common knowledge (a shared language that effectively represents that knowledge) 
exists to effect its transfer (Grant 1996; Jensen & Meckling 1995; Carlile 2004). In 
contrast, creating or acquiring the common knowledge required to transfer specific 
knowledge is more difficult. For example, tacit knowledge is though to be primarily 
transferred by either first translating it into explicit knowledge (Nonaka 1994) or  
limiting its transfer to within communities of practice whose members already share 
the necessary common knowledge, acquired through shared experiences and practice 
(Brown & Duguid 2001). The importance of common knowledge for effective 
communication explains the difficultly of transferring knowledge between functional 
groups within organisations, such as between engineers and finance departments, 
which have difference specialised (domain specific) knowledge (Brown & Duguid 
2001). Conversely, it also explains the ease at which knowledge can be transferred 
among professional bodies between organisations, for example between accountants 
or financial managers in different firms who already share specialised knowledge 
(Brown & Duguid 2001).  
 
The key point is that knowledge transfer is an important aspect of the coordination 
required for complex tasks, particularly were novel knowledge and innovation are 
involved (Carlile 2004; Grant 1996). The reason that knowledge transfer is 
particularly important for complex tasks lies with the limitations of human cognition 
which mean that experts tend to be specialists (Grant 1996; Simon 1991). Therefore, 
for complex tasks that are not encompassed by any single expert’s expertise (or 
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domain specific knowledge) the integration of the knowledge of multiple experts is 
required (Carlile 2004; Grant 1996; Weick 2005).  
 
The expense and difficulty of transferring knowledge means that were possible 
(typically for tasks involving less novelty or innovation) organisations typically 
favour coordinating the actions of specialists rather than knowledge transfer (Grant 
1996). However, integrating experts’ knowledge through coordinating their actions 
requires that many of the interdependencies between those expert’s specialisms are 
already known (Carlile 2004). Thus, when novel knowledge is involved, due to 
uncertainty or innovation, knowledge transfer becomes necessary in order to discover 
the interdependencies involved and generate the required new knowledge (Carlile 
2004). In simple terms the group’s actions must be flexible and adaptive in order to 
respond to the unexpected and therefore, cannot be standardized (Mintzberg 1979). 
Such reciprocal, flexible coordination based on knowledge transfer and common 
knowledge falls into the coordination category ‘mutual adjustment’ (Mintzberg 1979; 
Thompson 1967).  
 
Shared mental models 
Mental models are structured bodies of knowledge that determine how individuals 
interpret and interact with their environment (Mathieu et al. 2000). Mental models 
allow individuals to describe, explain and predict events in their environment by 
recognising relationships between objects in their environment and construct 
expectations on the likely result of those objects interacting (Rouse & Morris 1986). 
We use the term mental model to refer to a variety of similar concepts from 
physiology, sociology and psycho-sociology: schemata (Rentsch & Hall 1994; 
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Rentsch & Klimoski 2001); cause maps (Weick 1995); and representations (Asch 
1987). Shared mental models refers to a situation were the individuals in a group have 
significant commonality between their mental models (Cannon-Bowers et al. 1993). 
Shared mental models are through to be achieved through applying shared 
methodologies and engaging in shared activities (Dougherty 1992; J. Brown & 
Duguid 1991) or through the actions of individuals who can act as translators, enable 
the flow of knowledge between different groups (Hargadon & Sutton 1997).  
 
 
Shared mental models have been used to explain team behaviour, particularly how 
teams respond to difficult tasks where communication is limited (Mathieu et al. 2000; 
Cannon-Bowers et al. 1993). In particular, the ability of teams to produce rapid, 
adaptive and coordinated behaviour without codified rules or plans is attributed to 
shared mental models (Hutchins 1990). Shared mental models are thought to allow 
group members to predict the actions and resource requirements, including 
information requirements, of their fellow group members and critically predict how 
their own actions may influence the wider group (Mathieu et al. 2000). This process 
occurs without the need for intense or constant communication (Stout et al. 1999). A 
typology of the types of shared mental model that facilitate coordinated team 
behaviour is described in Canon-Bowers et al. (1993). They include shared 
understanding of the: technology used by the team; the task being undertaken and the 
roles and responsibilities, knowledge and skills of other team members (Cannon-
Bowers et al. 1993). There is an overlap between knowledge transfer and shared 
mental models: shared mental models regarding communication channels and 
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teammate’s knowledge and knowledge requirements will have an effect on the nature 
and efficacy of communication within the team (Grant 1996). 
 
A similar concept to shared mental models, referred to as shared representations, also 
underpins theory describing coordination at an organisational scale in high reliability 
organisations (HROs) (Weick & Roberts 1993; Hutchins 1990; Asch 1987). Asch 
(1987) described the interactions between group members in terms of contribution 
(the individual’s action), representation (the individual’s conceptualisation of wider 
group’s actions in relation to their action) and subordination (the modification of the 
individual actions in response to their representation of the group’s joint action). 
Coordinated group behaviour arises when individuals modified (subordinated) their 
actions (contributions) in line with a perception of the wider system of group actions 
(representation) that is broadly shared by group members (Asch 1987). In this way a 
shared mental model, or representation, of the group’s wider activities is central to the 
group’s ability to coordinate its actions. Weick and Roberts (1993) research into 
HROs builds on the work of Asch (1987), arguing that only when individuals within a 
group ‘heedfully’ represent, subordinate and contribute does the collective 
mindfulness characteristic of HROs emerge. Heedful is defined as action that is 
aware, attentive and conscientious (Weick & Roberts 1993; Ryle 1949). Collective 
mindfulness refers to adaptive and coordinated behaviour that is sensitive to the 
possibility of organisational failure (Weick et al. 1999). Weick et al. (1999) also argue 
that while a shared mental model of a groups wider activities is critical to 
coordination in HROs, this does not mean that all group members shared the same 
mental model. Rather, groups members mental models overlap, so that while each 
member does not conceptualise the whole system, overall, the majority of the system 
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is covered by the partially overlapping mental models of group members (Weick et al. 
1999). Partially overlapping mental models forms the basis of the conceptualisation of 
organisations as loosely coupled systems, where the combined mental models of all 
actors within an organisation is more complex than any individual’s mental model 
could be and is therefore, the basis for organisational ability to manage highly 
complex tasks (Orton & Weick 1990; Taylor & Van Every 2000). Weick et al. (1999) 
also emphasise that due to the dynamic nature of group activities in HROs, shared 
mental models are not static and that group members must remain constantly alert to 
the patterns of activities around them, something they call ‘sensitivity to operations’. 
Together, these theories of mindfulness in HROs and team behaviour emphasise the 
importance of individual ability to conceptualise the wider system of joint action are 
part of, to the emergence of organisation-wide, coordinated behaviour.  
 
In summary, mutual adjustment is achieved through communication of new 
knowledge and establishing shared mental models. This can be contrasted to 
coordination by standardisation which is achieved through controlling and integration 
actions (Grant 1996; Mintzberg 1979; Thompson 1967; Mathieu et al. 2000) (Table 
A.4.). However, the expense and difficulty of mutual adjustment means that where 
possible organisations coordinate practice through standardization while minimising 
the transfer of knowledge required (Grant 1996). For example, organisations tend to 
rely on standardized routines for coordination, only resorting to groups problem-
solving in a crisis (Hutchins 1991). The general trend observed in organisations is that 
reliance on mutual adjustment increased with task complexity (Perrow 1967) and 
uncertainty (Galbraith 1973; Ven et al. 1976) (Table A.4.).  
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Note on managing conflicting interests 
 
In some situations managing the interactions between organisational members is not 
only about communication but also about the conflicting interests of those actors 
(Carlile 2004; J. S. Brown & Duguid 2001). In these situations the problem is one of 
reconciling and subordinating conflicting interests (Lawrence & Lorsch 1967; Jensen 
& Meckling 1976). A substantive literature has been devoted to the issues of resolving 
goal conflicts (Lawrence & Lorsch 1967) and problems of agency such as goal 
divergence (Jensen & Meckling 1976). However, although clearly related to the issue 
of coordination, managing the disparate interests of organisational members is 
essentially an issue of cooperation rather than coordination (Grant 1996) and 
therefore, lies outside of the scope of this review.  
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 Figure legend 
 
Figure A.1.: The five coordination mechanisms in organisations (Mintzberg 1979). 
Figure A.2.: Mintzberg’s coordination mechanisms along a continuum of task 
complexity (adopted from Mintzberg 1979). 
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Figure A.1.: The five coordination mechanisms in 
organisations (Mintzberg 1979). 
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Figure A.2.: Mintzberg’s coordination mechanisms along a continuum of task 
complexity (adopted from Mintzberg 1979). 
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Tables 
 
Table A.1.: Thompson’s interdependencies 
Table A.2.: Coordination mechanisms (Mintzberg 1979) 
Table A.3.: Synthesis of dependencies and associated coordination mechanisms. 
Table A.4.: Synthesis of Mintzberg (1979)’s coordination mechanisms and 
interdependency. 
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Table A.1.: Thompson’s interdependencies (Thompson 1967) 
 
Interdependency Description 
Pooled the activities produce common resources but are 
otherwise independent 
Sequential each activity depend on the completion of preceding 
activities 
Reciprocal each activity requires inputs from all other activities 
and produces outputs for all other activities 
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Table A.2.: Coordination mechanisms (Mintzberg 1979) 
Coordination mechanism Description 
Mutual adjustment Coordination through informal communication between 
peers without outside control. Control often lies with 
operational staff. Mutual adjustment is both used by the 
simplest organisations and for tasks involving the 
highest uncertainty.  
Direct supervision A single supervisor coordinates the work of 
subordinates through direct commands and monitoring 
their actions.  
Standardisation of work Coordination by specifying the work to be done. For 
example, specifying in great detail the action of 
workers on an assembly line. 
Standardisation of outputs Coordination by specifying the results of the work 
without specifying how those results should be 
achieved. For example, specifying the profit and growth 
levels expected of organisational divisions. 
Standardisation of skills Coordination by specifying the training, necessary for 
specific work. Therefore, employs have the skills and 
knowledge to carry out the appropriate actions and 
interactions for coordination. For example, an 
anaesthesiologist and a surgeon need only minimal 
communication because they already know what to 
expect of each other.  
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Table A.3.: Synthesis of dependencies and associated coordination mechanisms. 
Dependency (Malone 
and Crowston 1994) 
Example of coordination 
process for managing 
interdependency 
(Malone and Crowston 
1994) 
Interdependency 
(Thompson 1967) 
Coordination 
Mechanism (Mintzberg 
1979) 
Shared resources Resource allocation, for 
example first come first 
served. 
Pooled Direct supervision / 
standardization of  work 
Task assignments Task allocation Pooled / sequential Direct supervision / 
standardization of work 
Producer / consumer:    
Prerequisite constraints 
(producer activity must 
be finished before 
consumer activity can 
begin) 
Notification, sequencing, 
tracking 
sequential Standardization of work 
Transfer 
(producer outputs must 
be delivered to 
consumer) 
Inventory management sequential Standardization of work 
Usability (producer 
output must be useable by 
consumer) 
Standardization sequential Standardization of outputs 
Participatory design, for 
example concurrent 
engineering 
reciprocal Mutual adjustment 
Simultaneity constraints 
(activities must or cannot 
occur at the same time) 
Scheduling, 
synchronisation 
Sequential /  reciprocal Direct supervision / 
standardisation of work / 
mutual adjustment 
Task / subtask 
(achieving overall goal 
requires multiple 
subtasks to be completed) 
Goal selection (choosing 
the goal), task 
decomposition (choosing 
the subtasks required to 
complete the goal) 
Sequential /  reciprocal Direct supervision / 
standardisation / mutual 
adjustment 
 Group decision making, 
for example voting or 
consensus reaching 
Pooled / reciprocal Direct supervision / 
standardisation / mutual 
adjustment 
 Communication, the 
transfer of knowledge 
between individuals 
reciprocal Direct supervision / 
standardisation / mutual 
adjustment 
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Table A.4.: Synthesis of coordination mechanisms and interdependency. 
Coordination 
mechanism (Mintzberg 
1979) 
examples of coordination methods Interdependency 
(Thompson 
1967) 
Emphasis on 
integrating actions, 
transferring knowledge 
or shared knowledge 
(Grant 1996) 
Standardization Rules and 
directives 
(Grant 1996) 
Resource allocation 
(Malone & Crowston 
1994) 
 
pooled integrating actions 
notification, 
transportation or 
standardisation 
(Malone & Crowston 
1994) 
sequential integrating actions 
Goal selection, task 
decomposition (Malone 
& Crowston 1994) 
sequential integrating actions 
Plans (Grant 
1996; 
Thompson 
1967) 
Scheduling, 
synchronisation 
(Malone & Crowston 
1994) 
sequential / 
Reciprocal 
integrating actions 
Mutual adjustment Routines* 
(Hutchins 1991; Grant) 
sequential / 
Reciprocal 
Integrating actions, 
shared knowledge 
Groups decision making (Grant 1996; 
Malone & Crowston 1994) 
Reciprocal transferring knowledge 
Formal and informal communication 
(Mintzberg 1979; Malone & Crowston 
1994; Ven et al. 1976) 
Reciprocal/ 
Team (Ven et al. 
1976) 
transferring knowledge 
Shared representation / Mental model 
(Asch 1987; Karl E. Weick & Roberts 
1993) 
Reciprocal Shared knowledge 
    
* Relatively stable patterns of behaviour created by shared norms and values. 
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Appendix B: Social science methodology  
 
B.1. Social and organisational research methodology 
Social science research includes several research paradigms each following distinct 
epistemological and ontological stances (Hatch 1997). The two most prominent 
research paradigms within social science research are the positivist (also referred to as 
modernist) social sciences, and the interpretive social sciences (Neuman 2011; Hatch 
1997). The positivist, or modernist, approach to social science assumes a social realist 
paradigm that holds there is a universal social reality that can be objectively described 
through causal laws (Neuman 2011; Hatch 1997). Key characteristics of positivist 
social research are a hypothetico-deductive approach (Bryman 1988), a focus on 
external validity (generalizability) (Locke 2001) and an assumption that the researcher 
is neutral and objective (Neuman 2011). Data in positivist research is typically 
quantitative but can also be qualitative (Denzin & Lincoln 2005), for example 
William Foote Whyte’s (1955) study of ‘Cornerville’.  Common positivist methods 
include experiments and surveys (Neuman 2011). Kimbrough and Componation’s ( 
2009) attempt to establish a probabilistic relationship between a priori measures of 
organisational culture and enterprise risk management implementation is an example 
of the modernism paradigm in organisation studies. 
The interpretive (or constructivist) social sciences developed from criticisms of 
positivism’s assumption of a universal social reality and challenged the ability of 
researchers and language to objectively observe and describe social realities (Denzin 
& Lincoln 2005; Cunliffe 2003). The interpretive social sciences accept that there can 
be multiple perceptions of reality and aim to understand social reality from the 
perspective of those who live it (Locke 2001). They assume that what is viewed as 
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reality is constructed through shared history, experience and communication (Berger 
& Luckmann 1967). Critically, interpretive social science places scientists within that 
processes of ‘reality construction’ and therefore do not assume researcher neutrality 
(Rabinow & Sullivan 1979; Latour & Woolgar 1986). Therefore, interpretive 
methodologies place an emphasis on reflexivity: consciously and explicitly 
identifying how the researcher’s knowledge, assumptions and actions influence data 
gathering (for example, the influence the researcher may have on interviewee’s 
responses) and data analysis (Cunliffe 2003; Nagel 1986). Typical interpretivist 
methodologies include ethnographic interviews and participant observation (Hatch 
1997). Interpretivist research in organisational studies focuses on the subjective 
experience of being in organisations and how those experiences are produced (Hatch 
1997; Locke 2001). Examples include Weick’s enactment theory (1969) and Taylor 
and Van Every’s (2000) discourse based view of the firm which emphasises the role 
of individuals and shared language in creating organisations.  
 
Other approaches to social and organisational science include the critical social 
sciences (Neuman 2011) and the postmodern paradigm (Hatch 1997). The critical 
social sciences abandon any requirements for research neutrality and actively aim to 
influence the social phenomena of interest (Neuman 2011). Action research is perhaps 
the best known example of this (Locke 2001). The postmodern paradigm developed 
from literary and arts movements in the 1960s, and takes the relativist stance of 
interpretivist to a more extreme level (Locke 2001). Postmodernism abandons any 
assumption that science can be objective and value free and instead focuses on the 
power relations between different perspectives of reality (Parker 1992). Postmodern 
research typically aims to deconstruct texts to identify the values and assumption that 
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underpin the version of reality therein (Kincheloe & McLaren 1994). This extends to 
scientific texts, for example Calas and Smircich’s (1991) investigation of the cultural 
influence on theories of leadership.  
 
B.2. Qualitative and quantitative data 
As a general rule positivist methodologies tend to use quantitative data and 
interpretivist methodologies use qualitative data, although this is not absolute and 
research can incorporate both forms of data (Neuman 2011; Yin 2008). Quantitative 
data takes the form of numbers, most often from research methods such as surveys 
and experiments but also from methods such as content analysis of interview 
transcripts of documents (Denscombe 2007). Analysis of quantitative data offers 
benefits such as compatibility with statistical testing and succinct methods of 
presentation such as tables and charts (Denscombe 2007). Statistical tests can also be 
applied to quantitative data to objectively test hypotheses and establish the confidence 
to which findings can be generalised to a wider population (Denscombe 2007). 
However, the confidence to which the analysis of quantitative data can be generalised 
is highly dependent on data quality: variables must be stable and well defined; 
objectively and consistently measured; sufficient sample size and the wider 
population must be defined (Denscombe 2007). Social phenomena, that change over 
time (such as management philosophies), are open to multiple interpretations (for 
example, attitudes towards gender roles) and have unclear wider populations are 
problematic for quantitative analysis (Tsoukas 2009).  
 
Qualitative data is defined simply as data that is not numerical (Glaser & Anselm 
Strauss 1967), can take the form of words and visual images, and can accommodate 
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unstable variables, multiple interpretations and unclear populations (Buchanan 2012; 
Tsoukas 2009). Qualitative data is primarily produced through interpretivist research 
strategies (Hatch 1997) such as ethnography, phenomenology and grounded theory, 
using methods such as interviews, documents and observation (Denscombe 2007). A 
common principle of interpretivist, qualitative data analysis, derived from grounded 
theory (Glaser & Anselm Strauss 1967), is that analysis should be grounded and 
emergent. This means that results and conclusions, including the analytical categories 
forming results results, are developed directly from the data collected and not defined 
prior to data gathering (Locke 2001). This is in contrast to the hypothetico-deductive 
approach typifying quantitative research where variables and their relationships, in the 
form of hypotheses, are developed prior to data gathering (Bryman 1988). One 
advantage of qualitative analysis is it that can develop an in-depth and detailed 
knowledge of very specific social phenomena (Tsoukas 2009). This is suited to 
studies of unusual or complex subjects and generates strong internal validity 
(Denscombe 2007; Tsoukas 2009; Malterud 2001). However, this focus on the 
particular is the basis of a common criticism of qualitative research: that by 
developing a description that is very context specific, external validity and wider 
generalizability is weakened (Denscombe 2007; Tsoukas 2009). 
B.3. Inductive, deductive and abductive 
Both qualitative and quantitative social and organisational research is often delineated 
by whether is follows deductive or inductive logic. Research that follows a deductive 
(or hypothetico-deductive) begins with a theory from which a proposition or 
hypothesis is developed. The proposition or hypothesis is then compared against real-
world observations to test whether it is a ‘true’ description of reality or not (Locke 
2001). In contrast research that follows an inductive approach begins with a set of 
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observations from which a set of related concepts are developed that explain the 
observation (Locke 2001).  
An alternative approach, abductive logic, begins with an empirical observation like 
inductive logic but does not end with an explanation for the observation (Kelle 2005). 
Instead, the explanation or hypothesis developed must first explain the observed 
phenomena but must also relate to previous knowledge and experience (Kelle 2005). 
In this way previous knowledge facilitates the interpretation and explanation of the 
phenomena under study while being modified to reflect the empirical observations 
(Kelle 2005). In practice this involves applying prior knowledge (for example, 
existing theories and past empirical observations) retrospectively (i.e. after empirical 
data relating to the phenomena under study is collected and described) to make sense 
of empirical data and, when all other options are exhausted, modifying or 
recombining previous knowledge to fit the data. Alasuuter et al. (2008) describe 
abductive logic as the “imaginative interpretation of accounting for finds by 
entertaining all possible theoretical interpretations, then checking these interpretations 
against experience until arriving at the most plausible theoretical explanation”.  
 
B.4. Qualitative management and organisational research practices 
In addition to the various research paradigms there are several distinct practices of 
qualitative research used in organisational studies. The four most common research 
strategies are; ethnography,  action research, case work and grounded theory (Locke 
2001). Each of these research strategies can be applied following any the research 
paradigms discussed, including interpretivist and positivist approaches (Locke 2001). 
These research strategies share some common elements and in practice qualitative 
research often combines aspects of ethnographic, case study and grounded theory 
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methods (Locke 2001). However, there are differences between these research 
strategies that deserve consideration. 
 
B.4.1. Action research 
Action research was primarily developed by Kurt Lewin, who was concerned with 
achieving social improvement through research (Lewin 1951). The basic principle of 
action research is that social phenomena can be best understood by changing them and 
observing the results. In organisational studies action research involves learning about 
organisations while bringing about a change in those organisations (Baburoglu & 
Ravn 1992). Action research typically starts with a problem, formulates an action plan 
to address the problem and evaluates the outcome (Elden & Chisholm 1993). Action 
research can follow both a postmodern research paradigm, for example addressing 
issues of inequality in political discourse, or a modernist research paradigm, for 
example trying to identify underlying truths that can improve organisational 
performance (Locke 2001). 
 
B.4.2. Ethnography 
Ethnography developed from social and cultural anthropology and emphasises the 
collection of first-hand data on social and cultural life (Locke 2001). Ethnographic 
research tends to focus on one, or a very few, social settings, developing an in-depth 
description of social or cultural life from an insider perspective and is thus, strongly 
aligned with the interpretivist research paradigm (Locke 2001). In common with 
grounded theory the research is inductive and analytical categories are developed as 
the research progresses (Hammersley & Atkinson 1996). Ethnographic research is 
typified by extensive participant observation, for example in organisational studies the 
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researcher may commit one year to a particular study, taking part in the daily life of 
the organisation for the duration (Barley 1990). 
 
B.4.3. Case studies 
Case studies refer to research on a particular context or defined system (‘the case’) 
(Locke 2001). The research methods used vary considerably between case studies and 
include both positivist and interpretivist research paradigms (Yin 2008; D. Buchanan 
2012). Case study based strategies are often used for descriptive, exploratory or 
explanatory research (Yin 2008) but can also be used to develop and test theory (D. 
Buchanan 2012; Tsoukas 2009). The key feature of the case study approach is that it 
considers the phenomenon of interest (the case) within its real life context (Yin 2008). 
For example, a case study on risk managers will interview or observe risk managers 
within their organisational context and incorporate relevant aspects of that context 
into the research. This is in contrast to laboratory experimentation and modelling 
which remove data gathering from the real life context (Meredith 1989). Yin (2008) 
describes case studies as suited to developing explanations of contemporary events 
where there is direct access to key individuals involved, for example through direct 
observation or interviews, but where the researcher cannot control the subjects’ 
behaviour (Table B.1). Case studies are also considered particularly appropriate where 
the phenomenon studied is difficult to delineate from its context (D. Buchanan 2012) 
or where the wider population of which the case is a member is unclear (Tsoukas 
2009).  
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Table B.1: Selection of methods, from Yin (2009) 
Method: Form of research question Requires Control of 
Behavioural Events? 
Focuses on Contemporary 
Events? 
Experiment How, why Yes Yes 
Survey Who, what, where, how 
many, how much 
No Yes 
Archival analysis Who why, where, how 
many, how much 
No Yes/no 
History How, why No No 
Case study How, why No Yes 
 
Case studies can incorporate any data source deemed relevant to the case, including 
both qualitative and quantitative data from a wide range of sources (Locke 2001). 
Stake (1994) and Yin (2008) identify six sources of data that can be used for case 
studies: interviews, direct observation, participant observation, physical artefacts, 
archival records and documents. However the full range of data sources used in case 
studies is more extensive (D. Buchanan 2012). If fact, there is no consensus on how 
data should be gathered for case studies and practice varies considerably (Locke 
2001).  Some case study methods require research questions and working hypothesis 
to be developed before data gathering (Yin 2008), other case studies develop the 
research question retrospectively (D. Buchanan 2012).  
Data analysis methods also vary between case studies. Yin (2008) describes five 
possible method of data analysis for case studies: 
1. Pattern matching: Comparing the actual outcome of a case, or cases, with a 
predicted outcome, for example one predicted by a theoretical model. 
2. Explanation building: Generating a causal explanation or hypothesis of the 
observed phenomena and identifying links for further research. 
3. Time-series analysis: A pattern matching analysis comparing changes over 
time.  
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4. Logic models: Comparing predicted and observed outcomes over a series of 
iterations, with immediate, intermediate and ultimate outcomes. This can be 
used as part of action research to evaluate the effect of interventions.  
5. Cross-case synthesis: Comparing the outcome of multiple cases by common 
set of criteria.  
As Buchanan (2012) points out these methods of data analysis are not rigid or 
exclusive, can be adapted to specific contexts and applied in combination to one set of 
data.  
As a result of the methodological diversity of case studies, they are considered by 
some to be primarily a research strategy for the selection of subjects to be studied 
(Stake 1994: 236). Cases are selected following the principle of theoretical sampling: 
cases which offer the greatest opportunity to learn about the research subject (Patton 
2002; Yin 2008). More specifically, cases can be selected because they are unusual 
(intrinsic cases); because they offer insight into the issue or theory or interest 
(instrumental cases), or as part of multiple instrumental case studies in order to 
strengthen generalizability through replication logic (collective cases or multiple 
cases) (Stake et al. 1994; Yin 2008). 
The strength of case studies is their ability to develop strong internal validity 
(Malterud 2001) through in-depth description of multiple factors concerning each 
case. This allows for triangulation of facts, whereby multiple sources of data can 
corroborate results (Yin 2008). It also allows the divergences and differences between 
the perspective and experience of individuals within a case study to be investigated 
(Buchanan 2012; Buchanan & Dawson 2007). In contrast, perhaps the most 
contentious aspect of case studies is their external validity (generalizability). Case 
studies face criticism because of their small sample sizes, with studies often 
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concerning a single case (Buchanan 2012; Buchanan 1999). However, this criticism is 
flawed as a case does not equate to a single iteration of a single variable but 
incorporate multiple factors together with contextual knowledge (Buchanan 2012). 
Following this, Yin (2008) argues that analysis based on multiple case studies is more 
akin to repeating experiments (replication logic) than multiple, individual data points. 
Furthermore, because the wider relevance of case study results is not measured 
according to sample logic, sample size is not a critical factor (Yin 2008). Buchanan 
(2012) argues that case study results can be generalized through four approaches that 
are independent of sample size: 
1. Moderatum generalizations: Generalizing (Payne 2005) based on common 
features between the case studies and other cases. For example if an ‘incident 
command system’ led to coordinated behaviour in the case study organisation 
(Bigley & Roberts 2001), other organisations with similar incident command 
systems can be inferred to have similar coordination characteristics.  
2. Naturalistic generalisations: Where the reader of a case study applies the 
knowledge gained from the case study to his or her own situation (Stake et al. 
1994).  
3. Analytical refinement: Case study results are generalized to theory (also called 
analytical generalization). Here a case study of a phenomena generates results 
that add to, or modify an existing theory concerning that phenomena, thus 
expanding the body of knowledge available (Tsoukas 2009). For example the 
development of high reliability theory (Weick et al. 1999) through multiple 
successive case studies.  
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4. Isomorphic learning: Transferring the knowledge learned from one case to 
others that share a common feature. This is primarily applies to transferring 
the lessons learned from accidents and disasters to other settings, for example 
other organisations in the same sector, or other organisations in different 
sectors that use similar processes (Toft & Reynolds 2005 pp66 and 72-5). 
 
B.4.4. Grounded theory 
Grounded theory was first developed by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss in the 
early 1960s. Their book ‘The Discovery of Grounded Theory’ published in 1967 
marked a major shifting point in qualitative research towards more inductive 
approaches and has become the basis of qualitative research today (Locke 2001; 
Glaser & Anselm Strauss 1967; Alasuutar et al. 2008). Grounded theory is a strategy 
for qualitative research that overlaps with action research, ethnography and case study 
research (Locke 2001). For example, it can aim to inform practitioners like action 
research, it uses theoretical sampling like case studies and inductively develops 
analytical categories throughout the research processes like ethnography (Locke 
2001). In fact grounded theory is often used in conjunction with a case study sampling 
strategy to gather data (Locke 2001). However, grounded theory differs from 
ethnography in that it is less focussed on culture and it differs from case studies in that 
is has a codified and systematic process of qualitative data analysis (Locke 2001). 
Grounded theory was developed partly in response to perceived shortcoming in social 
research methods of the 1950s and 60s. Theory in sociology at the time was 
predominantly formed from the results of quantitative methods following a positivist 
paradigm (Alasuutar et al. 2008). Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss felt that the 
influence of established theory on the outcomes of the positivist, hypothetico-
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deductive methods used were resulting in a growing gap between social theories and 
reality. At the same time they perceived that qualitative research often followed 
unclear methods and was primarily description and therefore, not developed into 
theory. In response to this, they developed grounded theory, of which the key 
contribution was to establish a more explicit and systematic methodology for the 
inductive development of theory from qualitative observation of social phenomena 
(Alasuutar et al. 2008). 
The core principles of grounded theory are inductive logic; simultaneous data 
collection and analysis; and constant comparison of the emergent findings against 
empirical observations (Alasuutar et al. 2008). The original grounded theory method 
sets out a systematic process of coding that develops analytical categories (codes), 
refines those codes and checks them against the empirical data as the codes become 
increasingly theoretical (Glaser & Straus 1967; Alasuutar et al. 2008). The basic steps 
of coding in grounded theory (Glaser & Straus 1967; Strauss & Corbin 1990; Bazeley 
2007) are as follows: 
1. Descriptive coding: Also called ‘open coding’ here analytical categories, or 
codes, closely describing the data are developed by asking questions of the 
data, such as who are the actors involved, what are their actions, what is the 
context of their action. The various characteristic of the data are separately 
coded (fracturing the data).  
2. Selecting focused codes: The most frequent or interesting codes are selected 
for further analysis and expanded by further data gathering following the 
principles of theoretical sampling. 
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3. Organising focused codes: Here the focused codes are compared to each other 
and organised into categories based on similar qualities, for example all codes 
describing actions or motivations could be grouped together.  
4. Axial coding: These describe relationships between the descriptive codes. 
These are identified by recombining the fractured open codes to identify 
patterns or associations between codes. 
5. Theoretical coding: These are abstract concepts which make sense of the 
overall data by linking the focused and axial codes with each other, and 
possibly with existing theoretical concepts.  
In addition, throughout the coding process the researcher is constantly comparing 
codes and data to ‘ground’ the emerging codes in data (Glaser & Straus 1967; Strauss 
& Corbin 1990; Bazeley 2007). The comparisons include: 
1. Comparing data with data: Data is compared with data to identify 
commonalities between the data that could be coded. 
2. Comparing data with descriptive codes: The data within each code is 
compared to the description of the code to make sure the code is a reasonable 
representation of the data. 
3. Comparing data with abstract codes (axial and theoretical): The abstract codes 
developed are compared to the original phenomena described 
(recontextualised) to determine if they are reasonable.  
4. Comparing abstract codes with concepts: The abstract codes developed 
through grounded theory can be compared to the concepts of other theories to 
determine how the emergent findings relate to prior knowledge. 
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This said, precisely what grounded theory is and how it should be implemented is by 
no means unanimously established and a variety of interpretations and applications 
exist (Locke 2001). Early grounded theory methodology (Glaser & Straus 1967; 
Straus & Corbin 1990) contained both positivist and interpretivist elements (Locke 
2001). For example the emphasis on ‘discovering’ facts, a single core variable and 
researcher neutrality reflect positivist assumptions, while the emphasis on the 
subjective perspective of the social actors studied reflects interpretivist assumptions 
(Locke 2001; Alasuutar et al. 2008). The positivist elements of grounded theory have 
subsequently been challenged (Kelle 2005; Charmaz 2006).  In particular, the original 
grounded theory (Glaser & Straus 1967) is seen to contain a conflict between its 
concepts of ‘emergence’ and ‘theoretical sensitivity’, which on the one hand insist on 
a purely inductive process, rejecting the role of prior knowledge in the emergence of 
facts, while on the other hand accept that a degree of prior knowledge is required to 
recognise relevant data and make sense of it (Kelle 2005). Strauss and Corbin (1990) 
attempted to overcome the conflict between the desire for a purely emergent 
methodology and the necessity of theoretical sensitivity with a collection of generic 
concepts that can be used to objectively identify relationships between descriptive 
codes. These are: (1.) phenomena at which the action and interaction in the domain 
under study are directed, (2.) causal conditions which lead to the occurrence of these 
phenomena, (3.) attributes of the context of the investigated phenomena, (4.) 
additional intervening conditions by which the investigated phenomena are 
influenced, (5.) action and interactional strategies the actors use to handle the 
phenomena and (6.) the consequences of their actions and interactions (Anslem 
Strauss & Corbin 1990). However, as Kelle (2005) points out the coding paradigm is 
not theoretically neutral as it reflects a micro-sociological perspective emphasising the 
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role of individuals in creating social phenomena and is therefore not compatible with 
research into macro-sociology or system theory. Kelle (2005) argues that abductive 
rather than purely inductive logic best describes the process of grounded theory: 
rather than developing theory based solely on data derived from the observed 
phenomena, theory is developed by integrating the observation of the phenomena with 
prior experience and knowledge. Adoption of abductive logic and rejection of the 
assumption of researcher neutrality lead to the development of more strongly 
interpretivist (constructivist) iterations of grounded theory (Charmaz 2006). 
Constructivist, grounded theory recognises the role of the researcher and their prior 
knowledge in constructing the emergent results, for example through sample 
selection, data collection and interpretation of the data (Alasuutar et al. 2008). 
Following a interpretivist research paradigm, constructivist grounded theory 
emphasises the need to accounting for multiple perceptions of experience in social 
phenomena and the importance of accounting for researcher reflexivity (Charmaz 
2006; Cunliffe 2003).  
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Interview questions for case study one: First tranche of interviews 
Intro by the interviewer 
• The interview will take approximately 40min. With the help of this and other 
interviews we will try to gain some understanding of the risk culture in [case study 
one]. As you will eventually notice my questions will get more specific in the course 
of the interview. 
• […] 
Warm-up questions  
1 How would you describe your company in one or two phrases? 
2 Where do you see [case study one] in 10 years? 
3 What role can risk governance take in this development? 
4 Can you please describe your role in the risk governance process?  
Risk Culture  
5 How was/is risk governance introduced to your department of the company? 
6 In implementing the framework, are you introducing new methods, e.g. 
auditing, introduced to your department? 
7 How much support did you get from senior management? 
8 How do you communicate risks to the other parts of the company? 
9 What problems have you been experiencing in these communication 
processes? 
10 How do you draw the boundaries to other teams/departments’ risk efforts? 
11 And in turn how do you establish common ground? 
12 Does your department seek external advice for establishing the risk 
governance framework? 
13 How well would you say the department is in control of the risks it takes? 
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14 What is securing the continuous update of relevant risk information? 
15 Are risks always clear to subordinates? 
16 Do subordinates understand how risks relate to E.ON’s core business? 
 
Risk Processes 
17 What triggers risk analysis efforts of your department? 
18 How does your department identify risks? 
19 How are you ranking the different risks – how does the process look like or 
who is involved at what stage? 
20   How do you assess whether a risk is acceptable or not? 
21 Are you already in a position to compare risks in your department with that of 
other departments? 
22 Is your method or are your tools available to other departments? 
23 How do you manage the knowledge you gather? 
24 Do you already share it with other departments? 
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Interview questions for case study one: Second tranche of interviews 
 
Interview questions: 
 
General opening questions 
1) In your role what sort of decisions do you make around risk? 
 How often do you have to make these decisions? 
 
2) How do you make these decisions on risk? 
 What sort of thing do you draw on to help you make these decisions? 
 Why would you base your decisions on X (and not Y)? (Seeking a response 
that would indicate whether the embeddness of values or rules affects their 
influence on decision making)? 
 
3) What sort of risk management decisions do you expect your work colleges to 
make? 
 And what do you expect them to base their decisions on? 
 Why would you expect them to base their decisions on X (and not Y)? 
(Seeking a response that would indicate whether the embeddness of values or 
rules affects their influence on decision making)? 
 
4) What do the people you work with expect you to base risk management decisions 
on? 
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 Why would they expect you to base your decisions on X (and not Y)? 
(Seeking a response that would indicate whether the embeddness of values or 
rules affects their influence on decision making)? 
 
5) When would you involve others in your decision making around risk? 
 (If so) In these situations why would you involve others in your decision 
making on risk?  
 And when would you not involve others in your decision making on risk, and 
why? 
 
6) Have you ever made a decision that in hindsight was the wrong decision? 
 What did you base this decision on? 
 What where the consequences? 
  In your opinion were the consequences related to what you based the decision 
on? 
 
Specific questions on judgement 
 
1) How does your own judgement play into decisions involving risk or risk 
management? 
 What sort of thing would you base your judgement on? (If needed prompt with 
examples: previous experience, experience of colleagues, evidence, and 
intuition). 
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 Why would you base your judgement on X (and not Y)? (Seeking a response 
that would indicate whether the embeddness of values or rules affects their 
influence on decision making). 
 Could you give me examples of risk management decisions you would mainly 
rely on your own judgement for? 
 
2) And conversely when would you not primarily rely on your own judgement 
for a decision? 
 How would you make decisions in this situation? (If needed prompt with 
example: rules, procedures, standard solutions). 
 Why would you base your decision on X (and not Y)? (Seeking a response 
that would indicate whether the embeddness of values or rules affects their 
influence on decision making). 
 Could you give me examples of risks you would not primarily rely on your 
own judgement in managing? 
 
3) Under which conditions would you involve a more senior employee in your 
decision making? 
 What sort of thing would you use to make a decision in this situation? 
 Why would you base your decision on X (and not Y)? (Seeking a response 
that would indicate whether the embeddness of values or rules affects their 
influence on decision making). 
 Please give me examples of risks you would involve a more senior employee 
to manage? 
 Why would you defer to seniority in these situations? 
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4) And when would you not involve a more senior employee? 
 In these situations what would you use to make your decisions? 
 Why would you base your decision on X (and not Y)? (Seeking a response 
that would indicate whether the embeddness of values or rules affects their 
influence on decision making). 
 Please give me examples of risks you would not involve a more senior 
employee? 
 Why would you not defer to seniority in these sitations? 
 
5) Under which conditions would you follow your own judgement even if that 
meant breaking or bending a rule or procedure? 
 What sort of thing would you base your judgement on in this situation? 
 Why would you base your judgement on X (and not Y)? (Seeking a response 
that would indicate whether the embeddness of values or rules affects their 
influence on decision making). 
 Please give me examples of risks you would break or bend a rule when 
managing, if you thought that was the right thing to do? 
 What consequences might you expect if your decision was A) the right one 
and B) the wrong one? 
 
6) And when would you not break or bend a rule even if it was against your 
better judgement? 
 What sort of thing would you base your decision on in this situation? 
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 Why would you base your decision on X (and not Y)? (Seeking a response 
that would indicate whether the embeddness of values or rules affects their 
influence on decision making). 
 Please give me examples of risks you would not break or bend rules when 
managing even if you thought it would be the right thing to do? 
 What consequences might you expect if your decision was wrong? 
 
 
7) When would you, and when would you not rely on someone else’s judgement 
in making a risk management decision? 
 
8) If you had only a limited amount of time to make a decision, say 1 hour, 
would this influence how much you relied on your own judgement or not? 
 What if you only had a very little time, say 15 minutes? 
 What if you had lots of time, say several months? 
 
9) Would the potential severity of the consequences of a decision influence 
whether you used your own judgement or not? 
 Would the basis on which you made the decision affect the reaction from the 
organisation? 
 
10) Would whether you had experience of a risk on which you are making a 
decision, affect whether you used your own judgement or not? 
 What if a colleague had experience of the risk? 
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 If the risk was totally new to the organisation, would this affect how you 
would make a decision about it? 
 If the risk was well known and had been experienced many times, would this 
affect how you would make a decision about it? 
 
11) <The organisation> operates across a wide geographical area in lots of 
different situations from urban to rural to industrial, does this influence 
whether you use judgement or not in managing risk, or rely on other peoples’ 
judgement? 
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Second case study interview questions 
 
 
Introduction (to give interviewee) 
 
Hello, first thank you for taking the time to meet with me, it is much appreciated. 
Second, everything in this interview will be held in confidence and any use of the data 
will be made anonymous. Before any results are published based on anything from 
this interview I will send a copy to you for your approval. At that stage, or any stage 
until actual publication, you are free to have your data removed and deleted. This 
research is being carried out by Cranfield University on behalf of DEFRA. It aims to 
investigate current risk management practices, the consistency in those practices, and 
the factors shaping them. We hope this will provide understanding on why some risk 
management practices become widespread and some do not.  
 
Bullet points signify secondary questions that can be asked if content in not addressed 
by main (numbered) question. 
 
Opening question: 
 
1) Are you familiar with the concept of risk-based policy making? 
 Would you say you are using such an approach? 
 
Perception of risk based policy-makings: 
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2) What is the purpose of risk based policy-making? 
 
3) Who or what is the main beneficiary of risk based policy-making and what benefit 
do you derive from it? 
 
Risk management in the policy cycle: 
 
4) How do your risk management activities change as you move through the policy 
cycle? 
 Has this been the same for other policy domains you have worked in? 
 What informs what risk management you engage in and when (throughout the 
policy cycle)? 
 
5) To what extent is there a common understanding within DEFRA on how to handle 
risk in the policy cycle? 
 What is the basis for this common understanding, for example shared 
experience of what works and what doesn’t, or codified guidance? 
 
6) Can you give me a broad outline of the types of risk that you incorporate into your 
risk management, for example social, environmental, and economic?  
 Why do you manage risk according to these categories?  
 
7) How do you differentiate between managing risk to DEFRA as an organisation (for 
example delivery risks such as damage to DEFRA’s reputation) and managing the 
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external risks DEFRA is responsible for (for example policy risks, such as the 
economic impact of animal disease)? 
 
8) Which points in the policy cycle are most problematic in terms of risk 
management?  
 How do you manage the transition from directly managing risk to managing 
risk through a delivery partner? 
 
General risk management, governance and areas of difficulty: 
 
What is risk and to whom? 
 
9) What are the main receptors, for example, for the risk assessment of a landfill site 
receptors may include local residents and ground water, or stakeholders is risk impact 
considered in relation to? 
 How do you engage with stakeholders on issues of risk? 
 
Rules versus expertise and experience 
 
10) How much discretion do you have to how you manage risk? 
 In circumstances not covered by best practice guidelines what guides your risk 
management? 
 
11) To what extend does risk enter into everyday discussion during policy 
development, or is risk mainly discussed within defined risk management activities?  
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12) Is it necessary to employ different risk assessment methods for different types of 
risk?  
 When would you employ quantitative data gathering, expert judgement or in 
team experience?  
 What informs the choice of risk assessment method employed?  
 
Hindering factors 
 
13) What, if any, factors limit your ability to manage risk? 
 What changes would you like to see that would facilitate your ability to 
manage risk? 
 
Coordination between subgroups and stakeholders 
 
14) To what extent is there a common perception of risk within DEFRA? 
 
15) When managing reputational risk, whose reputation do you consider, for example, 
ministerial reputation, your policy team, or the delivery partner? 
 
16) In the context of risk management, how do you handle conflicting interests 
between DEFRA and delivery partners?  
 What is the view of senior management within DEFRA on such issues? 
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17) How do you manage for the possibility your actions may impact on the risks faced 
by another policy domain, for example, by alienating a mutual stakeholder, or 
perverse regulatory impacts on other policy domains? 
 
Potential areas of difficulty where cultural factors may guide behaviour 
 
18) How do you keep up to date on current issues, escalating risks and emerging 
concerns? 
 
19) How do you assess whether a risk is acceptable or not and how clear is the 
guidance on this?  
 What is the underlying rationale for this basis upon which to assess risk 
acceptability? 
 
Final question, risk based policy-making impact: 
 
20) How has risk based policy-making changed how DEFRA creates and implements 
policy? Have all these changes been beneficial?  
 
Additional questions (if there is time): 
 
21) How do you deal with high impact low probability risks versus low impact high 
probability risks? 
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22) How do you determine whether quantitative or qualitative risk assessment is more 
appropriate and how to you incorporate quantitative and qualitative data into overall 
risk based decisions?  
 
23) How do you manage risks generated internally by DEFRA or your policy team 
(for example institutional blindness) as opposed to risks originating externally (such 
as flooding)? 
 
24) How do you address comparison or trade-offs between very different risk 
categories, for examples social risk and economic risks? How clear is the guidance on 
this? 
 
25) Where does the largest uncertainty reside in your risk management activities? 
 How do you communicate uncertainty in your risk assessments? 
 How do you minimise or reduced uncertainty to an acceptable level? 
 Is there a clear understanding of how to deal with uncertainty in risk 
management within DEFRA? 
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Appendix G: Example of full codes 
 
Data making up the code ‘Informal risk management’ (case study two): 
 
 
<Interviewee\\CD_vn680039 wma_transcript_4N> - § 4 references coded  [4.58% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.62% Coverage 
 
I worked previously in a much more reactive environment on international trade. It 
was much less programme and project managed. As a result I 
think risk was less systematically approached there.  
 
Reference 2 - 1.38% Coverage 
 
Yes well, in terms of risk in this job I haven’t seen any sort of formal Defra risk 
guidance that outlines how to assess risk and deal with risk. 
What I do in my team is discuss it with my wider team and with 
my managers, and there was actually something from Cranfield 
University actually on risk which was circulated and which I 
looked at. And that would be the closest thing to a sort of 
formalised approach to risk that I’ve seen.  
 
Reference 3 - 2.24% Coverage 
 
No, no. There was... again, I think in the previous role risks did tend to crop up and 
were then dealt with. There wasn’t that much forward planning. 
Possibly that was a function of the role, it wasn’t a typical 
Defra role. It wasn’t really to do Defra, to do with UK 
government policy, it was essentially responding to other 
government’s policies because it was an international trade 
function. And it was to do with if other governments change 
their policies or if there’s an animal disease outbreak or 
something, you have to react to that. So in terms of a general 
approach to those risks, I think there was a fair amount of 
planning done, but on a more specific level, perhaps it’s not 
that easy to do.  
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Reference 4 - 0.35% Coverage 
 
Interviewer: And was it the same in the previous role you had? Was there... 
 
Respondent: Again, not really no. 
 
<Interviewee\\DW_vn680043 wma_transcript_m8> - § 7 references coded  [7.07% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.49% Coverage 
 
Yes, in the formal sense yes.  I think with the stuff we’ve been doing, you know the 
day to day business we’ve been doing for years and probably 
you don’t think that much in terms of formal risk management.  
Maybe you do it kind of instinctively,  
 
Reference 2 - 1.17% Coverage 
 
we had a situation where regional offices had closed and we’ve had to move the work, 
and you know you had to do it really quickly and almost by the 
seat of your pants really in a way.  And, in those circumstances 
you might, might not actually sit down and do a formal risk 
management, or I guess you should do because it is a project in 
a sense but, so I think what I’m saying is that, where you’re 
setting out on a formal project and you probably would think 
about risk management but are probably areas where you don’t 
because there aren’t set processes that you’re supposed to go 
through.   
 
Reference 3 - 0.40% Coverage 
 
Sometimes when things come out of the blue and they’re below the radar then you 
might do that without a risk management.  And you’re probably 
thinking about risk but you’re not doing in a formalised way. 
 
Reference 4 - 2.27% Coverage 
 
Interviewer: So in that sort of grey area where there’s no, it’s not clear that 
there’s a formal process, that’s required and appropriate for 
that, you know in the grey area, to what extent is there a sort of 
a common understanding on how to manage risk by Defra, or 
how much consistency is there? 
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Respondent: I think you know it’s interesting talking about it, I think it’s 
possibly there isn’t that much of an understanding about these 
things need to be dealt with and maybe that’s an area that needs 
further thinking really.  But it comes, I think these sort of things 
become embedded don’t they?  As I say it’s a fairly relatively 
new way of looking at things.  And I guess it’s not got to the 
point yet where it’s instinctive.  It’s that sort of, what do they 
call it, conscious competence and unconscious competence.  
We haven’t got yet to the point where you do it just 
instinctively.   
 Yes, you probably do it informally, instinctively, but you don’t 
do a formal process.  I don’t think we’ve got to that point yet 
where you would instinctively think “Oh yes I’ve got a 
problem, what I ought to do is sit down and do a risk 
assessment.” 
 
 
Reference 5 - 0.84% Coverage 
 
With the smaller ones, where you don’t need external approval, you might be able to 
choose I guess, whether you do a risk register or not.  But it 
would make sense, if it’s a new project to do it.  And I guess 
then there’s those smaller things that we talked about earlier, 
where they’re almost part of the day to day job, which you 
could do a risk register, but you might think “Well actually 
that’s a bit over the top.”  So… 
 
Reference 6 - 1.04% Coverage 
 
Well I think again it’s – I think it probably would, it depends again on whether that 
particular piece of work is significant enough for you to think 
that it justifies having a risk register.  I think those earlier 
conversations, if it wasn’t that sort of piece of work, yes they 
would feed in.  But you know, on small pieces of work one 
talks about risk doesn’t one.  And you sort of think “There’s a 
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risk this might happen, or there’s a risk that that might happen.”  
But those are things which we will fall below the threshold. 
 
Reference 7 - 0.87% Coverage 
 
I think they’re largely informal.  You know I think it has to be based on your 
knowledge of how the organisation works.  I think Defra’s 
pretty good at sharing policy or sharing understanding or 
knowledge between the different policy areas.  But as far as I 
know there’s not a formal process for doing that.  And of 
course there’s always pressure, you know not to copy too many 
people in on e-mails, because that can be a problem in itself. 
 
<Interviewee\\EA_vn680034_transcript_VF> - § 10 references coded  [11.70% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.29% Coverage 
 
Yes sort of.  I can’t say it’s at the forefront of my mind very often.  I’ve been taught 
about it but… 
 
Reference 2 - 1.01% Coverage 
 
Individually on my projects when they were first set up I put some risks together in 
the kind of project plan.  The programme itself is managed, 
because the Food Policy Unit’s run as a kind of programme 
with lots of projects, has risks.. a risk kind of tool that in 
theory’s there and we can put into but I just don’t particularly 
pay much attention to it. 
 
Reference 3 - 0.36% Coverage 
 
Yes I don’t really get back to it.  And actually for the skills work I don’t think we’ve 
really done any risk analysis recently. 
 
Reference 4 - 1.56% Coverage 
 
I am particularly when I do with work external stakeholders I have to say.  A lot of the 
work we do in food policy we say Government doesn’t own it, 
it’s not a Government’s, it's facilitating an industry led things.  
And so you kind of have to think about the risks, are they going 
to take it on?  Are they going to see this through, what you 
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actually want?  So in that way yes but I wouldn’t probably 
describe it as risk. 
 
I probably would if I was being interviewed for a job.  Just 
generally day to day I wouldn’t but you do have to think about 
it. 
 
Reference 5 - 1.44% Coverage 
 
No I think probably if you, if you have somebody coming in who you might think 
actually particularly the Country of Origin Labelling right you 
probably should have more awareness of risk and you’re doing 
more risk management.  It was a government commitment in 
the structural reform plans we’re having.  It was, the first stage 
was  delivered on time thankfully, so actually probably 
should’ve spent more time at the beginning thinking about what 
might have stopped it but just didn’t really, I don’t know why. 
 
Reference 6 - 1.79% Coverage 
 
Depends how much you actually check I suppose you know through the policy cycle, 
whether you just plough on and get on with it.  And once 
you’ve taken a course of action I think quite often you tend to 
just drive forward and then once you’ve doing it you’ve 
forgotten the risks a little bit.  If you do that thinking right at 
the beginning.  I don’t, I mean looking at the policy cycle here 
you can see that they’ve got risk stuff coming in all over the 
place.  So I think it’s developing appraising options is probably 
the main area that is looked at and once you’ve done that and 
you’ve picked your course you don’t tend to go back. 
 
Reference 7 - 2.20% Coverage 
 
It actually probably does that a bit more if you actually sat up and thought about the 
conversation you’d had about policy development.  And 
particularly in my work around stakeholders and getting them 
to agree things.  It probably is, there is probably quite a lot of 
talk in that about risks even though it’s not kind of referred to 
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in that way or formalised in that way.  Then we’re talking about 
you know how we’re going to handle particular meetings or get 
particular documents cleared through stakeholder groups.  
There is a kind of well what’s going to happen if they don’t like 
X, Y and Z and if this group wants that and that group wants 
that, what we can do about it. 
 
So I suppose that’s risk based discussion it’s just in the 
conversation without being formalised. 
 
Reference 8 - 0.67% Coverage 
 
Interviewer: Is there sort of clear understanding on how you should be doing 
that within Defra or is that you’ve learnt that based on 
experience of doing it before? 
 
Respondent: Experience really.  It’s not something that we’re taught. 
 
Reference 9 - 1.09% Coverage 
 
It’s quite hard really I think that there’s a lot, there’s probably there are formal ways 
you know the high, medium and low impact and all that kind of 
thing.  But I don’t think it is that necessarily it’s more through 
to discussion with people that you work with about actually if 
this goes wrong what are we going to do about it?  So it tends 
to be through kind of informal discussion. 
 
Reference 10 - 1.28% Coverage 
 
Yes.  Yes and that you have, are you prepared to go, how far are you prepared to push 
it?  You’ll discuss that with people around you to get a feel 
for…  And sometimes that’s legal risks actually so you do talk 
to the legal team particularly on the stuff on I do on origin 
labelling for example.  And there’s all kinds of legal potholes 
about what you can and can’t do with the context of the EU.  So 
you’ll often to talk to specialists in that to see. 
 
<Interviewee\\IB_vn680036_transcript_kQ> - § 3 references coded  [1.82% Coverage] 
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Reference 1 - 0.95% Coverage 
 
In terms of, I mean, the way I’ve found that most helpful is, when you’ve identified a 
risk, and you’re looking at developing counter measures, where 
people have been doing similar things and you can go and say, 
you know, “How did you deal with the presentational risks on 
this,” or, “What do you do to get round this issue?” then, yes, 
that’s helpful.  But there’s… 
 
Reference 2 - 0.72% Coverage 
 
Yes, it’s, you know, having the right network of contacts, knowing who the people are 
to talk to throughout the department.  There’s no, kind of, as far 
as I’m aware, sharing of risk experience that goes on other 
than… 
 
Interviewer: In a formal way, it’s informal? 
 
Ian: Yes. 
 
Reference 3 - 0.15% Coverage 
 
And, of course, on-going discussions with people, you know. 
 
<Interviewee\\JM_vn680041_transcript_r0> - § 3 references coded  [4.21% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.99% Coverage 
 
Yes I think within my policy role it’s something that we do automatically.  We don’t 
always necessarily think of it as being risk based but you know 
there is some, a degree of accountability and reporting etc 
through the, from top level down and up again so. 
 
Reference 2 - 1.14% Coverage 
 
And even so far as the submission to a degree, to a lesser degree it’s there so that 
you’re aware of…  Although I’m not very good at telling you 
what the risk, the actual risks are because as I say it’s kind of 
like you know you read up on it when you need it but we’re 
doing it to a degree anyway. 
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Reference 3 - 2.08% Coverage 
 
 From experience perhaps if you’ve had a meeting and from that, with external 
stakeholders for instance and you have written up the notes of 
that meeting and you’ve sent them out for clearance and then 
there is disagreement as to what was understood from that 
meeting, that kind of is like a risk assessment isn’t it.  It focuses 
you on what you have to be careful what you’re saying.  You 
have to be clear and confident that what you’re trying to get 
across has actually got across in the way that you want it to.  So 
there’s that aspect. 
 
 
<Interviewee\\JR_vn680038_Transcript_Ln> - § 3 references coded  [3.01% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.97% Coverage 
 
There are always influences.  You tend to work as teams to facilitate good practice 
and where people have had good experiences, that tends to get 
round.  Similarly, if you – it gets round even quicker if 
somebody has a bad experience.  So, yes, there are means of 
capturing and the, sort of, sharing of information across teams 
in terms of what’s being done, and approaches. 
 
Reference 2 - 2.03% Coverage 
 
An informal basis, tends to be, one doesn’t have time these days to do too much 
writing up about what a – precisely in sharing that about, it 
might get stored within a particular team and, I suppose, these 
days, I haven’t actually experienced it myself, technically one 
could, because a lot of stuff gets shared in shared facilities now 
within our computer systems so, technically, team sites are 
there and other teams can have access, so if they want to look at 
what you’ve done for a risk register for instance, or how you’ve 
dealt with a particular stakeholder in terms of that risk, 
technically, those documents could be there and they could 
access them, so they can go to that without actually having to 
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come to you and say that’s in here because those documents 
have been done. 
 
Reference 3 - 0.01% Coverage 
 
Yes. 
 
<Interviewee\\MB_vn680035_Transcript_PX> - § 6 references coded  [7.24% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.59% Coverage 
 
And sometimes it probably will but often that will be through a narrative paper or 
something.  So someone will come to the board and say 
“Here’s what’s going on.  Here are the options we’re looking 
at.  What do you think?”  Rather than through a more 
formalised risk based approach.  So I think that’s probably true 
actually, yes. 
 
Reference 2 - 1.83% Coverage 
 
I think there’s very little, if anything at all in the way of formal quality assurance for 
somebody’s risk assessment. It doesn’t mean that there isn’t 
any QA.  But it tends to come more from, in my experience 
someone will take a risk register to a program board.  And the 
senior people who sit on that board, who do come from a 
variety of different policy areas and sometimes a variety of 
different organisations if it’s a cross organisational board will 
give their comments. Examine it, go through it. 
 
But to some extent it’s sort of up to the SRO to satisfy himself 
or herself that that’s been done thoroughly enough.  And 
ultimately the buck stops with them basically.  But there isn’t 
really an obvious, automatic process for which there is 
guidance etc of which I’m aware for you to check…  There 
isn’t a clear view for example.   
 
So when economists do impact assessments they have to be 
peer reviewed by other economists, often from other 
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departments.  I don’t know of any similarly process for risk 
assessments. 
 
Reference 3 - 0.67% Coverage 
 
I think quite often they sort of happen, a document gets circulated, everyone reads it 
and nods sagely.  And then the document subsides again and 
submerges again and what’s come out of it?  So it’s more of a 
sort of cultural memory and history thing that embeds those 
lessons.  Rather than a more formalised process to make sure 
you’re extracting maximum benefit out of it. 
 
Reference 4 - 1.34% Coverage 
 
Yes so that does happen and that’s one of the mechanisms by which you get the kind 
of informal spread of people learning from the past and that 
kind of thing.  Although there’s been, it’s too early for there to 
have been any formal exercise I have already had chats with 
people and had rumours circulated about what the lessons 
learned are from the forestry thing.  Like doing proper 
stakeholder mapping and making sure your stakeholder 
mapping goes wide enough. 
 
Someone was joking that they had a stakeholder map which 
had on it the Confederation of Forest Industries and the 
Woodland Trust and things.  But nobody had put the 
Archbishop of Canterbury or Dame Judy Dench on their 
stakeholder map so…  Yes those kinds of stories are circulating 
yes. 
 
Reference 5 - 0.90% Coverage 
 
I don’t think there’s a formalised common approach that I know of.  So there isn’t sort 
of training or a document or what have you.  But I think 
probably a fairly common approach has actually evolved.  Just 
through people talking to each other and using tricks of the 
trade and knowing the best way to do it. 
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It’s really a generalised influencing problem.  And influencing 
skills are something that central government officials tend to be 
quite good at.  Because it’s sort of their bread and butter. 
 
Reference 6 - 1.92% Coverage 
 
But where you get the information for that from is actually quite informal.  Some of 
it’s sort of fairly obvious.  The kind of risks that are in the 
categories we talked about earlier, sort of generating internally 
within DEFRA or internally within government.  So Treasury 
are about to pull the plug.  Well that’s a risk that everyone’s 
probably quite aware of.  
 
I think the risks that are probably under scrutinised and don’t 
always get spotted.  And don’t always get [fed 0:43:58] 
assessments are more external ones like what are the fertiliser 
prices doing.  Or like how will this policy be impacted if there’s 
a revolution in Libya you know? 
 
I think that kind of thing, people like me who are interested in 
the policy area and work in policy area will read the news.  And 
keep up to date and have informal networks as well of people 
within government and outside government. 
 
But that information gathering is perhaps sometimes a bit 
haphazard.  And can rely on the quality of the individual’s 
networking skills and how much attention they pay to new 
sources etc. 
 
<Interviewee\\MM> - § 2 references coded  [1.07% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.29% Coverage 
 
you just have working groups and you just set up meetings with industry, people and 
things like that.  It depends really.  
 
Reference 2 - 0.77% Coverage 
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You have to be aware.  It depends.  I like to talk anyway so I will go and have a chat 
with people, “How did this go?”, “What happened at that 
meeting?”.  Sometimes you can find things out that way.  Other 
times you just land in it.  Sometimes I think it is good to talk to 
colleagues to find out what has been going on. 
 
<Interviewee\\PE_vn680042_transcript_kp> - § 7 references coded  [7.39% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.93% Coverage 
 
whereas the nature of the risk as a whole - which is making sure that the UK stays 
under the carbon budget it set itself – is less about things like 
risk registers and risk ratings and forming risk management, 
and more about designing processes in a way which allows 
people to take account of, and live with, risk, rather than 
necessarily minimising it. 
 
Reference 2 - 0.34% Coverage 
 
There’s a fair degree of consensus because we developed our various work stream 
plans together through away days and such like. 
 
Reference 3 - 0.35% Coverage 
 
and the policy work streams are more about a gradual progression through various 
issues.  That, essentially, is a little more ad hoc. 
 
Reference 4 - 1.04% Coverage 
 
I think that doesn’t happen as much as it should.  I think from my perspective there’s 
definitely lessons learned from my own experience having been 
around the department for a while and having done stuff for a 
while.  Generally, one learns lessons from others involved in 
the process, and where they’ve had these things before.  There 
isn’t an awful lot of centralisation of lessons learnt. 
 
Reference 5 - 0.79% Coverage 
 
I think, yes that is probably how we spread these lessons.  It’s just through the water-
cooler conversations.  Yes, it’s informal discussions with your 
peers on how they’ve approached certain situations and 
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sometimes you will learn from other people.  So, yes, there is 
definitely scope to do that. 
 
Reference 6 - 1.22% Coverage 
 
I don’t go for full reporting as such, but I have regular catch ups with all the project 
owners, who are generally the risk owners, every week or 
fortnight depending on how important the project is, so I can 
understand how things are going and be able to then update the 
risks as appropriate or identify new ones.  Generally, new risks 
will generated because there’s new projects, or there may be 
certain external factors which will change the risks as well. 
 
Reference 7 - 2.72% Coverage 
 
Well, in terms of how we assess it, I think I said before [?? 0:41:53] internal project 
management is pretty qualitative, quite informal.  I think that’s 
probably a relatively large weakness in the way that Defra 
handles risk, and probably the government generally, that there 
isn’t a clear externally defined way of measuring the 
importance of the risk, in terms of having a proper risk matrix; 
where you understand “This is what defines low, this is what 
defines medium,” or whatever else. 
 Consequently you have a huge range in different assessments, 
and what different [rag 0:42:32] ratings actually mean, which is 
deeply unhelpful as a general rule.  Within the mitigation 
program, we’ve got our own agreed sense of what amber, red 
and green mean.  It’s at least intending to [?? 0:42:49] program, 
but it’s still a high, low, medium rating which is to a certain 
extent subjective depending on how optimistic you’re feeling 
on any one day when you fill in the risk register.  So, I 
wouldn’t say it’s particularly reliable. 
 
<Interviewee\\RR_vn680040_Transcript_Mz> - § 8 references coded  [8.52% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.18% Coverage 
 
I think you’d probably have [the 0:02:42] use implicitly, yes. 
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Reference 2 - 0.30% Coverage 
 
Other than that – yes, we don’t hold a risk register ourselves for Packaging as a subset 
in that area. 
 
Reference 3 - 0.52% Coverage 
 
Is there – a rationale why Packaging doesn’t use a, have a user risk register? 
 
Respondent: No, not really.  We probably should have one.  I think it’s just a 
matter of time. 
 
Reference 4 - 2.65% Coverage 
 
I guess one is, we’re looking at the moment with the shift – we consulted on targets 
on businesses for packaging recycling, and that was under the 
previous administration that we’d set higher targets.  This 
administration is keener on more responsibility deals, and that 
kind of thing, so less, sort of, regulatory targets and more, kind 
of, responsibility as to that kind of thing.  And there are risks 
associated with that, in terms of the current system, where we 
set the targets and legislation creates a fund of money that’s 
available for recycling, whereas if you moved to voluntarily 
systems into the fund of money, it isn’t created for the state of 
the businesses.  And that’s the kind of issue we will discuss 
within the team, as to, you know, what are the risks of this 
approach versus this approach?  And we don’t actually, kind of, 
formalise them, we just discuss it amongst ourselves. 
 
Reference 5 - 0.63% Coverage 
 
I guess in our area they’ve been more – because we are so informal in the way it’s 
managed, they’ve been more focussed on ensuring that those 
risks have been looked at or mitigated.  I’m kind of guessing at 
this. 
 
Reference 6 - 1.45% Coverage 
 
Yes, I mean, I guess because we don’t do a formal risk management, we often don’t 
have the whole picture, as it were, to do that kind of 
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prioritisation, which might be a quite useful exercise to do, 
because it is so, sort of, ideas and things thrown around, it just 
becomes a bit of a muddle of, you know, “Can we do this?” 
rather than actually giving any specific structure.  So I guess 
that’s a slight hindrance – is that we don’t follow any particular 
structure to the way we do things. 
 
Reference 7 - 1.32% Coverage 
 
Interviewer: How do you keep up to date on current issues, escalating risks, 
new emerging risks? 
 
Respondent: We don’t really.  (Laughter). 
 
Interviewer: I mean not necessarily formal processes and things.  I think 
most people don’t use formal processes for this. 
 
Respondent: Yes.  I mean it’s just discussion within the team isn’t it, when 
people notice things, or feel there’s a particular risk of going 
down a particular policy route? 
 
Reference 8 - 1.48% Coverage 
 
I think it’s in – it kind of is, and it isn’t with the identification really, I guess, because 
we operate in a very flexible way.  As I said earlier, we don’t, 
kind of, prioritise the risks and then sometimes you can miss a 
risk because we don’t – certainly I don’t, I don’t know whether 
Judy Kelman does, it may be managed higher up in the team, 
but we don’t, kind of, stop and consider what the risks are to 
this approach.  They just, kind of, come up as we’re going 
along to achieving the objective. 
 
<Interviewee\\SC interview notes> - § 1 reference coded  [3.85% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 3.85% Coverage 
 
but in policy still ‘old school’ way based on intuition.  
 
<Interviewee\\SC_vn680032_Transcript_B9> - § 4 references coded  [3.68% Coverage] 
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Reference 1 - 0.80% Coverage 
 
Yes.  We don’t quite put numbers on probabilities, as a whole, but we think this is 
more likely, this is less likely, this is almost certain, this is …. 
 
Reference 2 - 2.22% Coverage 
 
So that’s our policy objective and in talking to ministers and considering amongst 
ourselves and with lawyers and the Environment Agency and 
so on, we’ll scope out how far we think we need to go and put 
advice to ministers on that basis.  So I suppose there’s an 
element of risk assessment there, but that’s very soft-touch, 
very qualitative and based on, essentially, expert judgement, or 
not terribly expert judgement. 
 
Reference 3 - 0.34% Coverage 
 
 internal communication – keep upto date on related policy issues 
 
Reference 4 - 0.31% Coverage 
 
 but in policy still ‘old school’ way based on intuition.  
 
<Interviewee\\SH_vn680037_Transcript_7N> - § 2 references coded  [0.82% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.71% Coverage 
 
If you’re just maintaining a policy that’s been ongoing for some time then you’re – 
and this is what I was talking about I think when we were 
talking about you get to implementation stage and you’re just 
growing on; that there is quite a big degree of potential for you 
to not actively consider the risks in such a regular and sort of 
 
Reference 2 - 0.10% Coverage 
 
and some people will do it in a more informal way 
 
<Interviewee\\TA interview notes> - § 1 reference coded  [4.92% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 4.92% Coverage 
 
stages 1-3 still tacit and reliant on expertise, informal processes not explicitly risk.  
 
<Interviewee\\vn680048.wma transcript> - § 1 reference coded  [65.47% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 65.47% Coverage 
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It’s interesting, I hadn’t really thought of it in quite the way until we spoke, but how 
much actually looking at risk has permeated into the work that 
we do. So it’s quite stimulating at that – and looking at now in 
terms of risk, maybe we need to look at that again and try and 
mitigate some of the things that we’ve had. But we haven’t had 
a particularly risk based policy, de facto, but it’s something we 
have been doing. So it’s not been explicit it’s been implicit in 
what we’ve done.  
 
<Interviewee\\vn680049.wma.06.04.11_transcript_cD> - § 2 references coded  [2.43% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.99% Coverage 
 
Craig: Do you keep a Risk Register? 
 
Stephen: For the ALSF it is quite unusual.  No we don't and maybe we 
should have done.  I inherited that one.  It wasn't something that 
I kicked off and ran with but I was using earlier on as an 
example of risk register and issue logs as a classic example 
over a cotton finish sort of project that I was working on. But 
this programme was a large programme that was up and 
running but with no really resource input.  I have got an advisor 
and I have got a party that will help out as well keeping tables 
together but it is a large area of work but we are so understaffed 
here. 
 
Reference 2 - 1.44% Coverage 
 
but on the rural side there was an old classic way of reporting.  
Now we are a wee bit in limbo land going up on the whole rural 
sphere because what we do in rural, we don't actually deliver, 
we deliver through others so it is an advisory function that we 
have, rural champion as you say.  We are a rural champion 
across Government to make sure that those Departments 
creating new policies or new regulations have done so that rural 
areas and individuals that live in rural areas are treated 
equitably and fairly with their urban counterparts.  And the 
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issues there are, their issues are not really so much for our unit, 
although we would maybe get it in the neck if we didn't put our 
thoughts and points across to other Government Departments, 
but those other Government Departments don't take them up.  
The effects are obviously in the rural areas.  But that is just a 
function that we have.  
 
<Interviewee\\vn680050_transcript_Kg> - § 3 references coded  [3.40% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.75% Coverage 
 
So, I think, yes, I’m not particularly talking about risk tools in 
what I’m saying, but I think what it’s been about is doing the 
project on control strategy for Classical Swine Fever, it was 
about looking what the, you know, routes of incursion are.  I 
suppose we looked at different stages.  If the disease wasn’t 
here, how can it get here and are we comfortable that the 
controls we already have in place are adequate to be reasonably 
confident it can’t get here easily.  Then it was, kind of, can you 
detect it, because if you don’t detect it, it’s going to carry on 
spreading.  And, what measures have you got in place to stop it 
spreading while it’s here and, again, it’s, kind of, saying, do it – 
are there big holes there are the moment, or are we comfortable 
that that’s okay for now, where do we need to focus.   
 
Reference 2 - 1.16% Coverage 
 
But, equally, as they don’t want such onerous controls that are 
unnecessary, so there’s – I wouldn’t say there’s formal risk 
assessment there, but there’s an assessment of the impact of the 
controls and then it’s, kind of, saying, “Look, what’s the impact 
going to be on industry, can we convince the Commission that 
these meet regulations and meet our objectives under EU law, 
and are we content from a veterinary perspective that the main 
controls are still going to be effective and stop disease 
spreading?”  So, there’s a, kind of, number of… 
 
Reference 3 - 0.48% Coverage 
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Balancing, yes.  But, in terms of risk tool, I wouldn’t say that was a formal risk tool, 
but it was all about the risk of disease spreading, not 
specifically a, kind of, you know, some numerical tool that we 
could easily build. 
 
<Interviewee\\vn680051_Transcript_final_m5> - § 7 references coded  [5.13% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.41% Coverage 
 
But there are some activities that carry on regardless, and are not managed in a project 
– through project management methodology.  So it’s a bit of a 
hybrid, if you like.   
 
Reference 2 - 0.34% Coverage 
 
So the bits that are on-going are not part of a clear project [?? 0:04:24]? 
 
Male 1: They wouldn’t have a structured risk method approach.   
 
Reference 3 - 0.82% Coverage 
 
By the time something tends to become a project, you’re starting to get round towards 
preparing for delivery and delivering elements of the policy 
cycle.  The sort of brainstorming and thinking that goes on 
before you get to that stage, tends to be much more organic and 
much less structured.  It’s much more fluid at the initial 
thinking stage. 
 
Reference 4 - 0.65% Coverage 
 
 In that, as I say, at the conceptual stage, there’s very little by way of structured risk 
assessment.  It’s all part of the thinking that goes around 
“We’re here, we’ve got an issue that needs to be addressed.  
How do we address it?  And where are we going beyond this?” 
 
Reference 5 - 0.89% Coverage 
 
Yes.  You’re talking to people, trying to gather experience from others that may have 
had a similar situation.  You’re basically, absorbing a lot of 
information, filtering it, running things past ministers, 
highlighting the pros and cons, and the risks and issues 
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associated with different strategies.  So at that point, it is a 
conceptual analysis of what’s going on.   
 
Reference 6 - 0.81% Coverage 
 
I think at the beginning of the journey round the policy cycle, there is no real process 
involved.  It’s a matter of absorbing information, filtering it, 
assessing it, and applying experience and your general policy 
advice expertise, to the problem – the issue – or whatever 
you’re considering.  And it’s much more intuitive at that stage, 
 
Reference 7 - 1.21% Coverage 
 
But at the start of the process, it is very fluid.  It’s difficult to 
impose a structure on it.  I’m not sure that imposing a structure 
on the initial thinking – the blue skies stage, of a piece of work 
– is terribly sensible.  Because it constrains thinking in a way 
that may not be helpful, in terms of ensuring that you come up 
with the best options and the best outcomes.  And again, 
there’ll tend to be more ministerial involvement, and senior 
management involvement, at the start of a piece of work.  
<Interviewee\\A vn680046.wma_transcript_jK> - § 3 references coded  [2.88% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.55% Coverage 
 
No, it's not widely used because at the end of the day, there has to be an agreement.  
We're trying to make things easier for the farming community 
but, at the same time, there's this directive and deadlines really 
to meet. 
 So the word risk is not always used, but everybody knows that 
yes, there is a risk of slippage, for example, if these meetings 
don't go ahead on a monthly basis and decisions are not made at 
these meetings, the papers are not cleared with new research 
and new analysis at the end of each agenda item, for example. 
 
Reference 2 - 0.62% Coverage 
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So would it be fair to say that outside the meetings it's a bit more reactive.  If 
something happens that's threatening the ability to deliver, then 
you'll deal with it.  So it's slightly more reactive in that sense 
 
Reference 3 - 0.72% Coverage 
 
Through discussions.  We meet them and try and get round the table, sort things out.  
Internal communication; email each other.  I think face to face 
usually is always a better way because discussions get held.  
You always find a way round it, somehow. 
 
<Interviewee\\AT_vn680044_transcript_M2> - § 2 references coded  [0.91% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.80% Coverage 
 
But in our case, in terms of the team I work in, which is, as I say, more reactionary; 
we don’t really have a target, as such, in terms of meeting the – 
well, we have a target of keeping within the obligations under 
the Habitats Directive. But there’s no targets in terms of –  
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Data making up code ‘respect for experience’ (case study one): 
 
<Interviewee\\KM 17-11-10 Transcript> - § 4 references coded  [4.61% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.04% Coverage 
 
there is built documentation and standard letters etc that we use that mitigate certain 
risks.  So it’s covered from a commercial, legal, regulatory 
point of view. 
 
But nevertheless when you do a design there’s an element of 
risk there and obviously that’s where…  It’s awkward to get a 
standard thing if you like to mitigate all the risks.  When you’re 
designing something we rely upon the knowledge, experience, 
the training and qualifications of the design engineers basically 
to actually manage out risk within the designs.   
 
Reference 2 - 1.11% Coverage 
 
And then there’s the personal judgement for the finities that you also have.  So again 
there’re some things that you have to decide.  And part of the 
decision process is that you factor in.  Your personal experience 
and knowledge and your competence around that really.  And 
people with doing certain roles within the company are, if you 
like assessed as to for instance our designers and estimators are 
on a matrix.  So in order to, they move through the matrix and 
gain additional skills.  Which is sort of linked to their salary etc 
and the type of work they do. 
 
Reference 3 - 0.49% Coverage 
 
So as part of that risk I, along with my counterpart on the east we’re making a 
judgement if you like based on expertise, technical and general 
knowledge if you like of the industry and the work that we’re 
dealing with to come up with a structure.   
 
 
Reference 4 - 1.97% Coverage 
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Definitely experience is a massive factor in instilling this really.  Because certainly 
the more you’ve been working in an environment by default 
you see some of the things that could happen.  And that’s sort 
of instils in to you the reasons why you should do the right 
thing if you like.  I can speak as I’ve sort of come through the 
ranks, I’ve been operational.  I’ve been an engineer switching 
on the system.  And things going on and it sort of brings it to 
light.  So as it goes by it sort of, it instils a…  I think it’s just 
generally as you grow up. 
 
I mean we was talking about this the other day just life 
experience.  When you’re young you’re a bit of a hothead in the 
car.  You race off everywhere.  But I mean now through life 
experience you tend to slow down, you think a lot more.  I can’t 
speak for everyone, as I dare say you know yourself.  But I 
think it definitely has an impact, you know your life experience 
does play a call in the judgement that you take on, on day to 
day risks. 
 
 
<Interviewee\\DC 11-11-10 Transcript> - § 3 references coded  [4.32% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.35% Coverage 
 
A lot of it is down to the experience of the people that you’re with.  As to any risk 
really, any of the risks.  You might be the most experienced 
person there, but you can miss something obvious that one of 
the apprentices picks up on.  So it’s generally a good sort of 
take everything in from what everybody says.   
 
Reference 2 - 1.62% Coverage 
 
DC: I suppose in a way, when we’re working as a team we all rely on other 
people’s judgement and I suppose it would depend on how well 
you know the people.  A lot of people I’ve worked with for sort 
of probably the last twenty years and, generally speaking you 
would probably take their judgement as being good.  So, so 
generally you would use other people’s judgement. 
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Reference 3 - 1.35% Coverage 
 
Interviewer: So your own experience, but also how important is other people’s 
experience that you might have access to? 
 
DC: Yes, that’s important, because we’ve got some really experienced people 
working here.  So you would use their judgement and use their 
experience to make your own judgements.   
 
<Interviewee\\DS 11-11-10 Transcript> - § 5 references coded  [8.52% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.20% Coverage 
 
It’s normally previous experience more than anything else.  When I first joined it was 
all through the rules, but then as you develop through you get 
your own judgement on ways to do it and that was how it ended 
up being. 
 
Reference 2 - 2.70% Coverage 
 
Interviewer: How important were the people you were working with in terms of 
shaping your judgement, how you figured out the grey areas? 
 
DS: They’re quite important because they have their own interpretations on them.  
On the grey areas and you sort of put your heads together and 
you work out between your own interpretations that you come 
up with different ways of doing things.  A lot of the time you’d 
come up with different ways, even if you’re talking to the same 
person again.   
 
Reference 3 - 0.22% Coverage 
 
experience or someone else’s experience, 
 
Reference 4 - 2.06% Coverage 
 
Interviewer: What would you base your judgement on, on how would you judge the 
potential severity?  What would you base that judgement on? 
 
 280 
DS: That would be again past experience or from the third person, so if you speak 
to someone about it another time and you might have heard 
them say what might had happened if they had done it a certain 
way, so it’s like that.   
 
Reference 5 - 2.34% Coverage 
 
DS: There’s normally enough with just the people that you work with, their own 
experience of it, because I was working with a bloke that had 
worked here for thirty years, so his experience was quite vast 
and he’d seen most things.  And then you’d obviously get like 
engineers turn up and you’d have their opinions of everything.  
So there’s always enough experience to cover the judgement 
area of it, it’s just the rules. 
 
<Interviewee\\GB 10-11-10> - § 6 references coded  [46.50% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 6.80% Coverage 
 
So it is quite empowering, in terms of making decisions in terms of how we run the 
company and how we run our own reports, and things like that, all those guys make 
all of those deicisions. However at the end of the day there is a top line that says we 
need a set amount of critera, anything additional to that 'off you go,' help yourself use 
hte team as you like  and that would generally be the same in the west as well, in 
terms of the team there. HOwever,  I would caviet that with the fact it does depend on 
how experienced the team was, in terms of how much autonomy you give them, let 
them loose for want of a better word. And there would be peroid, certianly this year, 
when we have been quite controlling. We had a third change in the number of staff in 
the East area here, in terms of recruiting new staff, and we had a third of our staff 
actually change roles, or we got an additoinal third of the staff in. Now that is quite a 
big change in that area, and I think there is an area there were your turn around and 
say well, 'I am going to control this,' and you step back into the controll aspect. 
 
Reference 2 - 4.98% Coverage 
 
 And then there is an amount that we actually sit people in the business, well this is 
how we want you to opperate and then from there onwards, once people are skilled in 
terms of understanding how we opperate and what we do on a day to day basis then 
they get the oppertunity to make decisions based on their knowledge around that. So 
there is an element of controll upto a certian point but after that it relaxes. 
 
Reference 3 - 8.08% Coverage 
 
Craig - does that impact on your ability to manage risk? 
 
Greame - ummm not, its doesn't impact on my ability to manage risk because we have 
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to manage risk in a different way. We have to engage with our alliance partner and get 
them to do some of the risk assessment, the guys will do risk assessment themselves 
sometimes, they will take a car out to a site and have a look some of the risks on site. 
So they are fully aware of the risks that are out there,  
 
Craig - But do they have the relevant experience of all those risks to make the right 
decisions? 
 
Graeme - possible not some of them, and that is why we engage with our alliance 
partner to bring some of that experience in, but its a hand-off all the time. So whilst I 
recognise there is a gap in my team I can't fill that gap at this moment in time, so I 
have to back fill that expertese or that knowledge with knowledge from another part, 
from the delivery part of the business. So your always using a second set of eyes. I 
mean it will build up, of course over a peroid of time. But if you only have people 
who have been in the departmet for six years, i think, there seems to be a cultural 
thing within, in general in organisations these years, that if you have been there six 
years you have been there too long and you start to move on.  
 
Reference 4 - 5.38% Coverage 
 
Craig - an how far, whats your opinion how far up the heirarcy in the organisation 
preactical experience is useful. 
 
Graeme - well I would say that it is, personally its very useful upto my level, you 
could arge above my level my boss is more of a strategic manager is terms of 
understanding EONs drivers, and the driver of the business rather than the technical 
aspect of it. But since I manage the design and estimating team I think it is only right 
that I have a full and frank understanding of hte activity that is carried out, on both 
sides actually in terms of an appreciation, because at the end of the day somebody has 
got to sit there and say my team need training in this, this and this. If you haven't got 
that knowledge set, then I think it is very very difficult to appreciate what the guys 
haven't got as apposed to what they have got. SO I think, certainly my level, the level 
down for where I am, my managers are not experienced in a delivery qualification but 
they are very technically qualifide in terms of understanding what they guys need to 
do their day to do job. So its difficult, if I could have a split of team, I would like 50% 
of those guys in my team to have opperational experience because I think it would 
benefit them, but I know that at this particular moment in time that is not going to 
happen. So, I think it is important but wether I have got it or not is another thing.  
 
Reference 5 - 12.19% Coverage 
 
So we use expertese in terms of their knowledge as well. from a commercial and 
regulatory point of view I would make decisions on whether it is right or wrong to 
make a charge in some instances or whether it complide from a time scale. but again 
as a backup from that there is a commerical and regulatory team that I have very good 
relations with. They are a good backup in that respect as well.  
 
Reference 6 - 9.28% Coverage 
 
Greame - I don't expect, I suppose the formal proceedure and hte laid down 
guidelines, that's fine for certain aspects, you've almost got a ticksheet on some of the 
things we can look at and go 'does it comply to this, this, this and this - yes that's OK 
 282 
or thats alright.' But what I would expect is that allot of the guys, because they haven't 
got certain types of experience that they have counciled somebody who has got that 
knowledge. And its usually covered by way of an email to somebody, so we send 
somebody an email: 'we've got these issues can you please comment, I need to make a 
decision based on this, this is what I want to do, and these are the issues.' And they 
will get a responce back. Every single time the guys  will save that responce, and its 
goes into the design file. So its fairly risk adverse, or arse covering. It can get like that 
sometimes, I think we have been bitten alot of times in the past over, you know we 
have been told, and people say 'ohno I never said that.'  
 
 
<Interviewee\\FG 11-11-10 Transcript> - § 9 references coded  [21.80% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.29% Coverage 
 
Well you see in theory that’s, you know if you’ve got you know the more experience 
you’ve got within the organisation the better chance you’ve got 
of looking at what risks are about and how to deal with them 
risks.  You see some of the, like the younger generation they 
just come along, they’re there to do a specific thing that they’re 
told to do and they can’t possibly see the risks that us older 
people can see and where know about. 
 
Reference 2 - 1.09% Coverage 
 
Well I don’t think they do.  You see that’s possibly why we’d, you know certainly in 
the East that we’re taking them under our wing and trying to 
guide them into the right direction that you know that they 
should be thinking about what risks they can come across and 
how to deal with them risks.  Because that is, in theory that’s an 
important part of their training. 
 
Reference 3 - 2.45% Coverage 
 
Interviewer: So in addition to the sort of procedures, the equipment that comes to 
you the sort of experience and sort of wealth of knowledge and 
awareness that you get through that, does that have a 
significant, play a role in how safety you can operate? 
 
FG: I think it does, yes.  Because you see well I’m getting to the end, I’m getting 
towards the end of my working life but basically what a lot of 
my work is at the moment – from now is bringing young lads 
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on.  I’ve got one lad with me he’s acting as a Mate to me but 
he’s just finished a four year apprenticeship with one of the 
contractors that we used to employ.  And he’s been TUPE 
transferred over to our Alliance Partner and he’s with me now 
for me to put him in the joint hole, see what he can do and 
bring him on so that he’s up to the standard of… 
 
Reference 4 - 1.74% Coverage 
 
Interviewer: So learning that experience or learning, passing on that experience is 
done with the people you work with directly your sort of peer 
group, that way. 
 
FG: Excuse me.  Yes because at the end of the day I know what can go wrong, not 
all the time but I’ve probably been there, I’ve had that happen 
to me, I know what the consequences are and I don’t, you 
know.  If I can stop it happening to somebody else by giving 
them a little bit of information what is important then at the end 
of the day I’ve probably saved another accident or probably 
saved somebody’s life. 
 
Reference 5 - 4.34% Coverage 
 
Well it, basically it meant you were relying on people what you’d got and if like, if 
there was people what wanted to leave or people that was 
coming to the end of their working life you’d then got nobody 
to replace them.  And the only people that you could, in theory 
you could use was you’d got your existing staff that you could 
promote upwards but you see there was nobody there to back, 
to come in to take their place.  And then it got to a stage where 
the staff levels started dwindling in the sense in that the 
expertise was not as good possibly as they should be.  Like they 
started, they had a [row 0:11:37] about where they bought when 
they closed the contracting side of, when it was EME and they 
trained some of them up as Jointers and Linesmen. 
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Some of that staff, soon as they’d done the training course they 
thought they was Jointers and they’re not.  You’ve got to earn, 
it’s not a case of going off to school and doing all the joints that 
we’ve got in our regime because there’s no two joints alike.  
And it’s all about and it’s totally different doing a joint on a 
bench to what it is in a joint hole for water.  And it’s even 
worse when you come to do it at night when you’re working 
with artificial light and you’re standing in shadows, you get all 
these shadows and all that sort of business. 
 
And you know you’ve got to really, you’ve got to be really on 
the ball as to what you’re doing.  And you’ve got to focus on 
what you’re doing. 
 
Reference 6 - 4.74% Coverage 
 
Mentoring in the field it’s – doing it in a classroom is alright in one respect but you 
see you only, in a classroom you only get one crack at what 
you’re doing.  So like you go there for, you go to the school for 
x number of weeks and you’ll do one of each of the joints what 
they think you should be trained at.  But when you come out on 
to site you’re in a joint hole that probably, like this time 
usually’ll be full probably with water.  You’ve got other 
utilities in the ground with you it then gives you the practical 
sense well I’ve not got the room here as I had when I was in the 
training school.  I’ve got to be a lot more careful of what I’m 
doing you know I’ve got something six inches away that if I 
don’t shroud all up and shroud that up there’s a big chance that 
I could have a flash over from it. 
 
You know that’s and that’s, you only get that by doing it out in 
the field and somebody possibly like myself showing them in 
the first instance of what they’ve got to do and then let them 
follow suit.  And basically you keep an eye on them.  And 
personally onsite trading is the best thing that you can have you 
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know you get used to, you get to know all the different ins and 
outs.  You come across all the difficulties that you don’t come 
across at the training school and to me you can’t beat onsite 
training.  
 
And luckily this company at the moment once a person has 
done his four year apprenticeship then they give him at least 
another 18 months after that under supervision to gain that 
additional experience off the person that they’re with.  And to 
me you can’t beat that. 
 
Reference 7 - 2.30% Coverage 
 
But basically we do all the risks as a group you know whether there’s two of us, six of 
us we all have a little get together, right this is what we’ve got 
to do, what’s the risks we’ve got you know we’ve got to take 
into account, you know sort of what traffic are we looking at?  
What pedestrians are we looking at?  Are we blocking people’s 
entrances up?  What have we got to do to keep them, you know 
to keep on the right side of the customer?  Because at the end of 
the day we’re working for the customer and we’ve got to make 
sure that customer’s safe while we’re doing what we’re doing.  
And part of that does come from experience but it also, 
sometimes if you’ve got a fresh face there they can possibly see 
something that us older ones probably just take for granted. 
 
Reference 8 - 1.12% Coverage 
 
Interviewer: So when would you and when would you not rely on somebody else’s 
judgement in making a decision on risk? 
 
FG: It’s probably somebody that’s probably not got a lot of experience.  If they’re 
not sure of what, you know what you’re trying to talk about. 
It’s sometimes you get people what they’ve probably not, only 
been in the industry say five/six years. 
 
Reference 9 - 2.72% Coverage 
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But through my experience I say well we should be ten metres away from that damage 
before we could sooner put in a repair in.  But obviously if you 
go to that ten metre point and through the experience that a 
tradesman has got and you do all your necessary testing on the 
cable you then can say to that Project Manager “Well this cable 
is perfectly alright to put a repair on.”  Or “There’s something 
wrong with it we might be going x metres further back and 
trying again.”  Because at the end of the day we don’t know 
how far the soot and carbon’s gone up that cable, we don’t 
know how far the moisture’s gone up that cable. 
 
So you know it’s a combination of the two really.  There is 
certain thing that’s written down but they’re written down for 
guidance as to what you should be doing.  But obviously the 
older you are the wiser you become and that’s when they start 
talking to the wise owl as I would call it. 
 
 
<Interviewee\\GT 17-11-10 Transcript> - § 4 references coded  [5.87% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.23% Coverage 
 
That’s interesting.  More expertise, because certainly in the past we’ve done things 
which is more…almost a voting type thing, of 20 senior 
managers and actually getting some weighting of how that falls. 
 I think now we’re more towards – there are experts in each area.  But that’s 
what we do as a Board.  Clearly, experts in each area always 
think that their risk is the biggest risk, and so when you collate 
them all up everything is at the top right of the diagram, 
effectively. 
 
Reference 2 - 0.67% Coverage 
 
Generally it’s very positive.  You’ve got a lot of experience there, you’ve got a lot of 
these values and culture.  Things change slowly over time and 
therefore you do get a core kernel of doing the right things, 
behaviours, values, and what we’re trying to do. 
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Reference 3 - 1.31% Coverage 
 
Interviewer: Is that gut feeling based on your first hand experience?  What are you 
basing that gut feeling on? 
 
Respondent: Yes, my experience and the experienced people around me.  It’s hard 
to write a manual on it.  I’ve been in the job for five years now, 
most of my asset management directors have been in the 
industry for 30 years so there’s enough expertise around to 
actually challenge and test each other and say “does that feel 
right, as far as that level of risk we think we’ve actually got 
there.” 
 
Reference 4 - 2.67% Coverage 
 
Interviewer: So is that situation where the written procedures didn’t really fit the 
situation, then that was escalated up to you to make the 
decision of whether it was okay to change the procedure?  So 
people who work for you, if a situation occurs where there is a 
procedure that they have some reason to believe is not 
appropriate for a particular circumstance, what would you 
expect or require their judgement to be based on, that that 
wasn’t the right thing to do? 
 
Respondent: One, trusting their judgement of these individuals, generally they’re 
experts in their field, trusting that they get counsel, but then 
having the confidence of going up the chain very quickly – if 
it’s critical make the decision there and then, having enough 
empowerment from the directors to make those decisions there 
and then that’s required.  So, a control room engineer who sees 
faults, things like this.  But, in the understanding that if it’s a 
certain risk or size, then there’s a very clear escalation principle 
that they can get the decision quickly. 
 
<Interviewee\\JO 9-11-10> - § 3 references coded  [13.42% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 8.56% Coverage 
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And then in my experience there are a number of fairly high profile accidents over the 
last twenty or thirty years which colour my qualititative judgement fairly 
significantly. An example, hatfield rail accident, I think the rail was at the side of the 
track, two new maintenence workers or two new maintenence managers went into the 
backlogs and cancelled them all. If we go from one system to another I am paranoid 
about not loosing the outsanding defects and making sure they have been transfered to 
the new system. And that they are all risk assessed and managed. So there are a 
number of those events that I have studied and personally take lessons from. 
 
Reference 2 - 8.56% Coverage 
 
 
Jim - sorry the Baker report on the Texas oil refinerie, has I don't know how many 
peoples judgement that has influenced. One will ask continiously, one of the lessons 
from that is what field of risk here havn't I looked at. Because they were getting great 
health and safety scores, but they ignored the process risk safety scores. So what are 
the aspects of this project that I have not looked at, that might turn out to be a risk. 
That's one of the lessons from that. The X hundred recomendations of the Baker 
report. 
 
Reference 3 - 5.03% Coverage 
 
We are all familiar with the Kennedy example 'bay of pigs' where the definition of 
group think comes from. So I am sort of paranoid about being sucked into group 
think, but there are times when you know that group is going to make a better decision 
than the one I was going to make. And do I have the ability in myself to either give 
way against my judgement or change my judgement based on the evidence that they 
are presenting. Those would be the two circumstances.  
 
<Interviewee\\JS 12-3-2010VN680010 Transcript> - § 1 reference coded  [1.31% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.31% Coverage 
 
I think erm I've got examples where it's been very reactive.  And erm it's harder to do 
the proactive but we are doing the proactive work because for 
example if we're putting together an unconstrained budget that's 
more money than is in the either E.ON business plan or [?? 
0:42:43] then we are saying more needs to be done and that 
might be for safety or legal perspective based on our good 
engineering experience. 
 That is harder to get through the business than an incident causing something.  
So you're absolutely right erm we'd have more hurdles put in 
the way. 
 
<Interviewee\\KP 11-11-10 Transcript> - § 3 references coded  [6.04% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 0.75% Coverage 
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You see things and then I teach apprentices, I’ve got two apprentices with me and 
they often ask me “Why did you see that because I never saw 
it?”  And I’m like trying to explain to him may be 28 years of 
experience of assessing things because we’ve always assessed 
it even though we’ve changed the way we assess things now.   
 
Reference 2 - 0.71% Coverage 
 
Interviewer: And you yourself where did you develop your this awareness? 
 
Respondent: I’ve been here from school.  I’ve been here from school and I was 
taught by…  Like old…  From, how it was with me is that I 
was with an old bloke who taught me and now I’m the old 
bloke who’s…  That’s how I perceive it. 
 
Reference 3 - 4.58% Coverage 
 
 
Interviewer: So when, so on the judgement and particularly on your sort of 
individual judgement you’ve already talked about this a bit.  So 
when would you not primarily rely on your own judgement in 
making a risk decision? 
 
Respondent: I’d always go on my own judgement and if I thought it wasn’t right 
that would be it and we would, you know I’d go to an EDS or a 
Project Manager and sort of say “This is the reason why I think 
that…”  We come across it quite regularly.  I had one yesterday 
I was working on a junction, the Council gave us permission to 
work 10 metres/15 metres from the junction but the footway 
was right near the junction.  I go to the Project Manager “I’m 
going to have to need traffic lights.  And we’re going to have to 
do it after six o’clock at night.” 
 
So that’s my answer.  There was one yesterday then what 
happened was we got the traffic lights at six o’clock, Council 
agreed with everything what we said to do so six o’clock we 
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got traffic lights, I went back there and did the job last night.  
So you know it all goes down to the person on site.  It can’t 
come down to him…  Because if they go there one day and 
they think “Well we’re just going to have this hole just here.”  
That’s okay but everything isn’t rosy like that is it?  And things 
change.  A car might have parked there or blah blah blah so you 
can’t do the job. 
 
So they rely on your judgement. 
 
Interviewer: Okay.  So in terms of the organisation relying on your judgement or 
you coming back and saying “You can’t do it this way.”  Does 
it matter that who, the person you’re talking to, the authorising 
officer or whoever it is does their experience matter in… 
 
Respondent: Well the, generally what happens is is that the lad that the job like what 
we’ve been just, we’re talking about, he relies on myself as 
having 28 years of experience to his 2½.  So yes he might have 
been my boss but he also listens to what we have to say and 
he’s developing from that as well. 
 
 
<Interviewee\\PG_11-11-10 Transcript> - § 1 reference coded  [1.37% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.37% Coverage 
 
Well I think the difference with some of the asset programmes and replacements is 
some people do it some people don’t.  I mean I’m the only one 
that I’m aware of from of a delivery manager who’s actually 
gone and actually done some work for network strategy.  
Because it shouldn’t really be my role but I’m conscious 
because I’ve lived in Lincolnshire all my life I know what the 
state of my network is and what have you.  So I’m conscious I 
know what age profiles of these are, past lives different roles I 
also know what the asset condition is.  So clearly from my 
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point of view I think it’s part of my role to identify to network 
strategy saying “Look these assets need to be replaced.” 
 
Interviewer: So you had information that they didn’t have in there? 
 
Respondent: 35 years worth of local knowledge, working on the system.  As I say 
I’ve been an operational engineer in Lincolnshire. 
 
 
<Interviewee\\AL 9-11-10> - § 15 references coded  [87.60% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 3.59% Coverage 
 
Craig - So all those risk based decisions that you are making, waht sort of things do 
your draw on to help you make those decisions. 
 
A - probably all the years I have been working in the industry. becuase I was tought 
right from the very beginging there are electrical risks, mechanical risks, there's roof 
leavking, there's roofs falling to pieces. I suppose vigilance is probably, the fact that 
you have been trained as well so you acutally go in ticking these risks off mentally. 
You not going to the ticksheet and going I must look for this, I must look for that. Its 
mainly born from experience.  
 
Reference 2 - 5.98% Coverage 
 
 would probably be a little bit more vigilant when I am going into the customer ones, 
becuase I know from experience that they will probably have been neglected from a 
safety point of view, but if I go into one of our own substations I automatically do all 
of our safety checks anyway but I am not, most of hte time, going to walk into 
something obvious like a hole in the floor. You know, don't get me wrong, it is 
possible from accidents that may have happened. But I'm not expecting the same 
hazards in one of our own places. Another thing you have to take into consideration is 
that I am a lone worker. Not two of us, or a mate, I am on my own. 
 
Reference 3 - 13.70% Coverage 
 
Craig - Why is it  that experience and not a sheet of paper saying you need to check 
these things when you go into a colueary? 
 
A - becuase, I don't think that every sheet of paper covers all that risk on that site. 
There are mining colueries and colleuries that are shut down and just pumping water. 
And alot of ones pumping water are less of a risk than ones that's acutally working, 
minging coal all day. There is more vehicular activity on site, so straight away when 
you go into one mine thats been made redunant I know I've not got that but there is 
going to be more risk from picking shards of glass from vadilism and things like that, 
but on a site that's working there's not. So you sort it down to even what you are 
wearing on your feet, but it seems to come, although its drummed into us its PPE this, 
it's PPE that, I know very well that if I need to up my game a litte but I can do that 
based on experience from the five years as an apprentice with tradesmen, so 
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something that you learn at an early age in your life, and the earlier you learn the 
safety culture the more its sticks. Plus the fact during my employment years I've been 
in some nasty situations from suicides, electrical suicides, fires, so I'm always aware 
and I have always seen the worst case senario. So its not a case of 'oh this will never 
happen' I have seen it happen. I have seen both sides of the coin through my extensive 
employment history in the company.  
 
Reference 4 - 13.70% Coverage 
 
Craig - who are the main influences in creating that attitude to risk, is it your peers, 
your immeadiate manager, or it is the CEO or... 
 
A - I would say its your peers, its the people you actually worked with in a similar 
environment. No disrepect but you get a manager thats a manager, but they've got no 
coal face experience. The other way you get a manager that understands this but he 
did that and has been promoted to this. So its allot easier to talk sense to this guy, than 
it is Bill he's from Scotland hes another manager, waht they did before well he was in 
charge of the nuts and bolts. So because he's not had that exposure to it he doesn't 
fully understand that risk, but what he would understand is you know, you've got to 
dot the I's and cross the T's and put an appostrophe in there, colour that yellow. He'll 
understand those proceedures and if you don't follow those proceedures you'll be in 
trouble, but he probably doesn't fully understand that proceedure.  
 
Reference 5 - 10.57% Coverage 
 
I wouldn't say, there is no time pressure when it comes to safety, that is my feeling 
and that would be the way I picture it. You are best looking at something three times, 
than get it wrong the first time. So I dont think I would come into a situation where 
there is any time pressure on a safety judgement. As I say I know myself walking in to 
the site, looking around: what sort of site is it? It's a steel works. There's risk of that, 
there's risk of coal fallling, there's a conveyer be;t. You're doing this as your walking 
in, as your actually approaching where you want to get to, so not like look for htis, 
look for that. Even rabid dogs, animals that get in the substation, some cats or 
anything, everything carries a risk, but its being vigilant, its not like you have to go in 
wearing steel gloves to everyplace in case there is a cat in. You just look around, you 
get a feeling, is it close to a woods? Lots of tall grass, you just gotta thing ahhhh, you 
see signs of rat droppings, you know Wheels disease. You just know what your 
looking for, alright there might be the odd clue, food trays where they have been in 
with rat poison that kills them, so you are going to know. If there is one of those there 
you might not see a rat but there is a potential hazard. Potential risk from Wheels 
disease. I think its as I say, because I've been in the industry all of my career.  
 
Reference 6 - 10.57% Coverage 
 
A - I think that, very often when there is a group of people, you very often learn from 
the most experienced. Everybody has to look, potentiall face that risk sometime or 
another,  
 
Reference 7 - 9.45% Coverage 
 
A - I would say when I was an apprentice I actually served 5 year apprentice, and 
most of that time I served with different tradesmen. Like learning the trade as well as 
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learning cultures. I don't think it quite happens like that any more, the latest one is 
when set trainings or apprentices on, they tend to put them on a two or three year 
program to get them through a qualification, ie. colllege. but I don't think they are 
giving these people enough time with the more experienced tradesmen, because you 
can learn allot more by sometimes watching a qualified tradesmans approach, that you 
can say 'oh its says in the book in these circumstances we do this, we dont, we do the 
other' And because we are working on live electricity allot of the time in the ground, 
then I think it is sad, that that seems to have gone.  
 
Reference 8 - 9.03% Coverage 
 
well obviously I have been involve with other peoples experience in the jobs I have 
done over the years, and when you have to sit on a formal tribunal investigating an 
accident you understand what happened, understand the failings of the individual or 
sometimes you've got to look at the failings of the company. They are not legislating 
for that risk, but there aren't many situations where if somebody is vigilant enough 
that most risks are covered, there's always unexpected, if you go in somewhere and 
there is, hundred, million to one shot something could explode in there because the 
electrical going through, 
 
Reference 9 - 18.25% Coverage 
 
Craig - In, how much a role does the organisation play in the ability of peoples ability 
to learn from other's experience, I am thinking of this guy I talked to, a jointer, and he 
was saying there is no one place where he and other jointers can gather together, like a 
tea room, so he has lost that ability to learn from other peoples experience.  
 
A - What we've got now, they don't do five year apprenticeships anymore, thats out, 
too expensive. We have like traineeships, a smaller amount of time for people to 
learn, right. But what they do they give the technical training, they know that X equals 
Y and Y equals X and bla bla bla. What, that is the theory, but they don't seem to be 
able to get any practical trainging, which to send a guy with another one of those 
jointers, if you are working for a year as his mate, when I say a mate I mean a two 
man team, you don't lookse any money because whether you are doing that or that 
man needs another man with him, they work in a two man team. But he's then able to 
learn from the more senoir guy, because the thing about jointing, because I was a 
jointer, they face big hazards everyday because they are actually digging down in the 
pavement, digging through soil sublayers, all descriptions, connecting gas works, 
water pipes, NTLs, Virgin, all sort of ducting, then actually to manipulate on a live 
cable everyday. And so their safety precautions are allot more. But once again they 
can always shout up and say 'I am not happy with the way this is, I would like it made 
dead, this is the reason.' And no one to this day would say 'sorry I don't agree with 
you we will send a more experienced man,' because that just puts that guy off doesn't 
it? So we don't have that culture where we learn some of those elements you can't be 
taught in college or in university, you can't be taught experience, I can fill you with 
knowledge until your eyes water but what I can't give you, nobody can put an 
injection in your arm called experience. That can only be given by hands on.  
 
Reference 10 - 18.25% Coverage 
 
Craig, so then another way of putting the question, if you are so and so director or 
whoever you are, how do you instill and develop good risk judgement in the people 
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who work for you? 
 
A - In the old days, and by old days I mean pre 2000, what you had, you had a 
numbers of teams, like ten jointers, ten teams, they would be allocated to a foreman or 
supervisor. How that supervisor was always someone who came off the tools, and this 
supervisor would be visiting all ten teams on a daily basis. And as being one of these 
people, it was part of my job to get to these sites that have got  a problem. Stop them, 
and not nurse them, but guide them through the risk managment for that particular 
senario. But most people only need the telling the once, 'oh I see what you mean, if 
you do this this way or don't dig right there, put a small piece of triangle and dig there, 
oh I see what you mean.' You have got to accept there is an extra cost in that extra 
meter of ground, but your extra meter actually is the difference being the job being 
safe, and nothing might have happened, but if they had happened to hit somebody, a 
member of the public or a vehicle, its like saying to these people, 'don't do it 
everytime but obviously where there is this situation, this is the way to approach it.' 
Or there might be different incidence that they, or different briefing, and they don't 
quite understand, then you go and give them a practical demonstration of that. But we 
don't have that foreman anymore. That position doesn't exist.  
 
Reference 11 - 18.25% Coverage 
 
Craig - And, what has the impact of that been, has it reduced the good judgement out 
there? 
 
A - Well, I would say that, there is nothing like getting ten people together and having 
a bit of a jolly anymore. That's not the culture of the organsiation anymore. Training, 
don't get me wrong all the training is there, but what you can't give these people is 
practical experience. As I say you can make them understand the theory of what you 
are doing, but theory and practice are always two difference animals.  
 
Craig - Is there, already, do you see coming, an impact from that? 
 
A - well your impact is your increase in accidents, because there are skills that they 
don't have. So what we are tending to do now, we are trending to recruit from all sorts 
of different industries, that may be these two lads have been farmers. There has to be 
a certain level of intelligence to do the job peroid. And most of the skills that you 
neeed, for the hands on practical skills, add to that the knowledge from training, add 
to that knowledge from two days of day school, night school, anything. But what you 
never throw in there is objection of experience, and that is something that you cannot 
legistalte for, you cannot write down, its like anything, like how did you try to tie your 
shoelaces. Somebody showed you, didn't they. How did you learn to tie your tie, 
somebody showed you. You learn best from being shown how, they won't show you 
the wrong way to do it, they will show your the way that works best from their 
experience. 
 
Reference 12 - 5.83% Coverage 
 
Craig - So is this trend, continueing or has there been a swing back so that experience 
is valued again 
 
A - no I think at the moment we are sort of in the middle of all this. Personally, its 
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only my opinion, but I think at the moment we are sort of in the abyss, right. Since the 
companies been the way it is now, under EON, there has been more switching 
incidents than there ever was. These are incidents when people, switching on the 11 
kv they can actually do things wrong, its not unsafe, but it switched people off. And 
there has been more of these incidents than ever, at my career upto 2000 in the 
company I probably heard of three of these indicents in all of my 40 year career. Over 
this last ten years, I've been in management of a service provider, Morgan utilities, 
now I find myself to be transfered back to this company through EON bring me back 
in. There are more incidents now than there ever was, it would probably be good for 
you to talk to one of our control engineers. Maybe you should have one of those on 
your list. They actually work in here on the next floor up. 
 
Reference 13 - 5.83% Coverage 
 
Craig- And that increase in switching incidents is because of less experienced people 
doing it? 
 
A - yes absolutely. 
 
Reference 14 - 7.02% Coverage 
 
Craig - and, I talked to a guy from SHE, and they put up posters and things of had 
happened in the EON organisations, and they had people who had had an accident tell 
other about it 
 
A - If anything happens we have what we call a safety bulletin, and that safety bulletin 
comes in in a very short space of time. But very often its sometimes something that 
you cannot avoid, it might be a manufactuers fault or twenty, forty year old switch 
gear that all of a sudden somebody has opperated one of these switches and a springs 
broke. Now what we do is we embargo every one of those types of swtich until such 
time as we can do a modification of it. So we are not putting ourselves under 
unessissary electrical hazard by opperating something that in another part of the 
district, in another part of the country a springs dropped off and caused a flash over. A 
bit like the royals royce engine but we don't know what it is yet, so the engine has 
come back to royal royce and they will do a full investigation to say if its safe for the 
jumbo 380s to carry on, or no it can't done. But they would never have put those 
engines in service knowing there was a problem. So they couldn't forsee that, so the 
retrospective legeslation called MOD will take that into account, but until then there 
are hundreds of these planes flying in the sky.  
 
Craig - So there bulletins are they effectice then? 
 
A - I would say so yeah,  
 
Craig - Do they influence you, in the decisions you make? 
 
A - personally yes, because I might keep an eye out for this kind of switch gear thats 
known to be X, or failure of Y. Or keep an eye out incase it starts to rot at the boack. 
So your looking at all that as well. 
 
Craig - So, the arenatuics held as an example of being very good at risk managment, 
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and the characterisitc of them they will imeadiately start talking about, 'oh you heard 
about this incident,' and they will start discussing the details. 
 
A -yes the more important the incident the more emphasis given 
 
Craig - and does this happen in EON do people discuss incidents? 
 
A - Oh yes, if there is any major problems then and if they feel its needs more than 
just sending a bulletin out they will do that 
 
Craig - Could they do more of that or ? 
 
A - I think its imaterial, its six of one, six of the other.  
 
Reference 15 - 4.39% Coverage 
 
A - with that if its sheering the sheep. but I couldn't go and sheer a sheep. But if you 
show me how to sheer one I will give it a go,  wahts the risk from the cutter? Do I 
need any special gloves? ANd if you get people asking. right, rather than just taking a 
flyer at it. Becuase they can't see a hazard if they don't have the comprehension to 
know what the hazard could be. And this is the same as the trainee I think, if you've 
got electricity going through OK, behind that, protecting that is a 600 amp fuse, and 
your working on it, its not like a 3 amp or a 13amp in your socket at home. The 
chances of getting electrecuted are the same but potentially if anything goes wrong 
with the cable you are working on, you'll probably end up being on fire before the 
fuse goes, that will not happen with a household fuse. But you get an eletric shock 
from both, but the potential for that to cause a bigger hazard although same electricity, 
same voltage is much higher. So its that I don't think that we instill into our jointers, 
or fitters. Becuase we are taking on a range of skills sets now, were before we took 
them on at 15, 16 and trained em. We now take on people in their late twenties. Now 
by your late twenties you have become very much established in the way you think. 
And I would say those people need a little bit more training, especially on practical 
rather than theoretical because they have come to the stage in life where they know 
best. I'm 28 lived a bit, I know best. We have all been there, forget office safety, lots 
of decision in life are based on how you forsee risk. Wether its putting ten pound on a 
horse or... 
 
<Interviewee\\CS 10-11-10 Transcript> - § 1 reference coded  [1.22% Coverage] 
 
Reference 1 - 1.22% Coverage 
 
Interviewer: Okay. So you’re relatively new here. So in terms of learning how to do 
things and how things were done, what have you mostly relied 
on? I mean, something like this or people around you? 
 
CS: People around. I think that there’s a couple of people that used to do this. Be 
responsible for this. And up until maybe a month or so ago, 
maybe not even that long. I think it’s probably a couple of 
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weeks ago, I was – there was another person kind of – we were 
jointly responsible for doing that as he was handing over to me. 
So it was kind of like just handed over from somebody else 
how the process worked. 
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Appendix H: Peer review of coding 
 
Table H.1.: Summary of peer review of selected codes by two peers (JD and FS). 
 
Original 
code 
Code 
description JD 
Agreement 
between 
original 
code and 
JD 
Code 
description FS 
Agreement 
between 
original 
code and 
FS 
Final code (if 
changed from 
original) 
use of experience 
throughout the 
hierarchy (Table 
4.1.1.) 
 
Situations where 
judgement is used 
Y  Use of judgement Y  
Risk 
Management 
tools (Table 
4.1.2.) 
Using models Y Models Y  
Industry 
standards (Table 
4.1.2.) 
Best practice N Codes of practice N Industry best practice 
Data (Table 
4.1.2.) 
Qualitative data Y Data Y  
Colleagues 
(Table 4.1.2.) 
People’s experience Y Experience of others Y Colleagues’ 
experience 
Superiors (Table 
4.1.2.) 
Line manager’s 
experience 
Y Escalation  Y  
Codified rules 
(Table 4.1.2.) 
Procedure Y Manuals Y  
Expert 
consultation 
(Table 4.1.2.) 
People (experts)  Y Consulting experts Y  
Individual 
experience (Table 
4.1.2.) 
Using own experience Y Experience of decision 
maker 
Y  
Lack of 
coordination and 
communication 
(Table 4.1.7.) 
Poor explanation of risk 
management strategy 
(no communication) 
Y If communication is 
bad then motivation to 
coordinate drops 
Y  
Respect for 
experience (Table 
4.1.6.) 
Two way 
communication across 
hierarchy / experience is 
highly valued 
Y Experience is 
appreciated up and 
down the hierarchy 
Y  
Importance of 
line manager 
experience (Table 
4.1.6.) 
If manager has no 
experience he or she 
cannot understanding 
decision of more 
experienced individual 
N Shared experience/tacit 
knowledge important 
for communication 
N Importance of shared 
experience for 
communication 
Individual 
experience (Table 
4.2.1.) 
Individual experience Y Experience of 
implementation 
Y  
External 
stakeholders 
(lateral 
knowledge 
transfer) (Table 
4.2.1.) 
Debate with 
stakeholders 
Y stakeholders Y  
Informal 
communication 
between policy 
teams (lateral 
knowledge 
transfer) (Table 
4.2.1.) 
Network with work 
colleagues 
Y Horizontal networks Y  
Specialist 
advisors (lateral 
knowledge 
transfer) (Table 
specialists Y experts Y  
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4.2.1.) 
Delivery body*  People from delivery 
body 
Y Delivery body partners   
Codified lessons 
learned (Table 
4.2.1.) 
Formal reports Y Written lessons learned Y  
Culture of 
collaboration 
(Table 4.2.2.) 
Organisation’s culture 
encourages 
communication 
Y Tacit expectation to 
call in expertise 
Y  
Risk registers and 
team 
communication 
(Table 4.2.2.) 
Risk register encourages 
communication 
Y Risk registers support 
routine communication 
Y  
Lack of 
knowledge 
retention (Table 
4.2.3.) 
Staff loss Y Change causes loss of 
local knowledge 
Y  
Lack of financial 
resources (Table 
4.2.3.) 
Limited money Y Budget cuts Y  
Lack of time 
(Table 4.2.3.) 
Limited time Y Lack of time Y  
Lack of formal 
knowledge 
sharing  (Table 
4.2.3.) 
No procedures to share 
knowledge 
Y No exchange of 
experience 
Y  
Formal risk 
management 
practice (Table 
4.3.1.) 
Risk management 
following formal, well 
established procedure 
Y Believers in risk 
management process 
N  
Informal risk 
management 
practice (Table 
4.3.1.) 
No process, casual risk 
management 
Y Informal risk 
management 
Y  
Not driven by 
risk at all (Table 
4.3.1.) 
No need for risk 
management 
Y Informed resignation 
from risk management 
Y  
Going through 
the motions 
(Table 4.3.1.) 
No need for risk 
management but 
following procedure 
Y Box-ticking Y  
Informal 
consultation and 
collaboration 
(Table 4.3.3.) 
Group discussion Y Casual discussion Y  
Leadership 
expectations 
(Table 4.3.3.) 
Doing what the boss 
says 
Y Top-down expectations Y  
Codified 
processes (Table 
4.3.3.) 
Following rules and 
procedures 
Y Manuals and rules Y  
Experience 
(Table 4.3.3.) 
Personal experience Y Own experience Y  
Stakeholders 
(Table 4.3.3.) 
Groups discussion with 
stakeholders 
Y Stakeholders Y  
Not formal 
guidance (Table 
4.3.3.) 
Not rules or procedure Y Not written rule or 
guidance 
Y  
Training (Table 
4.3.3.) 
Training and personal 
experience 
Y training Y  
Normative 
(Table 4.3.3.) 
Bosses expectation N Normative expectation Y  
Individual 
pragmatic 
legitimacy 
(Table 4.3.3.) 
Influence of work 
environment 
N Pragmatic compliance Y  
Direct 
stakeholders 
(Table 4.3.5.) 
Everybody who uses the 
policy and the affected 
public 
Y External beneficiaries Y  
Department’s 
reputation (Table 
4.3.5.) 
Department’s reputation 
among other 
departments 
Y Inter-governmental 
reputation 
Y  
Avoiding making 
mistakes (Table 
4.3.5.) 
Reduce bad decisions Y Avoiding bad policy Y  
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Take on risks 
(Table 4.3.5.) 
Make and implement 
decisions faster 
N Reducing uncertainty 
barriers to making 
decisions 
N Make decisions despite 
risks 
Facilitate 
participatory risk 
management 
(Table 4.3.6.) 
Encourage 
communication within 
teams 
Y Integrate staff Y  
Demonstrate risk 
management 
activity (Table 
4.3.6.) 
Communicate risk 
management activities 
to others 
Y Framing practice in 
risk terminology 
N  
Unnecessary 
bureaucracy 
(Table 4.3.6.) 
Not needed, 
meaningless process 
that nobody will pay 
attention too 
Y Useless exercise Y  
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Appendix I: Further data for Tables 4.3.5 and 4.3.6. 
 
Table 4.3.5.: Conceptualisation of risk management 
This table describes how participants conceptualised what and who risk management was for. This reflects 
underlying assumptions about risk management’s role within the organization. The data shows an overall lack of 
consensus as to what and who risk management was for. The main perceived beneficiaries were the reputation of 
the Department and the end customer. Perceptions of the purpose of risk management were more diverse. 
Purposes described ranged from producing good policy, to benefitting the reputation of policy makers, to 
benefitting the individuals involved in developing policy.  
 
Main code and sub-codes Example 
Main code Sub-codes 
Beneficiary of risk management – 
the participants’ perception of who 
or what the main beneficiary(ies) of 
risk management are. 
Direct stakeholders  “If you are going to look at the real big 
picture, then I would say it should be of 
benefit to whoever your end customer is 
because you are doing something in a 
way that you have really tried to take on 
board their thoughts.” 
Department’s reputation “Then I guess I’d be more focused on 
the reputation risk to the department.” 
Minister(s) responsible for policy “And if it’s done properly I think the 
ministers are beneficiaries.  Because a 
minister can lose their job over a badly 
managed program or something like 
that.” 
Government’s reputation “Beneficiaries? Well I guess we are 
pursuing government policy so I mean it 
is the government so to speak who are in 
certain ways the most direct 
beneficiaries.” 
The public “So ultimately I like to think that the 
public benefits.” 
Project team “In a public organisation I mean the 
obvious beneficiary are people who are 
working on whatever particular project 
or piece of work they happen to be 
doing.” 
Person formally responsible for risk “Probably the senior reporting officers, 
so the people who’re actually 
responsible ultimately in name for 
delivering.”  
Main code Sub-codes  
Risk management function – the 
participants’ perception of how risk 
management delivers its benefit. 
Avoiding making mistakes “When you start getting on a critical 
path in terms of delivering something, 
the project management structure takes 
over.  And is designed to stop people 
embarrassing ministers, or doing 
something daft, or things going wrong.  
So the system does tend to take over.”   
Take on risks  “ It’s a way of being able to identify 
where the key risks are, tackle them and 
mitigate them, and actually get on and 
do what you want to do.” 
Incorporating and balancing 
stakeholder interests 
“We do and then we try to accommodate 
the needs of all parties, whether it be 
[…].” 
To produce better policy “I guess to produce policies that are – 
they are most likely to have the greatest, 
the best outcome – the greatest benefit 
with the least negative impact.” 
Meet bureaucratic demands “I mean if they’re really useful if 
someone said to me so say someone 
senior says to me Emily you need to 
think about the risks of this, I want to 
see something.  That’s the first place I’d 
go to the tools to use them because 
they’re useful for that.  But I think you 
don’t necessarily automatically think to 
do them.” 
Benefiting the Department’s “[…] there’s the department itself, of 
course, in terms of reputation.” 
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reputation 
Benefiting Government’s reputation “[…] and of course being a government 
department it’s the overall government's 
reputation as well.” 
 
Covering your back “Cynically, to cover peoples backs.  
People want to make sure that... I think 
especially with something like the 
project I am involved with now the risk 
of being judicially reviewed is very 
conscious in people’s minds.  If you are 
somebody who is quite keen, to get on 
within the Department and is quite 
ambitious, you don't want yourself to be 
mired in some policy that wasn't 
delivered or managed well so I think in 
terms of managing risk, I suppose it is 
that people will do it to make sure that 
they have covered all the bases so to 
speak and done the right things and got 
things checked and verified.  So, yes, I 
would say covering backs really.”  
Tool to push individual agenda “I think the water has become 
somewhere muddy where people want 
to use risk assessments for different 
things.  I think some people have the 
perception that they want to give the 
impression that everything is fine, and 
therefore they want to minimise the 
presentation of that risk whereas other 
people want to draw people’s attention 
to it, and deflect blame from themselves; 
“It’s all very risky,” and therefore they 
want to increase that risk.  So, it’s an 
interesting tension.”   
Increasing risk awareness “I would say so, yes. I mean you can’t 
always - as you say, you can’t always 
take a no-risk solution. There are always 
going to be risks to whatever solution. 
But at least you try and identify them. In 
a perfect world you try and identify 
what those risks are so that at least you 
know when something goes wrong why 
and you’ve tried to put in 
countermeasures.”  
Facilitate proactive risk 
management 
“Well, as I understand it it’s to really try 
and identify when you’re setting out to 
do something, all the things that could 
conceivably go wrong.  And to try and 
firstly have some sort of strategies in 
place to prevent those things going 
wrong.” 
Prioritising limited resources “I think this has got multiple answers 
this.  I would say, from our point of 
view, it’s going to be about prioritising 
limited resources.”  
 
 
 
 303 
Table 4.3.6.: Perceived effect of formal risk management 
This table describes how participants perceived formal risk management. Perceptions are varied. Perceptions of 
the effect of formal risk management range from: improving risk management; to benefitting project management 
and an unnecessary bureaucratic burden. Of particular note is the perception that formal risk management is 
desirable as a way to make explicit and thus demonstrate risk management activity to superiors. This suggests 
some participants perceive that their superiors have a positive attitude towards risk management and expect to be 
gain personal benefit from being seen to manage risk.   
 
Main code and sub-codes Example 
Main code Sub-codes 
Perceived effect 
of formal risk 
management  
Formal risk 
management is 
defined as with an 
explicit logic and 
evidence based, 
and following a 
repeatable 
method. 
Demonstrate risk 
management activity 
“Probably the senior reporting officers, so the people who’re actually responsible 
ultimately in name for delivering […] for him to know that we’ve seen the risks and 
can demonstrate that I think is really beneficial for him.” 
Help prioritise risks 
and work 
“Actually I’ve just thought of a third and that’s where, if you’re sitting on a project 
board for someone else’s project, and if you haven’t got much time, it helps you to 
focus on the things you really ought to be focus- you know what do I need to be 
worried about?” 
Facilitate participatory 
risk management 
“Yes. I find having a formal risk register has been very useful. It’s like I say, it 
encourages everybody within the team, regardless of where you are – in terms of 
subject area or in terms of the organisational structure, to comment and to flag things 
which wouldn’t I don’t think happen otherwise.” 
Unnecessary 
bureaucracy  
“And I don’t actually think it [systematic approach] has made a fundamental difference 
to the way I approach looking at risks about my policy things anyway.” 
Prompt attention on 
risk and risk 
management 
“I think it’s partly the discipline of actually thinking through the issues.  So you do 
actually have to make time to sit and think about it.  So that does prompt you to 
consider things in a slightly more structured way, rather than just carrying on and 
hoping for the best.  Which is the other alternative, to a large extent.  You just hope 
everything is going to be all right.  And make it up as you go along if it doesn’t.” 
Facilitate proactive risk 
management 
“Well…generally, spotting problems before they happen is the main one.  And, I think 
making sure that you’re putting in processes to minimise and mitigate risks from the 
start, rather than having to do it later.  So, you’re generally going to save yourself 
money and time by planning it properly in the first place.” 
Help keep track of 
risks 
“It's important because you can register your risks on there.  You can keep them up to 
date and you can actually keep track on exactly where you are and what is going to be 
the biggest problem facing you as you go through the decisions on this policy area.” 
Keeping aware of 
project plan 
“It keeps you focussed; it keeps you aware of the trajectory you’re on, and what you 
need to be doing now to prepare for the upcoming processes. And it keeps you thinking 
about all the processes within the cycle at any given time so you’re not just 
concentrating, as might happen otherwise, purely on delivery without thinking ahead to 
how you’re actually going to be monitoring progress etc.” 
Formally assign risk 
owners 
“You also formally assign owners to them, so there’s some sense of who is in control 
of this.” 
Helps identify risks “But I think the system now with the range of impact assessments that go into this 
policy cycle, I think that there’s a very, very good chance of the right risks being 
identified and assessed correctly. If ministers don’t want to go for a different policy, by 
all means do so, but at least they’re aware of the risks.” 
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Appendix J: Complete coding hierarchy 
 
Table J1: Complete coding hierarchy  
Chapters Case 
study 
Social process Cultural factor (s) Supporting open codes Table 
4.1., 5.1. Power 
Utility 
(Case 
study one) 
Deference to 
expertisea 
Shared experience; 
Respect for 
experience (a high 
value attributed to 
direct experience) 
use of experience throughout the 
hierarchy 
 
4.1.1. 
Colleagues’ experience; Individual 
experience 
4.1.2. 
High time pressure; Beyond 
experience; Conflict between rules 
and expertise; Risk is predictable and 
well known; Complex risk decision; 
Risk is not covered by codified rules; 
Multiple risk categories 
4.1.3. 
Risk management complexity 
necessitates judgement 
4.1.5. 
Respect for experience; Importance of 
shared experience for communication 
4.1.6. 
Lack of coordination and 
communication 
4.1.7. 
4.3., 4.4., 
5.2. 
Governme
nt 
Departme
nt (Case 
study two 
– 
knowledg
e transfer) 
Informal, lateral 
communication 
Culture of 
collaboration 
Individual experience; External 
stakeholders (lateral knowledge transfer); 
Informal communication between policy 
teams (lateral knowledge transfer); 
Specialist advisors (lateral knowledge 
transfer); Delivery body; Codified lessons 
learned 
4.2.1 
Culture of collaboration; Risk 
registers and team communication 
4.2.2. 
Lack of knowledge retention; Lack of 
financial resources; Lack of time; 
Lack of formal knowledge sharing 
4.2.3. 
5.3. Governme
nt 
Departme
nt (Case 
study two 
– shared 
knowledg
e) 
Predicting the 
wider impact of 
individual risk 
management 
actions 
(representationd ) 
Common 
understanding of the 
purpose and 
function of risk 
management 
Formal risk management practice; 
Informal risk management practice; 
Not driven by risk at all; Going 
through the motions 
4.3.1. 
Informal consultation and 
collaboration; Leadership 
expectations; Codified processes; 
Experience; Stakeholders; Not formal 
guidance; Training; Normative; 
Individual pragmatic legitimacy 
4.3.3. 
Beneficiary of risk management; 
Purpose of risk management 
4.3.5. 
Perceived effect of formal risk 
management  
4.3.6. 
Avoiding EU infractions; Avoiding 
negative stakeholder response; Risk 
to the Department’s reputation; 
Managing limited resources; Risk to 
UK Gov or minister reputation; 
Balancing stakeholder interests 
4.3.7. 
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Appendix K: Biographical information on interviewees in case 
study one 
 
Interviewee (not 
actual name) 
Policy Area Role Grade 
1 Nitrates Policy Adviser Grade 7/Team 
Manager 
2 Nitrates Business manager Executive Officer 
3 Waste -producer 
responsibility 
Policy Adviser Grade 7/Team 
Manager 
4 Waste -producer 
responsibility 
Policy Adviser Higher Executive 
Officer 
5 Waste -producer 
responsibility 
Policy Adviser Higher Executive 
Officer 
6 Waste -producer 
responsibility 
Policy Adviser Higher Executive 
Officer 
7 Rural Policy Adviser Grade 7/Team 
Manager 
8 Rural Policy Adviser Senior Executive 
Officer 
9 Food - country of 
origin 
Policy Adviser Grade 7/Team 
Manager 
10 Food - country of 
origin 
Policy Adviser Senior Executive 
Officer 
11 Food - country of 
origin 
Policy Adviser Higher Executive 
Officer 
12 Food - country of 
origin 
Policy Adviser Higher Executive 
Officer 
13 Carbon budgets Policy Adviser Grade 7/Team 
Manager 
14 Carbon budgets Policy Adviser Higher Executive 
Officer 
15 Carbon budgets Policy Adviser Higher Executive 
Officer 
16 Landscape and 
outdoor recreation 
Policy Adviser Grade 7/Team 
Manager 
17 Landscape and 
outdoor recreation 
Policy Adviser Higher Executive 
Officer 
18 Landscape and 
outdoor recreation 
Policy Adviser Higher Executive 
Officer 
19 International 
protected areas 
Policy Adviser Grade 7/Team 
Manager 
20 International 
protected areas 
Policy Adviser Higher Executive 
Officer 
21 Animal welfare Policy Adviser Grade 7/Team 
Manager 
22 Animal welfare Policy Adviser Senior Executive 
Officer 
 
